IPPNW joins more than 30 NGOs calling for CTBT entry into force
The following NGO statement was delivered to the Article XIV Conference on Facilitating
the Entry Into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on September 25. The
statement was read by Jessica Mathews, President of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, on behalf of more than three dozen individual and organizational
supporters of the CTBT.
Accelerating the Entry Into Force of
the CTBT: Now is the Time
Statement by Representatives of Non-Governmental
Organizations to the Article XIV Conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force
of the CTBT September 25, 2009
of the nuclear age makes clear that opportunities to reduce the grave dangers
posed by nuclear weapons are often fleeting.
When the right political conditions
are in place, government leaders must seize the chance to make progress.
is such a time.
Entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) is within sight. Since the idea of a ban on nuclear testing was
first proposed in the 1950s, it has stood among the highest priorities on the
international nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. As U.S.
Obama noted in April of this year, the CTBT is a concrete step toward a
world without nuclear weapons.
The CTBT is more important now than
The CTBT has near-universal support: 181 nations have signed and
150 have ratified the Treaty. Last fall, the UN General Assembly voted
in favor of a resolution on the CTBTand we expect the one no
vote by the United States will become a yes vote this year.
applaud those states that have lined up to express their support of the Treaty
at this Conference. We recognize those states that made their full financial contribution
to the build-up and operation of the Treatys international monitoring and
But rhetoric alone is not enough to make the entry
into force of the CTBT a reality. Article XIV of the Treaty provides that in order
to enter into force, ratification is needed from a number of key players.
necessary states have failed to ratify the CTBT and are therefore delaying its
entry into force.
To help put the CTBT over the finish line, we also strongly
urge that like-minded pro-CTBT states work together to develop and execute a common
diplomatic strategy to persuade the remaining states to sign and/or ratify the
treaty before the next Article XIV Conference two years from now. Failure to pursue
such an effort will cast doubt on the sincerity of the many strong statements
of support for CTBT entry into force expressed at this conference.
strongly encourage those few states that have not delivered their assessed contribution
or that do not yet allow the transmittal of data from monitoring stations on their
territory to do so without further delay. Such actions are contrary to the goals
of the Treaty.
The Value of the CTBT
By banning all nuclear
weapon test explosions, including so-called hydronuclear explosions, the CTBT
limits the ability of established nuclear-weapon states to field more sophisticated
warheads. Without the option of nuclear explosive testing, it is far more difficult
for newer members of the club to perfect smaller, more easily deliverable warheads.
these and other reasons, CTBT ratification has long been considered essential
to the fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT and the goal of effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament. The CTBT also serves to reinforce the nonproliferation system
by serving as a confidence-building measure about a states nuclear intentions
and, in this regard, it can help head-off and de-escalate regional tensions.
the CTBT in force, global and national capabilities to detect and deter possible
clandestine nuclear testing by other states will be significantly greater. Entry-into-force
is essential to making short- notice, on-site inspections possible and maintaining
long-term political and financial support from other nations for the operation
of the International Monitoring System and International Data Center.
Entry Into Force
Ratification by the United States and China is particularly
Given their existing nuclear test moratoria and 1996 signature
of the CTBT, Washington and Beijing already bear most CTBT-related responsibilities,
yet their failure to ratify has denied themand othersthe full security
benefits of CTBT entry into force.
The United States is poised to be a
leader on the CTBT once again. We applaud President Barack Obamas April
5 statement in Prague in which he said: "To achieve a global ban on nuclear
testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S.
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it
is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned."
President Obama must translate those words into action by mounting a substantial
effort to win the support of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate for the treaty. With
the support of a wide array of NGOs in the United States and around the globe
the President must convince the Senate that the Treaty enhances U.S. security,
is effectively verifiable, and would not compromise future efforts to maintain
the reliability, safety, or security of the United States existing stockpile
of nuclear warheads.
Technical advances in each of these areas over the
past decade should make the case for the CTBT even stronger than it was in 1999
when the Senate failed to provide its advice and consent for ratification.
years, Chinese government representatives have reported that the CTBT is before
the National Peoples Congress for consideration but has apparently taken
no action to win legislative approval needed for ratification.
renewed pursuit of CTBT ratification opens up opportunities for China and other
Annex II statessuch as Indonesia to lead the way toward entry into
force by ratifying before the United States does. Action by Beijing would increase
its credibility as a nonproliferation leader and improve the chances that other
states in Asia, as well as the United States, would follow suit.
the June 8 statement by Indonesias Foreign Minister Hassan
We share [President Obamas] vision of a world in which nuclear weapons
have been eradicated. We trust that he will succeed in getting the CTBT ratifiedand
we promise that when that happens, Indonesia will immediately follow suit.
Indeed, ratification by Indonesia would enhance its reputation as a world leader
and agent for international security.
India and Pakistan could advance
the cause of nuclear disarmament and substantially ease regional tensions by converting
their unilateral test moratoria into a legally-binding commitment to end nuclear
testing through the CTBT.
Eleven years ago this week, then-Indian Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee told the 53rd UN General Assembly that India would
not be among the last states standing in the way of the treaty's entry into force.
Unfortunately, over the past decade, neither India nor Pakistan have transformed
their de facto nuclear test moratorium into a legally- binding commitment not
to conduct nuclear test explosions. It is past time for Indias current leaders
to take up Prime Minister Vajpayee's promise to the General Assembly and move
toward joining the near- consensus on the CTBT.
Last month, Indias
National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan said in an interview: As of now,
we are steadfast in our commitment to the moratorium. At least there is no debate
in the internal circles about this.
