Instead of Nuclear Weapons

New Views on Human, Global and National Security

Report from an International IPPNW and Peace Researchers Seminar
Moscow 25 March 2002
Instead of Nuclear Weapons – New Views on Human, Global and National Security
An international IPPNW and Peace Researchers seminar taking place at the Russian Federation State Duma, Moscow, 25th March 2002

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Introduction

INSTEAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr Hans Levander
Physician, Specialist Internal Medicine
University Hospital
SE 751 85 Uppsala
Sweden
Email: hans.levander@slmk.org

Instead of Nuclear Weapons project

The project Instead of Nuclear Weapons was initiated in year 2000 by the Swedish Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, SLMK. In January 2001 an invitation was sent out: "Invitation to more than 25 Peace Research Institutes and about 10 NGO’s – Non Governmental Organisations world-wide, as well as the Ministries for Foreign Affairs in seven nuclear weapons states, with the aim to promote independent studies and reports on the theme: Instead of Nuclear Weapons." (Appendix). The selection of institutes and NGO’s was made in consultation with the international federation IPPNW – International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and all invited institutes and NGO’s returning applications with high quality and ethical working methods were accepted.

The response was applications and reports from eight peace research institutes and six NGO’s. Two main dimensions of the nuclear weapons problem were pointed out to be of special interest for this research project:

1. Which are the main human and psychological obstacles for a nuclear weapons disarmament process?
2. How can a comprehensive and sustainable security be built, a security that will substitute the nuclear weapons deterrence policy?

Seminar at the Russian Federation State Duma

At an international IPPNW and Peace Researchers seminar, taking place at the Russian Federation State Duma on the 25th of March 2002, participating researchers and NGO’s presented their reports. Introductions to the seminar were given by Mr Nikolai F. Gerasimenko, MP, Chairman of the RF State Duma Committee for Health, and by Mr Sergei I. Kolesnikov, MP, Deputy Chairman of the RF State Duma Committee for Health, Co-president of the Russian national affiliate of IPPNW, Academician of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences.

The following persons and organisations could for different reasons not join this seminar in order to give their presentations: Mr R. Billé France, Mr S. Pullinger UK and the representative from the International Federation of Medical Students’ Association – IFMSA.

Seminar report

This seminar report builds on 14 reports and a final ”conclusions and recommendations”. The report will be available in April 2002 at the Non-Proliferation-Treaty Precom meeting, United Nations New York, and at the forthcoming 15th IPPNW world congress taking place in Washington DC early May 2002. The report will also be used at IPPNW consultations with nuclear weapons decisionmakers within the programme "IPPNW Annual Dialogues and Seminars with Decisionmakers at the Capitals of the Nuclear Weapons States”.

This official report without copywrite will also be available at www.slmk.org. We hope that the report will inspire the debate on how to structure new security in the post nuclear weapons period. We are well aware that several of the participants do not have English as their native language. Due to limited time and resources we have not made detailed checking of the language, thus leaving the report with a flavour of multi-cultural collaboration.
Thanks
SLMK wants to express sincere thanks to all participants and to our Russian IPPNW colleagues and staff, contributing to the realization of this project and seminar “Instead of Nuclear Weapons”. Planning, international communication and cooperation has a value in itself for the aim of confidence building across national and cultural borders towards common security.

Some personal reflexions
Let us make it our highest priority to safeguard the thin layer of air, soil and water that constitutes the Biosphere around planet Earth. I understand that the Biosphere within which we coexist is just about 14 000 meters thick, the distance of one hours biking or a few hours walking! Research by Physicists (Nuclear Winter; Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions, 1983 Science) as well as reports from WHO (Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services, 1984 and 1987) conclude that the stockpiles of nuclear weapons, if used, will destroy the preconditions for life on Earth for unpredictable time.

Do not the nuclear weapons and the US National Missile Defence system belong to the same category of thinking, emotion and strategy as: the Great Wall in China, the overloaded Swedish battleship Wasa 1628, the gigantic Russian Tsar Canon today placed outside the Kremlin, the former invincible British Navy, and the French Maginot-line in the 1930’s?

A scheme comparing some qualities of “Old Security” and “New Security” is added in order to promote the discussions how to direct a paradigm shift in security thinking and policy.

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**SOME QUALITIES OF SECURITY – A PARADIGM SHIFT TAKING PLACE**

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Instead of Nuclear Weapons;
New Views on Human, Global and National Security

An international IPPNW and Peace Researchers seminar
Moscow 25 March 2002

Conclusions and Recommendations

Atomic bombs were initially produced in response to the threat from Nazi Germany. Their number and power grew during the Cold War until the threat of destruction of all mankind became the ultimate deterrence. Nazism is gone, the Cold War is over, but the nuclear weapon states still cling to their nuclear weapons. Our conclusion is that this addiction must be overcome. Alternative security programmes introduced “Instead of Nuclear Weapons” can facilitate such a process.

We, as concerned physicians and peace researchers of the world, are scared and deeply concerned by the aggressive posture that some of the nuclear weapons states have recently adopted. It is our considered opinion that given the current international environment, especially in the wake of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, nuclear weapons rhetoric could easily be converted into a nuclear strike. Recently, nuclear weapons states have threatened to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. This is a new development, illegal in terms of international law and in contravention of the Non-Proliferation Regime.

Hence, we implore the nuclear weapons states to refrain from the dangerous posture of threatening with nuclear weapons and to urgently decommission and dismantle their nuclear weapons in agreement with their pledge in Article VI of the NPT, and instead pursue human-centered approaches to security.

In this regard we would like to recommend the following:

- The establishment of new defense doctrines that do not rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence or for actual warfighting.
- New cooperative and comprehensive security measures, that focus primarily on the security of human beings rather than on the security of states.
- The creation of arrangements and policies that promote trust and confidence rather than fear, transparency rather than secrecy, and security “together with” rather than security “against”.
- The consideration of unilateral disarmament. Any nuclear weapons state, given the political impetus, can disarm its nuclear arsenal unilaterally. The argument demanding a necessary “balanced nuclear weapons disarmament” must be challenged.
In order to achieve this, it is essential that the following obstacles be overcome:

- Lack of awareness of the possible consequence of a nuclear war: The extinction of mankind.
- Insufficient determination on the part of governments of Nuclear Weapons States to seriously explore the elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Lack of trust between nuclear weapons states.
- The public, including youth, is not well informed of the dangers of nuclear weapons or of alternative security options.

These obstacles can be overcome by means of the following:

- Establishment of a target date for the final elimination of nuclear weapons. Agreements on a timetable for the step by step reduction of nuclear weapons aiming for the complete abolition of all nuclear weapons within a reasonable time such as one or two decades.
- Raising public opinion through continued education on the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons and on disarmament issues.
- Making nuclear disarmament an issue for political parties.
- Establishment of new nuclear weapons-free zones.
- Dialogue and collaborative programs between states and communities, including the nuclear weapons states, in areas such as peace education, nonviolent conflict solving, language training, cultural diversity and environmental sustainability. Such programs should include youth and schools, universities, parliamentarians and military officials.

**To develop security alternatives to nuclear weapons is one of mankind’s most urgent needs. Very few countries in the world rely on nuclear weapons for their security. The nuclear weapons states must try harder!**

Moscow 25 March 2002

* Gunnar Westberg MD,*
President of SLMK,
Swedish Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

* Hans Levander MD,*
President of the Seminar
The paper examines the nature of the State in its relation to the Economy, or, in other words, the distribution of political and economic power in the USA. The author holds the view that the State and the Economy are two aspects of an indissoluble unity, and that the tendency in the USA is toward ever greater concentration of both economic and political power. This process ought to be counterbalanced by the fact that democracy, in principle, is opposed to such concentration. The key point in time when democratic expression can have major influence is during the election of the President and a significant proportion of the legislature, which takes place every four years.

The US electorate is potentially volatile since only about half the registered voters go to the polls during presidential years and about a third in non-presidential years. In addition it is currently the case that candidates who have access to substantial funds inevitably sway voters in their direction, and this clearly demonstrates voting fragility. In 1992 a third party led by Perot gained 19% of the vote. Yet, in 2000 Nader with limited funds gained 5% of the vote where he had some visibility in the Pacific North West indicating that the money buys visibility and that this is what can be used to turn the voter.

The suggestion is that a third party adopting a single issue, the elimination of nuclear weapons, could make significant inroads into public opinion. Additionally, the electoral techniques would need to be innovative. The television age first began to influence elections from the 1950s, but now there is scope for new tactics and techniques, by appealing, for instance, to young first time voters using post-modern methods and the Internet in new and creative ways. Anything less than using an electoral run at the presidency will make little impact since the history of opposition to nuclear weapons in the USA has not been encouraging to abolitionists and the current political opposition is not strong since it operates mainly as bi-partisan opposition to non-proliferation.

While nothing is said about Russia in my paper, I would suggest that a first move to the elimination of nuclear weapons would be achieved by an announcement that Russia was applying to join the European Union. Not only would Russia be welcomed into the Union progressively over the next generation but the changes in perception of what constitutes national security would render holding nuclear weapons in readiness as needless and antiquated.

P.S.

The views expressed in this paper are strictly those of the author.
Instead of Nuclear Weapons – Democracy and the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

“Our job is to increase public awareness, encourage dialogue, catalyse action, and promote new thinking [about weapons of mass destruction] in this country and abroad. It is this last point – the need to think anew – that I want to emphasize today.”

Sam Nunn, former US Senator, Thurs, March 29, 2001, speech at the National Press Club on the foundation of the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Introduction
The need to think anew is no easy task, especially when the objective is to remove the threat of weapons of mass destruction once and for all from this planet. On the other hand, Goethe has told us: “Everything has been thought of before; the problem is to think of it again.”

The answer to the elimination of nuclear weapons may, therefore, be right under our noses if only we could see it. This paper does not assume at the outset that the solution will be found, only that it can be found. Informed by a social science approach this analysis focuses on the relationship between the state and the economy primarily in the USA, recognising, however, that a more complete approach across the several cultures in which nuclear weapons exist is required.

This paper refers to a key area of social science, the relationship between the state and the economy and, confident of the real existence of the industrial-military complex and its effect on policy (indicative empirical evidence included in Appendix I) and the disorganised nature of the opposition (discussed in Appendix II), suggests a political non-violent solution.

The State and the Economy
In the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War when US capitalism appeared to be racing ahead of the rest of the world in terms of providing the mass of the people with an unheard of standard of living, Marcuse2 struck a severe note of doubt. He set out to show that hidden by this prosperity, modern technological society is heading for a disaster in a number of ways. Human beings were becoming the very commodities they purchase; environmental and military catastrophe was around the corner but false consciousness prevented anyone from seeing this and other threats to their existence.

“Does not the threat of an economic catastrophe which could wipe out the whole of the human race also serve to protect the very forces which perpetuate this danger? The efforts to prevent such a catastrophe overshadow the search for its potential causes in contem-
the opening sentence of The Communist Manifesto (‘there is a spectre haunting Europe, the spectre of Communism’).

“The Enemy is the common denominator of all doing and undoing. And the Enemy is not identical with actual communism or actual capitalism – he is in both cases the real spectre of liberation.”

In this way Marcuse replaces the desired feature communism with liberation and he also observed that in this same process the insane becomes the rational:

“… the insanity of the whole absolves the particular insanities and turns the crimes against humanity into a rational enterprise. When the people, aptly stimulated by the public and private authorities, prepare for lives of total mobilization, they are sensible not only because of the present Enemy, but also because of the investment and employment possibilities in industry and entertainment. Even the most insane calculations are rational: the annihilation of five million people is preferable to that of ten million … It is hopeless to argue that a civilization which justifies its defense by such calculus proclaims its own ends.”

To Marcuse, then, we owe a perspective which gives us a conception of rationality, technology, commodities, the state, government and bipartisanship and the human condition and what the state fears most, which is not an external enemy but the liberation of its own people. All this may be a little hard to accept without further adornment. The conception of the state will, therefore, have to be further explored through the eyes of other commentators.

To neo-liberals and western political theorists, the state is relatively unproblematic. The general conception is one of a pluralist democracy. Everyone can have his or her say, one way or another, hence pluralism. Of course, some elements are disadvantaged but, then, laws are passed to adjust this and, in a gradualistic way, the state ensures that society moves to one of greater equality and higher living standards. Marcuse rejected this approach as have other commentators who see the State approximating to being the executive committee of the ruling class(es), its exact nature depending on the historical circumstances.

Not long after Marcuse’s text was published, Ralph Miliband made a clear distinction between the state and the government in his analysis of the State in its relation to the prevailing perception of modern capitalism. In common language these two words are confused. The State, however, is a much broader and, more insidious, phenomenon than government. In Marxism, the State is the superstructure intrinsically related to the base of private ownership of the means of production. However crude this would seem, there is a glimmer of obviousness about such an analysis. The state will tend to function in the interests of the dominant economic forces. Thus, we are not surprised if George W Bush, as head of the US government, which is an integral part of the State, appears to be acting in the interests of Big Business. We expect it; the Republican electorate and the greater part of the Democratic electorate endorse it.

Useful for its theoretical approach, its methodology and the critiques it occasioned Miliband’s analysis of the modern capitalist State and the early critique by Nicos Poulantzas in particular help to identify some useful positions for our current analysis.

Marx was concerned more with the economic base than with the State. Activists such as Lenin and Gramsci were more concerned with the State than the economy. Leftist analysis of the State has been at times concerned with practical problems of the revolutionary; other commentators have been more concerned with ‘economism’ (the economic determinism thought to be in the works of Marx). Miliband’s aim was to demolish bourgeois conceptions of the state or, at least, challenge the long held adherence to notions of a pluralist democracy as the model to be striven for. He examined empirical data regarding the holders of key office holders within state apparatuses, ranging widely across most of the advanced industrial countries, and, in doing so, challenged the widely held conceptions of the pluralist model and was able to suggest strongly the merits of an analysis that held firmly to a base-superstructure model.

What would be rewarding would be to emulate this methodology concentrating on one policy matter: the elimination of nuclear weapons and those policy issues directly relating to disarmament. The nation states to be examined would be determined by this single anti-nuclear issue: USA, Russia, UK, France, China, Pakistan, India and Israel.

The analysis would have to take account of the features of similarity across the policy-making spectrums in each of these countries (and their satellites) and the features of dissimilarity. The economies differ, the class relations are not the same, the histories and cultures show marked differences, the nature and concentration of power and capital vary, the degrees and kinds of effective democracies differ, the motivations of the power elites and of the ordinary people diverge in a variety of ways and the degree to which external enemies are real or illusory are also at variance.

For this particular study we have only been able to make a prima facie examination of the United States of America, the most powerful of the nuclear states. We have concluded that the concentration of capital and political power lies at the root of one of the problems in shifting the US government toward the elimination of nuclear weapons and that change can only come from democratic action.

Concentration of Capital

The continued and increasing concentration of capital makes possible the concentration of political power. While in the Summer of 2001 GE and Honeywell failed to combine to compete with the increasingly successful European aerospace and communications industry, over the previous two years many mergers, amalgamations, take-overs and realignments served to strengthen US arms industry in the face of competition and to enable the industry to position itself for changes in US government policy. Major com-
companies like Lockheed Martin and Boeing maintain Washington offices headed by high-powered, well-paid industry executives solely for the purpose of influencing government decisions. Connected with the concentration of capital is the relatively small number of positions that carry enormous power.

Concentration of political power in the State apparatuses

There is evidence that the occupants of the command posts in the State apparatuses are ideologically fairly homogeneous and self-reinforcing. The armed forces, the government (whatever political party is in power), think tanks, universities and big business are closely connected. The media sources are generally accepting of the way these apparatuses work. In other words, the State in the USA has succeeded in establishing an ideological and political hegemony, which imposes the power, inter alia, of the interests of the profit driven industries including those that insist on the maintenance of nuclear weapons.

Some reasons for this ideological hegemony are as follows:
- the prevailing tendency to bi-partisanship
- the absence of any significant (working) class opposition
- right wing think tanks which soak up much governmental and philanthropic sources of funding
- the contradictions in US representative democracy and the US constitution which mitigates against a fuller democratic outcome.

Opposition groups

The continued existence of nuclear weaponry and further research into maintaining such weapons is not in the long term interests of the US consumer. This position is neatly summed up by William Weida in the quotation below.

“The allocation of resources to nuclear weapons has often had no discernible relationship to the levels of threat these weapons were supposed to counter and the costs of deterrence have been considerably and unnecessarily increased. It is important for the economic strength of the United States that these types of excessive spending be avoided in the future.”