Asked if India would have no
problem signing the treaty if the others whose ratification is required for the
CTBT to enter into force especially the U.S. and China did so, Mr.
Narayanan responded: I think we need to now have a full-fledged discussion
on the CTBT.
Mr. Narayanans statement is encouraging. But we
cannot afford to simply hope and wait. Leading states have a responsibility to
work much harder to encourage India and Pakistan to meet the same nonproliferation
and disarmament standards expected of other states, including ratification of
With no shortage of conflict and hostility in the Middle East,
ratification by Israel, Egypt and Iran would reduce nuclear-weapons- related security
concerns in the region. It would also help create the conditions necessary for
the realization of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
in the Middle East, as called for in the Middle East Resolution adopted by the
1995 NPT Review Conference.
Likewise, if Israel were to ratify the CTBT,
it would bring that nation closer to the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream and
help encourage other states in the region to do so. Iranian ratification would
help reduce concerns that its nuclear program could be used to develop and deploy
deliverable nuclear warheads. Continued failure by Iran to ratify the CTBT raises
further questions about the nature of its sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.
decision of the government of the Democratic Peoples Republic of North Korea (DPRK)
to suspend its participation in the Six-Party Denuclearization process is deeply
disappointing. We sincerely urge the DPRK to refrain from further nuclear testing
and we urge the effective and rapid implementation of the commitments made pursuant
to the Six-Party agreements by all involved as a step toward mutual security,
as well as CTBT entry into force.
Reinforcing the CTBT
reinforce their commitment to the purpose and objectives of the CTBT, we also
call upon all nuclear-armed nations to adopt clear policies not to develop or
produce new design warheads nor to modify existing warhead types for the purpose
of creating new military capabilities.
President Obama has already stated
on the White House Web site in January that he will stop the development
of new nuclear weapons.
Indeed, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has beenand
can continue to be maintained with high confidence through non-nuclear tests
and evaluations, and as necessary, the remanufacture of key components to previous
design specifications. Independent technical experts have determined that the
United States can maintain its existing arsenal through a conservative program
of warhead refurbishment rather than through new design replacement
warheads. We strongly urge the Obama administration to embed such a no new
policy in its forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review.
increase confidence in their commitment to the CTBT, we also urge nuclear-armed
states to seriously consider joining France in closing their test sites to all
nuclear weapons-related research activities and experiments, particularly those
involving fissile material. In the meantime, we encourage states with active nuclear
test sites to adopt transparency and confidence building measures that help clarify
that there are no prohibited nuclear test explosion activities of any kind on
CTBT entry into force is within reach. The next two years
may represent the best opportunity to secure the future of this long- awaited
and much-needed treaty. We urge you to act now and to act with boldness.
This statement was coordinated by the Arms Control Association, delivered
by Jessica Mathews, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
and has been endorsed by the following individuals and organizations:
Arguello, Chair, Nonproliferation for Global Security Foundation (Argentina)
Ban, Co-director, Citizens Nuclear Information Center (Japan)
Blechman, Distinguished Fellow, Henry L. Stimson Center (U.S.A.)
Executive Director, Nuclear Watch New Mexico (U.S.A.)
David Culp, Legislative
Director, Friends Committee on National Legislation (U.S.A.)
Coordinator, Nuclear Watch South (Atlanta, GA, U.S.A.)
Nicola Cufaro Petroni,
Secretary General, Union of Scientists for Disarmament (Italy)
Dr. Ian Davis,
Director, NATO Watch (United Kingdom)
Marie Dennis, Director, Maryknoll Office
for Global Concerns (U.S.A.)
Jayantha Dhanapala, former UN Under-Secretary-General
for Disarmament Affairs
Trevor Findlay, William and Jeanie Barton Chair in
International Affairs, Director, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance , and Professor,
Carleton University, (Canada)
Bill Goodfellow, Executive Director, Center for
Susan Gordon, Executive Direction, Alliance for
Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., Acting Director,
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1993 (U.S.A.)
President, Global Security Institute (U.S.A.)
Ambassador Robert Grey, former
U.S. Rep. to the Conference on Disarmament (U.S.A.)
Xanthe Hall, Programme
Coordinator, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (Germany)
Hallam, Coordinator, Nuclear Flashpoints (Australia)
David Hafemeister, Research
Affiliate, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
Morton Halperin, Director of Policy Planning, Department of State
Mark Harrison, Director, Peace with Justice Program, United
Methodist General Board of Church and Society (U.S.A.)
Paul Ingram, Executive
Director, British-American Security Information Council (U.K.-U.S.A.)
Isaacs, Executive Director, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation (U.S.A.)
Rebecca Johnson, Founding Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy
Marylia Kelley, Executive Director, Tri-Valley CAREs (U.S.A.)
G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association (U.S.A.)
Chief Executive Officer, Citizens for Global Solutions(U.S.A.)
President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (U.S.A.)
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, Director,
Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative, New America Foundation (U.S.A.)
Mathews, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (U.S.A.)*
Paine, Nuclear Program Director, Natural Resources Defense Council (U.S.A.)
Persbo, Acting Executive Director, Verification, Research, Training and Information
Larry Pullen, Advocacy Director, Faithful Security: the National
Religious Partnership on the Nuclear Weapons Danger (U.S.A.)
Executive Director, Peace Action West (U.S.A.)
Ambassador Henrik Salander,
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
Susi Snyder, Secretary General, Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom
Vappu Taipale, M.D., Co-President,
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Paul F. Walker,
Director, Security and Sustainability, Global Green USA (U.S.A.)
MD, Executive Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility (U.S.A.)
Young, Washington Representative, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned
*Institution listed for identification purposes only.