Opposition from within the establishment to nuclear weapons is not well-formulated, but momentum would occur if those parts of US industry were able to find a focal point around which it could coalesce.

Currently, the groups opposing nuclear weapons lack an effective power base; there is no effective Green Party; the Democratic Party is, in effect, an integral part of the State apparatuses. In terms of the class origins of the anti-nuclear activists, they are identical to those who occupy key positions within the State apparatuses.

Opposition groups require a markedly more effective power base to shift the existing policies toward the abolition of nuclear weaponry because working within the existing political parties is ineffective as is attempting to build opposition through a small number of ‘protest’ groups. There is scope, therefore, for a successful launch of a SINGLE-ISSUE POLITICAL PARTY in the USA whose Presidential candidate would propose the elimination of nuclear weapons.

A single-issue third political party in the USA

A single-issue political party requires a huge issue. The removal of nuclear weapons which have the capacity to destroy the planet ought to be a big enough single issue. It appears possible to organise all opposition to the industrial-military complex around this issue. Though it is in the interests of the armed services and huge parts of US industry to maintain a policy to retain nuclear weapons, it is not in the interest of the majority of the people. The prospects for opposition are, in principle, good, given the potential volatility of the US electorate. The volatility underlying the US democratic system could easily be released through non-violent and legitimate means.

The Potential Volatility of the US Electorate

IDEA\textsuperscript{16} ranks the USA as 114th in the world in terms of voter participation. Only 30\% of the electorate turns out to vote for parliamentary candidates and 50\% turned out in the last presidential election in 2000. This means, for instance, that George W Bush was elected by 24\% of registered voters. Already as a result of the Florida fiasco electoral reform movements have sprung up in the USA but as yet they lack direction and look for such leadership as might come from the Greens and/or Ralph Nader despite his poor showing at the last election.\textsuperscript{17}

Ross Perot gained 19\% of the vote when he stood. And Jesse Ventura is current proof that shocks to the system can occur. The single-issue party would have to appeal to a significant section of the non-voters plus a segment of each of the existing parties. It is fair to say that there is considerable scope for using post modernist means to gain the votes of first time voters, of those who would otherwise claim that “my vote is wasted” and of the many other protest groups who would feel a sense of unity and purpose.

One route would be to focus heavily on those first time 2004 voters who are now aged 14-18 (who for the most part are now in High Schools) and those year 2000 first time voters who did not vote last time (many of whom are in colleges and universities). Creative ways of reaching them through the Internet\textsuperscript{18} might be the main way forward rather than print or broadcast media.\textsuperscript{19} Most current protest web sites and web pages seem strangely old fashioned. Radical thought processes in the non-violent campaigns to remove nuclear weapons lag behind the very technology (the Internet) that could be employed to assist in the removal of nuclear weapons.
Conclusion
Each nuclear nation needs to be studied in its own terms, though much of the crucial work needs to be done in examining the true relationships that exist between state and economy. In the case of the USA, given the potential volatility of the electorate, there is scope for launching a single-issue political party whose presidential candidate would challenge the existing system within the democratic process by using post-modernist means, utilising the Internet to the maximum and concentrating especially on 2004 first time voters and the under thirty age group generally.

Footnotes
1 The author is most grateful for the help of Julie Carlson in the research for and preparation of this paper.
3 Ibid Introduction p. xli. This was written at the time of the threat from the Soviets but is still relevant, though the external threat is more vague: Talibans, Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, none of whom require 20,000 nuclear warheads and a fleet of nuclear submarines to be kept in order as we have seen since the attacks of September 11.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid, p.52
7 Ibid.
9 Nicos Poulantzas had already published Pouvoir Politique et Classes Sociales in Paris in 1968 and this volume appeared in English as Political Power and Social Class in 1972.
10 Cf. John Gray, False Dawn, New Press, N.Y, 1998 warns us not to confuse, say, modernisation with capitalism. E.g “Each version of capitalism articulates the particular culture in which it remains embedded.”
11 There are many sources which establish this process of amalgamation and growth of capital and control. See, for instance, Will Hutton & Anthony Giddens, Global Capitalism, Jonathan Cape, 2000
13 See, for instance Stephen J. Del Rosso Jr., The Insecure State (What Future the State), Daedalus, Vol 124. no.4, (Spring 1995). Also www.mediatransparency.org
14 William Weida The Economic Implications of Nuclear Weapons, June 30, 1998. William Weida is currently an economics professor, previously he was a pilot in the USAF and a civil servant at the Pentagon and an academic at the USAF Academy.
15 General George Lee Butler ex C-in-C of Strategic Air Command on the issue of how little understanding the President had in relation to the capacity for destruction while legislators really knew nothing (!): “It was all Alice-in-Wonderland stuff. The targeting data and other details of the war plan, which are written in an almost unfathomable million lines of computer soft ware code, were typically reduced by military briefers to between 60 and 100 slides that could be presented in an hour or so to the handful of senior US officials who were cleared to hear it. Generally no one wanted to ask questions because they did not want to embarrass themselves. It was about as unsatisfactory as could be imagined for that subject matter. The truth is the President only has a superficial understanding of what could happen in a nuclear war. Congress knew even less because no lawmaker has ever had access to the war plan.” Quoted by Jonathan Granoff in his excellent and terrifying article Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals and the Law, Law review, Brigham Young University, Volume 2000, number 4.
16 IDEA: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The dangers inherent in a democracy where the voters are apathetic were noted as early as 1861 before there were many democracies. “Representative institutions are of little value, and may be a mere instrument of tyranny and intrigue, when the generality of electors are not sufficiently interested in their own government to vote. Popular government thus practised, instead of securing against misgovernment is but an additional wheel in its machinery.” John Stuart Mill, Representative Government, 1861, Chapter 1.
17 Cf. See Tim Robbins, What I Voted For, The Nation, August 6, 2001 in explaining his and Susan Sarandon’s reasons for supporting Nader rather than the Democrats: “The young people who have helped launch a quest for an alternative party … believe that the Democratic and Republican parties are united on the major issues of our time. This new movement is a rejection of politics as usual…” Tim Robbins, the actor and film-maker, was recently awarded the Upton Sinclair Award by the Liberty Hill Foundation for his films and grassroots activism.
18 According to Netsizer, there are (August, 2001) 171 million Net users in the USA which makes the US electorate particularly vulnerable as a huge collection of individuals if it were possible to find a way through.
19 Print and broadcast media, as with US business generally, are subject to control by a small number of mega companies. This was elucidated as long ago as 1988 by Edward S Herman and Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media,
Pantheon Books, New York. The position has worsened since. The Internet has great anti-propaganda potential but it has not yet been remotely developed in this way as yet. If linked to the one-person, one-vote democratic system in the USA, there could be enormous scope for change without even one MacDonald’s Hamburger Restaurant being at risk from the direct action of demonstrators.
FRANCE

THE URGENCY FOR SURPASSING THE NUCLEAR AGE

Mr Jacques Le Dauphin  
Researcher  
Mr Roger Billé  
Researcher  
Institut de Documentation et de Recherche sur la Paix (IDRP)  
139 Boulevard Victor Hugo  
93400 Saint Ouen  
France  
Email: jacques.le_dauphin@libertysurf.fr  
rbille@libertysurf.fr

Summary

1) A decade after the end of the Cold War one might have thought the “nuclear genie” had gone back into its lamp.

2) So, for the five nuclear powers known until now, in spite of various international treaties, abandoning the nuclear weapons does not seem to appear on their present-day schedules.

3) The persistent refusal on the part of these states to ignore those international agreements – in particular Article VI of the N.P.T. – is likely to lead to more countries possessing weapons of mass destruction, a proliferation.

4) The American NMD project, far from attenuating the dangers, is more likely to aggravate them by starting up a new post-Cold War arms race.

5) Since the end of the Cold War, more and more significant voices have been clamouring for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

6) Arising out of the movement against nuclear weapons is the idea, which is being more and more emphasized, that today the purely military aspect of security is to be surpassed as a legacy that belongs to another age. Already, 10 – 12 years ago, certain state leaders have proposed that the suppression of their own “aggressive weapons” can be a new approach of international security.

7) Going from inter-state insecurity that tends to justify military reinforcement, to collective security in the name of the principle of human security is no small matter. It seems that, faced with such a tremendous challenge, humanity cannot do without the United Nations “The only world institution that has the legitimacy and competence on account of its universal composition”.

8) Without question, this is a challenge that calls for the participation of all citizens in the field of international politics. NGO’s also have a vital part to play in informing civil society, to debate, to act, to influence national and international institutions, so that whatever may perpetuate an outdated analysis of security relying on nuclear weapons will be outlawed.
The Urgency for Surpassing the Nuclear Age

1. A decade after the end of the Cold War one might have thought that the “nuclear genie” had gone back into its lamp. We have to admit that such is not the case. The disappearance of antagonism between two powers, while removing the major threat, did not mean that nuclear weapons were spontaneously reproved. The strategy configuration has changed but the problematics remain.

2. So, for the five nuclear powers known until now, in spite of various international treaties the importance of which we shall by no means underestimate, abandoning this type of weapon does not seem to appear on their present-day schedule. The American “Presidential Directive Decision 60” dated November 1997, the British “Strategic Defence Review” of July 1998, “NATO’s Strategic Concept” in 1999, the “New French Defence Programme Act” for 2003–2008, the Russian “Security Concept” and “Military Doctrine in 2000”, the Chinese Military programmes over recent years, are striking indications that this is indeed a present-day issue.

3. The persistent refusal on the part of these States to go purposely forward on the road to nuclear disarmament, the more so to exclude it from international relations has led and is likely to lead to new arrivals of countries possessing these weapons of mass destruction. Thus, after Israel, India and Pakistan now possess the nuclear weapon. There is the likelihood that the NPT, and Article VI, to which the present nuclear states do not comply will have no effect in abolishing the proliferation of these weapons. The fact is, the sincerity of the nuclear powers is hardly credible as long as they continue to declare that in their hands the nuclear weapon is a warranty of security whereas in the hands of others it is a threat to world peace. A number of countries that had noted with great interest the arms reductions planned by the USA and Russia – both bound by the CTBT – are now concerned by the vast existing stockpiles being modernised and the development of simulation methods for testing them on a permanent basis. As Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, Vice-Secretary General of UNO remarked at the NPT Review Conference 2000: “If the present nuclear states persist indefinitely in carrying out no substantial progress towards nuclear disarmament, I fear that the world consensus relative to ceasing the proliferation of nuclear weapons will gradually crumble, with the likelihood that a growing number of countries will reconsider their nuclear choices.”

4. It seems that the warning has not been heard, and if the threat of proliferation is not taken seriously, its perception will not lead to a change of doctrine but to looking for ways and means of protection from it. This is particularly the case with the American NMD project, a project which far from attenuating the dangers is more likely to aggravate them by starting up a new post-Cold War arms race.

5. The least we can say is that the “nuclear genie” is still reluctant to go back into its lamp. In this respect, we sometimes hear the following remark: “the nuclear cannot be disinvented”. Obviously, but history is generous with inventions of all kinds, which without being “disinvented” are nevertheless capable of playing a worthless role for the future. If this is not so for nuclear weapons, then the causes are of another nature with deeper implications.

6. The nuclear weapon is still part of a multi-dimensional concept where international security is based on the balance of power and military capacities in inter-State relations. Looking at the purely military aspect of security, “nuclear deterrence” has for fifty years been the touchstone of the powers that happen to be the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. In spite of valorous speeches on non-proliferation, it would be an illusion to imagine that these powers are actually prepared to abandon their tool of power – the nuclear weapon – spontaneously. Nevertheless, however powerful they may be, they are not alone.

7. Since the end of the Cold War, more and more significant voices have been clamouring for the elimination of nuclear weapons. There are various ways of addressing this issue; multiple, ethical, economic, political, legal, even military. But they have a common denominator: in the first place, questioning the reasons why states consider they have to possess this type of weapon for their security. So true is it that today no security exists independently of the security of others. In his declaration before the UN, Monsignor Renato Martino, permanent observer to the Holy See said: “The idea that the strategy of nuclear deterrence is essential to the security of a nation is the most dangerous presumption passed on from the previous period to the present one. Continuing nuclear deterrence in the XXIst century will be an impediment to peace rather than an advantage. It is a fundamental obstacle to the advent of a new period of global security.”

8. Arising out of the movement against nuclear weapons is the idea being more and more emphasized that today the purely military aspect of security is to be surpassed as a legacy that belongs to another age. A surpassing founded on the famous Hegelian concept “Aufhebung” that at the same time underlies abolish and elevate, eliminate and
accomplish. Cooperative security is in fact still confined to the state view and a conservative vision of the international system, the Westphalian system that has lasted for centuries. UNESCO is to be thanked for opening the debate on a contemporary approach to the question of security. The concept of human security can now be defined briefly in four words: human finality, globality, interdependence, rationality that seem quite suited to the reality of today’s world. Obviously, in this context, there is no room for nuclear weapons.

9. Going from inter-state insecurity that tends to justify military reinforcement to collective security in the name of the principle of human security is no small matter. It is a process, as the Palme Commission stated in 1982 that “should in the long run transform the vision that has been stimulating and perpetuating the arms race between the major powers”. With common security, the dilemmas of defence and security could finally disappear. The road to denuclearisation leads the way to a vision of global security springing from a growing allergy to the military nuclear issue. It seems obvious to me that, faced with such a tremendous challenge humanity cannot do without the United Nations “The only world institution that has the legitimacy and competence on account of its universal composition” as stated by the present General Secretary Kofi Annan. Is it advisable for this reason for it to be allowed to respond to the demands being expressed today in different forms by the peoples of the whole world? Therefore, the organisation must be revitalised to take seriously into account the diversity and interdependence of the world. It must adopt a more democratic way of functioning so that peoples and citizens have the authority to speak out and be heard. It is undoubtedly the most appropriate institution for drawing up and implementing a convention to ban all nuclear weapons.

10. Without question, this is a challenge that calls for the participation of all citizens in the field of international politics. NGO’s have a vital part to play in informing civil society, to debate, to act, to influence national and international institutions, so that whatever may perpetuate an outdated analysis of security relying on nuclear weapons will be outlawed. In this way, a network of international communication for organizing activities in common is a precious asset. The international community is undoubtedly capable of surpassing the nuclear age, but it will not be an easy process or a quick one. To sum up, the rhythm of the process will depend largely on the contribution of each one of us. It is a battle which is evidently worth the trouble.
Security without Nuclear Weapons

Introduction

There is No Security in a Nuclear World:

- The only weapon that threatens the extinction of entire human civilization is nuclear weapon. No country has used this weapon since the atomic bombing of Japan in 1945. But the fear of a nuclear war has existed since then.
- The event of 11 September 2001 has further increased the fear of use of this deadly weapon—this time by non-state actors. The suspected connection of a few Pakistani nuclear scientists with Al Quaida terrorist group provides substantial basis to this fear.
- After all, nuclear weapons do not deter terrorists and criminals. Nuclear terrorism thus makes eliminating these weapons an urgent need. According to the CIA, a number of terrorist organisations are seeking chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear agents and there are instances when some of them have contemplated using such weapons.
- Nuclear weapons in the hands of less disciplined states and well-financed terrorist groups, often motivated by ideological rage and ethnic hatred, may not be highly sophisticated, but are more likely to be used.
- Existence of nuclear weapons is a “dynamic motivation for proliferation.” It is also a potential direct source of proliferation through seizure, theft and illegal sale of such weapons.
- Unfortunately, motivations of nations for keeping nuclear weapons have not changed. The US motivation is for superpower status, Russia for great power status, China for countering domination by Washington and Moscow, Britain and France as insurance against US withdrawal and prestige; India to prevent Chinese domination and Pakistan to prevent Indian domination.
- Some argue that nuclearization of India and Pakistan has made nuclear disarmament an increasingly remote possibility. But this event has actually highlighted the need for nuclear disarmament more forcefully. So does the US proposal for establishing a National Missile Defence system, which has revived the classical debate on defence vs. deterrence. The ABM Treaty seeks to make deterrence work. But the NMD concept seeks to bypass it and emphasizes defence. Development of such defences would discourage dismantling the nuclear arsenal.

Swimming Cannot be Learnt through Correspondence Course:

- While a lot of talks have taken place on achieving a nuclear free world, currently no serious negotiations for a nuclear free world are being attempted. The nuclear weapons states have refused so far to begin a preliminary investigation of the feasibility of nuclear weapons elimination.
- Advocacy of nuclear disarmament by some governments has been an exercise in public relations or propaganda. No government has yet come out with a disarmament proposal acceptable to all, including its adversary. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s proposal for a Nuclear Free World fell on deaf ears. It was proposed by a non-nuclear state! A serious process of disarmament has not been encouraged.
• One of the most noteworthy advocacies of nuclear disarmament is the Canberra Commission. But this report “only proposed more modest measures of reductions and reduced alert statuses.”

Problems and Bottlenecks:

Secrecy and Lack of Transparency:

• The new “Strategic Concept” of NATO announced in April 1999 says that its nuclear forces consist of “dual-capable aircraft and a small number of United Kingdom Trident warheads.” The B61 bombs constitute the nuclear parts of the aircraft, but their presence in various European bases are Øshrouded in secrecy.’ While the role of nuclear weapons in American military strategy is relatively marginal, the secrecy surrounding it raises suspicion.

• The recently declassified documents related to secret deployments of US nuclear weapons around the world has come as a surprise to many, especially deployments in sensitive places like Japan, Taiwan, Greenland and Iceland. The Pentagon has withheld information on other locations.

Conventional Wisdom: Logical, but Untrue:

• Deterrence is not necessarily a pre-requisite for peace. Deterrence doctrines have encouraged arms race, since inherent in this doctrine is the fear that deterrence may fail. This leads to the development of second strike capability and proves that deterrence is not a full proof doctrine, but certainly an expensive one. This doctrine has proved to be counter-productive by stimulating nuclear arms race. The cost of such an arms race is Himalayan. If the Manhattan Project cost $20,000,000,000, the cost the nuclear arms race during the Cold War is beyond comprehension.

• The concept of nuclear deterrence is based on false logic. First, it would not work in the case of a nuclear war generated by miscalculation, accident, blackmail, terrorism etc. Secondly, nuclear capability has not prevented non-nuclear states from launching attacks or fighting wars against nuclear powers. Nuclear weapon capability of some nations have not deterred non-weapon states from attacking them: China against the American forces during the Korean War, Vietnam fought against China in 1979, Argentina against the UK in Falkland Islands, and Egypt against Israel in 1973.

• Nuclear capability did not help the US win the war in Vietnam, the USSR win the war in Afghanistan, and China achieve decisive victory against Vietnam. India’s nuclear capability was of no use in its fight against the terrorists in Sri Lanka or in Kashmir. Pakistan could not save the Taliban with its nuclear weapons!

• Nuclear deterrence did not work between nuclear weapon powers: Sino-Soviet border war in 1969 and the Indo-Pak war in Kargil sector in 1999.

• The most powerful nuclear weapon powers have experienced worst defeats: The US in Vietnam and the USSR in Afghanistan.

• The only time nuclear weapons have been used “was in far less compelling circumstances”. Use of nuclear weapons against Japan was like pumping yet another bullet into a dead man.

• Conventional wisdom suggests that nuclear weapons provide security. These weapons could not prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union!

• The notion that the US and the USSR did not fight war against each other due to deterrence is only a belief. The argument that existence of nuclear weapons kept Europe peaceful is a half-baked idea. It can also be argued that such weapons continue to keep the proverbial Sword of Damocles hanging over the Old Continent. Logical thinking may not lead one to truth!

Lessons To Be Learnt:

The Cosmos is Like a Cobweb.

Every process is linked to Every Other.

• The nuclearization of South Asia has made it evident that nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation doctrines cannot co-exist. A doctrine of comprehensive proliferation – both vertical and horizontal – should replace these two doctrines.

• About forty countries, which have nuclear capacity but not the nuclear bomb, have set an example of restraints for others. But the eight nuclear weapon capable countries can set a better example for others by eliminating their arsenals.

• The linkages between nuclear technology, nuclear proliferation, nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have to be understood and appreciated.

• If one can verify with reasonable degree of assurance that 139 NNWS parties to the NPT are nuclear weapon free, there is no technical reason why this should be impossible in case of NWS.

• The world’s hierarchical power structure would not change much if all the existing nuclear arsenals were eliminated. The US would still be the number one power in the world. The NATO can take care of conventional Russian capability. China, India and Pakistan would continue to be number one, two and three powers of Southern Asia respectively.

Preconditions and Models for Complete Nuclear Disarmament:

Let us Not Ask for the Moon, but Let us Try a Voyage to the Moon:

• Idealistic proposals for achieving a nuclear free world are abound; such as surrender of national sovereignty to an international authority (Maybe the UN), which would have control over nuclear weapons. Secondly, there should be an open world with free movement of people and a minimum level of political stability. Thirdly, establishment of
democratic societies where people could have larger says in governmental decision-makings. Fourthly, the existing state system is incompatible with nuclear disarmament and global reform should be undertaken to achieve peace, economic well being, social and political justice and ecological balance. Finally, unresolved problems, such as territorial disputes and historical animosities in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia should be settled as a precondition to a nuclear free world.

- All these idealistic proposals are important and useful. But the goal should be to go ahead with nuclear disarmament without waiting for the perfect realisation of all these goals. Most of the root causes of international problems have existed before the nuclear age and complete resolution of those problems need not be made the prerequisites for achieving a nuclear free world.

The Road Map:

Impossibles Are in the Present. Everything Is Possible in the Future:

- Those who believe they are protected by their or their allies’ nuclear arsenals pose the greatest challenge to efforts towards a nuclear free world. They need to be convinced that nuclear weapons are neither essential nor best ways to ensure security.

- While public opinion on the nuclear issues is important, public opposition to nuclear weapons is not sufficient to achieve a nuclear free world. Deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles in the 1980s in the face of protests is a bright example. Moreover, public opinion is not respected much in non-democratic societies, some of which are nuclear weapon states.

Converting the Believers/Doubting Thomases:

- Nuclear weapons cannot be dis-invented, but existing ones can be eliminated and further proliferation can be effectively prevented.

- Danger of cheating will always remain, but cheating will be more difficult in an environment of a nuclear free world than in a world packed with deterrence doctrines.

- Ever since the nuclear export controls are in place since the mid-1970s, “no diversion or misuse of a safeguarded plant or material has come to light. No nation, moreover, has alleged that another, which it dislikes or fears, has breached a safeguards agreement.”

The Crucial First Step:

- A Convention for the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons can be the first step towards eliminating the nuclear weapons. However, it should not be modeled on the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and bacteriological warfare. After all, chemical and bacteriological weapons have been used several times after 1925 and likewise use of nuclear weapons cannot be discounted so long as the weapons exist.

- A Nuclear Weapons Convention patterned after CWC and BWC is more appropriate. If these two weapons could be banned before their total elimination, banning of nuclear weapons use can also be done now.

It is necessary to throw the baby with the bath water:

- There is sound logic in favour of continuing nuclear energy. But eliminating the use of nuclear power can be a sure way of preventing weapons proliferation. Italy has closed down its nuclear power plant and Sweden has planned to go without nuclear power by 2010. Verification and transparency in this case will be easy. After all, the technology for enriching reactor fuel and processing spent fuel are not much different from the one needed for making the nuclear weapon. As long as there is a nuclear power industry, ‘nuclear weapons are only a year away’.

- Closing the existing nuclear power plants and preventing the construction of new ones should accompany managing existing fissile materials of all kinds of all the countries. Non-state actors do not have yet the know-how for making weapons and a few quantities of stolen fissile materials will be of no help to them. The anti-nuclear groups thus should campaign against all kinds of nuclear power plants, including research reactors and nuclear submarine programmes.

Who Should Do It?

Nation-states

- All the nations should adopt a doctrine of comprehensive non-proliferation by eliminating existing weapons, nuclear programmes and preventing further vertical and horizontal proliferation. Selective and piecemeal approaches may be useful for arms control, but not nuclear disarmament.

- All the nuclear weapon powers will have to sit together and take steps towards total nuclear disarmament, replacing the existing bilateral arms control efforts by the US and Russia. Such a measure may be more useful than extravagant conferences involving all the nations and leading to endless talks.

- It is time perhaps to revisit the Baruch Plan – the first ever proposal for nuclear disarmament. It was rejected by the former Soviet Union, which felt that it would have perpetuated the US monopoly over atomic weapons. This proposal can be modified and an international authority can be created to take charge of all the nuclear weapons before they are destroyed.

- Transparency has always been considered a precondition for total elimination of nuclear weapons. The power of the IAEA, scope of its activities and improved technical means of verification need to be achieved and the safeguards system should be applicable to all nations on a non-discriminatory basis.
Non-State/Civilian Actors:

• The nuclear danger and the need for abolishing the nuclear weapons should be made part of school and college curricula all over the world.

• Grass-root political leaders, religious leaders, peace activists, philanthropic bodies and even all sections of local and national bureaucracies should be made aware of the problems of nuclear weapons and necessity to deal with it.

• In other words, debates, discussions and research on nuclear issues should not be confined to the strategic community alone. The role of media, among others, is essential to spread awareness. More than the print media, the visual media has a larger role. Even the illiterates watch television.

• Artistes, painters, play-writes, novelists, cartoonists and film producers too have a role to play.

• A dialogue among civilizations and an inter-faith initiative to address this menace may be useful. Christians, Hindus, Jews, Muslims and Buddhists have the nuclear weapons capability. Ancient civilizations of Asia, Medieval civilizations of Europe and modern civilizations of Americas and Africa are in possession of nuclear weapons capability. The post-industrial societies, industrial societies, newly industrializing societies and developing societies have these weapons. Since these weapons threaten life on the planet, let there be mega efforts to address this issue.

• The increasing interdependence of nations can serve as an anti-dote to nuclear war. If ways and means are adopted to enhance this process, those possessing WMD will realise the uselessness and cost of such weapons. True interdependence would bring back the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction and enlarge it to the globe at large.
Countries have two important ways of maintaining national security: disarmament and deterrence. It is true that the states are responsible for defending their national security as it is enshrined in the Charter under the “chapeau” of legitimate self-defence, and there is no doubt that they need some arsenals for that end. But the idea is that, while the use of weapons of mass destruction is devastating, conventional weapons are more reasonable instruments for ensuring national security. Such a policy means a combination of disarmament (focusing on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction) and deterrence (the need to obtain warfare instruments).

Balance of Positions on National Security: A Combination of Disarmament and Deterrence. An Iranian Perspective

A. Introduction
Whenever a politician is asked about some vital aspects of national interest of his or her country, most probably, national security would stand at the top priority. History shows that the states have resorted to any means to assure their national security. In categorizing the state’s acts with respect to national security we are facing two important ways which, in a conceptualized framework, could be deterrence (military) and disarmament (political).

It is clear that deterrence involves a strategy of threatening punishment or denial to convince others that the costs of their anticipated action will outweigh the gains. The means by which states pursue policies of deterrence include increasing their general military capabilities and developing super weapons of mass destruction (1). Nuclear weapons were the most important element of deterrence between the U.S.A. and former Soviet Union in the Cold War era. Also these kinds of weapons were considered the national aim for some other countries to achieve a deterrent power.
On the other hand, disarmament, while having several meanings, mostly and practically equals arms control, which is measures taken unilaterally or through agreement among states to reduce the danger of war by such means as partial disarmament, security arrangements to avoid nuclear war and stabilization of force and weapons levels (2).

Regardless of deterrence or disarmament as a slogan or real end of national interest of the states in international arena, history shows the result of these policies. Relying on merely one of these options could lead a state to insecurity. The question is to what extent these policies should be resorted to as to ensure national security of states. What are the lessons of related experiences for living in the 21st century? And how can the situations in Iran be analyzed in this regard?

To answer these questions, first I will review the result of related national security policy of some great powers. It is needed to say that this article will not cover all aspects of national security policy, but the main focus will be on nuclear weapons. And second, an Iranian perspective will be provided.

**B. Experience**

From the beginning of nuclear age, NPT regime has been a cornerstone in the state’s approach towards nuclear weapons. As it divides the countries to haves and have-nots (3), most of the countries are not allowed to obtain these weapons and only P5 permanent members of the security council are entitled to have nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear deterrence mostly can be realized between the recent group of states, but as some of the others were critic of the discriminatory provisions of NPT, and have challenged this kind of regime.

Also in reality we have and had some nuclear weapon states, 5 plus others, for whom nuclear weapons were the most important instrument to assure their national security. I am considering the question that whether these weapons were enough for that end? And while some of the powerful advanced countries could obtain nuclear weapons, why had they voluntarily have ignored nuclear weapons option?

For the first question, the answer is that nuclear weapons, as the history of the former Soviet Union indicates, were not proper instrument to maintain security. The Soviet Union reliance on the nuclear power not only could not ensure its vital interests of integrity and continuity, but also with more attention on nuclear and military strength, even forgot the other needs in social, political and economic sectors. And finally this imbalance led to its collapse (4).

As mentioned above, although there are some countries like Japan or some European countries that have enough economic base to invest on nuclear weapons, they did not act for this end. The answer for this apparent paradox is provided in the second section of the article.

**C. Lessons Learned**

1. **New Dimensions of Security**

   In traditional approach to security, military was highlighted. Responding to the military challenges including suppressing internal riots and defending against foreign enemies, was the main task of security for the governing states. But now the situation has changed and new dimensions of security have emerged. Of course, it is not to say that military dimension of security has been perished, but at least the new dimensions have got more importance, which can even overshadow military security (5). And it is for this reason that powerful developed countries pay attention to the new dimensions of security and avoid of focusing on merely one dimension. The new challenges of national security in globalized era have proved and got increasing importance. Therefore, a new strategy of national security comprises of a multi-sided approach.

   Even the very meaning of military security has changed and technology improvement has brought new warfare instruments that does not necessarily include nuclear weapons. In response to new military challenges like terrorist attacks or asymmetric warfare, nuclear weapons are less effective (6).

2. **Changes in Deterrence**

   Through the process of globalization, the concept of deterrence has changed both in theory and practice.

   In theory with remoralization of international relations and in the light of globalization and denunciation of warfare, we are witnessing a movement that considers nuclear weapons as illegal. The ICJ in its advisory opinion of 1996 did mention about inhuman effects from use of nuclear weapons (7).

   Also, by the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, defenders of nuclear deterrence changed their conception of national security. The improvements of the 1990’s, in the field of nuclear disarmament, like indefinite extension of NPT, adoption of CTBT, 1997 Protocol to NPT and 2000 Review Conference of NPT are signals of lessening of the importance of nuclear deterrence among states.

   In general I can say that:

   1. Deterrence is not the cornerstone of national security policy of states as it was attractive in the past.
   2. Deterrence has extended its meaning and extended to the new fields like economy.
   3. Deterrence has moved from dominant international system level to the subsystem level, like deterrence between regional states.
   4. Deterrence is not an explicit strategy of the states, but it is implicit and hidden (8).

**D. Iran**

Iran is blamed for trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction and specially nuclear weapons (9). There is no evidence of such a claim and inspections conducted by
IAEA have proved Iranian clean hands, and also Iran has sponsored a new kind of inspections called voluntarily inspections. Regardless of the matter, I should consider the question that whether nuclear option is favoured for Iran or not? It is needed to say:

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s positions and actions are based on Islamic epistemology according to which any use of weapons of mass destruction can not be justified. As these kinds of weapons are inhuman, Iran has denounced any pro-nuclear positions and invited international community for total and final elimination of nuclear weapons (10).

2. Further to positions about nuclear weapons, Iran has sought to play an active role in international forums on disarmament for codifying international law of disarmament and has offered proposals to improve and obtain a comprehensive disarmament. Also, Iran has followed the issue of nuclear free weapons zone in the Middle East and hopes to solve problems in this way (11).

3. Iran is a developing country for which development in social and economic sectors is very important. Due to Iran’s increasing population and its several needs, any use of national budget for non-useful items would be devastating. If Iran wants to feel secured there should be no excuse for any ignorance of domestic threats, for being busy dealing with external threats. The experience of some developing countries such as North Korea which tried to invest on nuclear weapons makes the result clear, experts believe that for developing countries nuclear bomb would equal 10–15 years of more backdrop in development (12). Economically securing enough capital for getting nuclear weapon would be a great burden for developing countries. Furthermore, the responses of international community through actions like sanctions would increase obstacles on the process of development. India and Pakistan 1998 nuclear tests led them to more insecurity instead of strengthening their nations security (13).

4. Iran is nearly surrounded by atomic neighbours. Because Russia on the north, Pakistan on the east and recently the U.S.A. on the south are equipped with nuclear status. But Iran does not have any strategic problem with its neighbours for solving which nuclear weapons would be necessary. Hypothetically, Iran’s poor nuclear arsenal would be non-useful against weak neighbours and inefficient against strong nuclear arsenal of some powerful rivals like the U.S.A. More than that, any try to get nuclear weapons can be responded by pre-emptive attack (14).

5. With the improvement in the field of disarmament in the last decade, there is a hope of progress even with obstacles emerged provisionally. While, at the peak of the Cold War, any idea of inspection and disarmament was denied as the superpowers had suspicious views against each other, détente years and confidence building measures led to agreements on disarmament and this as a process is going ahead. So there could be strong hope for total nuclear disarmament too.

Also, as it was mentioned, with the rapid improvement of technology, which can change rules of game in international relations from hardware to software, the status of nuclear weapons has been weakened (15).

6. Finally we should ask whether international regime of non-proliferation could tolerate any crossing of its red lines? The answer is no. Because, even if a country is not a party to NPT, with the resolution of the security council in 1992, any try to get weapons of mass destruction, would be treated as against international peace and security. It means that, in such a case, the Security Council is entitled to respond coercively according to the chapter seventh of the Charter (16).

E. Notes

2. Ibid. p. 216.
3. NPT. Article 9(3).
5. Ibid. p. 157.
8. Ibid. p. 105.
COULD AND WOULD ELIMINATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAKE RUSSIA SECURE?
Analysis of Russia’s Military View

Mr Veniamin Vakhmistrov
Military Politology Expert, Ph D
Republican Humanitarian Institute
St Petersburg
Russia
Email: ven_sv@mail.ru

Could and would elimination of the nuclear weapons make Russia secure? According to materials being published in Russia’s military press, military experts see the answer to this question in the following way: “Essentially – yes, but – not yet”.

Why ”essentially – yes”? First, the high political leadership and military command of the Russian Federation repeatedly declared and continue to declare, that they act not only for non-proliferation, for the comprehensive banning of tests, but also they aim at complete elimination of nuclear arms as their goal. This principle is fixed officially and unambiguously in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, authorized by President Vladimir Putin.

Second, the military and politicians together assert that foreign-policy is clearly aimed at avoiding all war, including nuclear conflict.

Third, radical internal political changes in Russia have caused conceptual changes in state leadership’s notion of national security. According to the text of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (a basic document in this sphere for the Russian authorities) Russia has no obvious external opponents today. Thus for today, Russia has no enemies to target their weapons on.

Fourth, modern Russia has had to face unprecedented economic decline in the last ten years. It seems to be quite clear that in such conditions Russia alone is unable neither to participate persuasively in the arms race or to maintain a quantitative balance to the USA strategic nuclear arms, nor even to solve the problem of reliable maintenance of the nuclear arsenals. Finally it is hard to search for arguments against the statement that because of the Russia’s economic needs, nuclear disarmament will help to make available real financial resources and to concentrate them in other vital fields required for economic recovery.

Estimating the military and political situation of today the military command recognizes that the alignment of forces is determined not so much by quantitative characteristics of arms but mostly by its qualitative ones: informational, technical and spiritual. In other words, in the scenarios of supposed wars of the 21st century the role of nuclear weaponry is obsolete.

Hence, from the theoretical point of view on the character of modern and future wars, from the point of practical economic and military expediency view, Russia should not dismiss the idea of comprehensive nuclear disarmament when further nuclear supertension becomes financially senseless.

In the same respect military experts directly specify that in modern conditions a priority task for the maintenance of international and national security is not nuclear weapon deterrence, but a prevention of further proliferation of the nuclear weapons. A major shift has taken place in the direction of countries, such as India, Pakistan, China, Iran, and together with them Israel. The nuclear world of the 21st century becomes more and more multipolar. The threat of nuclear terrorism, accidents connected with nuclear weapons; dangers of non-authorized employment really exists and may well increase. After ”Kursk” submarine tragedy and September 11 events in New York it is more clear than ever.

(to be continued)
Still everything seems to indicate that in the Russian strategic mentality of today prevail the upholders of the views on the international security strengthening through the expansion of the range of nuclear weapons deterrence means. At the same time the role of strategic nuclear weapons is reduced mostly to a role of psychological threat of its deployment. Nevertheless, Russia still maintains its faith in the principle of nuclear deterrence.

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**Could and Would Elimination of the Nuclear Weapons Make Russia Secure? Analysis of Russia’s Military Views**

The following survey is based mainly on materials of the Russia’s official documents and the military press of the last years. It has to be started with a wellknown fact that the end of the 20th century was characterized by the geopolitical changes which hardly one could predict even twenty-thirty years before. The Soviet system, that controlled a huge part of global space, has disintegrated unexpectedly. Russia, as the largest post-Soviet new state formation, has become a successor of the USSR in the international affairs and has accumulated in its arsenals all nuclear potential of the former Soviet Union.

Ten years have passed since Russia had set foot on an independent way of state construction and the global opposition of two military coalitions – NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organisation had stopped. As a matter of fact during this period the world lives without nuclear arms race, without ideological opposition of socialism and capitalism, without iron curtain, that had divided formerly European East and West. In the other words, one can conclude that the former base for nuclear antagonism has disappeared and is absent now.

Under this circumstances it is natural to put and discuss a question about radical and complete elimination of the nuclear weapons. Isn’t it a historical chance for a decision of this problem in a practical way? According to the materials being published in Russia’s military press, military experts see the answer to this question in the next way: “Essentially – yes, but nevertheless – not yet”.

Why ”essentially – yes”? Firstly, the high political leadership and military command of the Russian Federation repeatedly declared and continue to declare, that they act not only for creation of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation universal state, for stopping and comprehensive banning of its tests, but moreover, they declare a complete elimination of nuclear arms as an ultimate goal. This principle is fixed officially and unambiguously in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, authorized by the President Vladimir Putin.

Secondly, the military and the politics assert in one tune, that in the foreign-policy sphere is clearly marked the tendency of decrease of war unleash threat for Russia, including the nuclear one. According to the General of Army Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, the large-scale threat for Russia is improbable. Such approach is set in to the basis of the Russian Federation Armed Forces Plan of Construction for 2001-2005 and the State Program of Arms and Military Equipment Development for 2001-2010.

In the Russia – NATO Founding Act (1997) is fixed the state on establishment of partner relations between former opposite sides. It means, that all major decisions on localization of arising threats henceforth will be accepted in common. Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Sergey Ivanov emphasizes now the importance for Russia to develop co-operation with NATO in a practical mode, where Russia ought to have a status of enjoying full rights partner.

The same mutual understanding has been achieved with China, that allowed Russia to reduce additionally on this direction some military formations and units. ”Here and in Siberia, – Anatoly Kvashnin declares – there is no a single completely deployed division”.

In the zone of Northern European countries, because of developed relations of complete mutual trust, Russia leaves only two brigades of land forces. In the Moscow military district there is left only one division of constant readiness. All these facts evidently testify that Russia actively supports the development of international peace and security strengthening mechanism at the global and regional level and practically aspires to liquidate military opposition.

Thirdly, radical internal political changes in Russia have caused also the conceptual changes in state leadership’s notion of the national security insurance problems. According to the text of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (a basic document in this sphere for the Russian authorities) Russia has no obvious external opponents today. In the past the USA was blamed to be a main source of nuclear threat as the leading class antagonistic state of ”rotting” imperialism. Now, when the USA has become for many in Russia an example of civilized economy and human rights, the former reasons for formation of the enemy image have disappeared. The same is possible to say...
about the other countries of NATO. This situation is quite analogous to that with China.7

Thus for today, the nuclear missile potential of Russia has no exact checkpoints for target designation. There is nobody to be at war with such weapon.

In – fourth, modern Russia has got into a very difficult economic situation. Last ten years proved to be the period of unprecedented economic decline. It was caused by the accumulated defects of the Soviet economic system, the results of the USSR disintegration, and the ill-considered reforms after 1991. As a result the GNP of Russia in comparison with 1990 has been reduced more than 40%, the production of mechanical engineering – 55%, the agricultural production – 43%, the freight traffic – 3 times. The living standard of the population has been sharply lowered, the protracted demographic crisis has started6.

Russia rapidly loses prospect to join the leading economic states. Already in 1997 the GNP of former poor China surpassed Russia 6 times8. Today overall per capita production in the Russian Federation is approximately 30% lower than the world average level. By the data of the World Bank highly technological production comes only to 19% of the Russian industrial export, while in the USA – 44%, Japan – 38%, France – 31%, Germany – 26%, China – 21%.

It is clear that a deep crisis of science and engineering has place in Russia. As a reflection of critical situation in this sphere Vladimir Putin adopted in 2000 the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation9.

In the 1990s the number of personnel had been engaged in scientific research, has decreased in Russia approximately 2 times. The enormous backlog in sphere of computer science and communication has been outlined. Amount per capita of mobile telephones in Russia is behind world level 13 times, of computers – 2 times, of addresses in Internet – 8 times.

The insignificant economic growth, achieved in 1999-2001, had place due the temporary reasons (devaluation of rouble, growth of the energy world prices) and consequently does not provide conditions for the accelerated revival of Russia’s economic potential. But against the background of the private capital flight from the country the payment of state foreign debts has already reached more than 85 billion dollars over the last 10 years.

It seems to be quite clear that in such conditions Russia alone is unable neither to participate impressively in the arms race or to maintain a quantitative balance to the USA strategic nuclear arms, nor even to solve the problem of reliable maintenance of the nuclear arsenals. Hardly anybody was surprised with the publications that the two-parties commission of US Congress, had been going into the questions of a nuclear materials storage safety, has stated an estimate according to which the Russia’s stores of the nuclear weapons and nuclear materials threatened gravely the national security of the USA. The appeal of this commission to the USA administration to allocate in addition 30 billion dollars during nearest 10 years so as to help Moscow is quite understandable10.

Finally it is hard to search for arguments against the statement that because of the Russia’s nearest economic needs the nuclear disarmament will help to make available real financial resources and to concentrate them in other vital fields for struggle with the economic crisis.

Lastly, it is necessary to take into account a proper military aspect.

First of all, it is important to understand how the character of modern and future wars according to which the planning and development of military sphere (political and technical aspects) is carried out today is realized by Russian political leadership and military command.

As to the text of the Military Doctrine and last materials of Russian open military press, the basic features of modern war include:

• wide use of indirect strategic actions (diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, information struggle; sea, air and land blockade of traffic communications, demonstration of force, etc.);
• massive information preparation (information blockade, expansion, aggression), disorientation of public opinion in the separate states and in the world community;
• disorganization of state and military control system;
• blocking (putting out of action) of troops and weapons control systems;
• use of not contact forms and methods of actions, distant fire and electronic detection;
• employment of the newest highly effective systems of weapons and military equipment (the one based on new physical principles too);
• defeat of energetic enterprises (nuclear first of all), chemical and other dangerous manufactures, infrastructure, communications, objects of life-support;
• high probability of involving of new states, escalation of combat operations, expansion of scales and structure of the used means.

A hot discussion about essential understanding of the contemporary term “warfare” is the issue of today for Russian military press. It is caused by realization of the world transition to a war of new generation. From one side a distinctive feature of this transition is the appearance of so named NCW (network-centric warfare) concept. It reflects the danger of terrorist and criminal organizations acts, which have no united central direction and strict hierarchy but co-ordinate their plans through Internet11. From another and more important side this transition is connected with the advanced countries adoption for service of the high-precise and “information” weapons12. It changes fundamentally the start and process technology of the warfare, making it not only little-contact or non-contact at all, but moreover it does not require a little-selective destructive power of the nuclear weapons too. Such technology was approved for the first
time by the NATO members during the operation "Storm in desert" (1991), then in Yugoslavia (1999) and Afghanistan (2001). According to the estimate of the Russian military experts, both operations have shown their high efficiency.

An important qualitative feature of the wars of new generation is also its vertical spatial scope. It is now an accomplished fact that the air and cosmic space are considered by the military as a single unit in the aspect of war pursuit. The NATO members employed more than 100 military and civil sputniks during planning and conducting of actions in Yugoslavia.

Estimating military and political situation of today the military command recognizes that the alignment of forces is determined not so much by quantitative characteristics of arms but mostly by the qualitative ones – informational, technical and spiritual possibilities. In other words, in the scripts of supposed wars of 21st century the role of nuclear cudgel is not already absolute. This role can become as that scenic "gun", which contrary to usual stereotype will not be fated to shoot.

On the other hand during last years the military organization of the Russian State has undergone so serious destructive and collapse changes, that modern Russia is unable to provide even a former level of military potential, including its nuclear part.

In comparison to the Soviet period the military budget of the Russian Federation has reduced approximately 15-20 time. According to Deputy Minister of Defence of RF L. Kudelina in 2001 the national defence expenditures came to 17,99% of the federal budget. It was approximately 7 bill. dollars. This level of financing considerably concedes to leading Western states and is comparable with military expenditures of such countries as Turkey, Brazil, India, which are not military super powers.

In 1990s up to 70% of expenditures of the Russia’s Defence Ministry was allocated for maintenance of the Armed Forces, basically for money allowances, regimentals and food. The expenditures for acquisition of the material did not exceed 20%, for the scientific researches – about 5%.

All that has resulted in the actual discontinuance of arms modernization. In opinion of the experts, without reequipment of the Army and the Navy all available arms of the Soviet period by 2005–2010 years will become finally obsolete. If the task of re-equipment of the Armed Forces till 2010 is to be set, it will require according to published estimates not less than 100 bill. dollars. At a present level of the national defence expenditures it means the allocation for scientific researches up to 80% of all military budget, but that is absolutely unreal. To keep partially the capacities of the military-industrial complex allows the export of weapons. However, according to the international estimate, Russia has no more than 3–4% of world arms production, thus its share in the world trade of the weapons does not exceed 10–12% and can hardly considerably bring up. At the same time Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Account Chamber Alexandr Piskunov emphasize that in the recent 10 years of weapons trade Russian military-industrial complex hasn’t invested just a penny into fulfilment of the State Defence Order.

Under these conditions not only the quality of the Russian Armed Forces equipment is lowering but also the level of combat training is appreciably reducing. A most vivid example was the wreck of newest nuclear submarine "Kursk" in August 2000 with loss of all hands. After special investigation of this accident President V. Putin has discharged 14 admirals and higher officers of the Navy. The Commander-in-chief of Russia’s Northern Navy was discharged too.

The Army command recognizes, that because of lack of the material and financial means more than ten years up to 2001 no any division in the Armed Forces has carried out tactical exercise and already a galaxy of commanders, who never organized the measures of such scale has grown.

Meanwhile the possibility to increase rapidly the volume of military expenditures is extremely limited. It is ought to agree with those published estimates, which assert that unlike the Soviet period, today’s Russia is not capable to hold deployed groupings of troops on any of strategic directions, and in foreseeable future it can not expect for any military superiority in case of the conflict neither in West, nor in East.

Hence, from a theoretical point of view on the character of modern and future wars, from the point of practical economic and military expediency view Russia should not hush out the idea of comprehensive nuclear disarmament especially right now on the edge of centuries and millenniums, when the further nuclear supertension becomes obviously financially senseless.

In the same concern military experts directly specify, that in modern conditions a task of real priority for the maintenance of international and national security is not the nuclear weapon deterrence, but a prevention of further proliferation of the nuclear weapons. It has become completely clear since the second half of 1990, when the camp of nuclear states had been filled up by India and Pakistan, meanwhile Northern Korea and Iran had carried out the tests of ballistic missiles for the range about 1500 kms with the pay-load close to the weight of nuclear ammunition. Thus a vector of nuclear conflict threat gradually changes it direction and displaces from traditional pairs, such as Russia and USA, to the side of the Third World countries, such as India, Pakistan, China, Iran, and Israel together with them. The nuclear world of 21st century becomes more and more multipolar.

On the background of favourable conditions for the nuclear weapon proliferation turned in last years, there is expressed not unreasonable pessimism concerning the possibilities of the international community to stop this process. One cannot forget that according to various estimates, about 20 countries are at the "threshold", i.e. they are capable to
create nuclear weapon on an available industrial basis. Thus the threat of nuclear terrorism, accidents connected with nuclear weapons; dangers of it non-authorized employment really exists and has tendency to increase. After "Kursk" submarine tragedy and September 11 events in the USA it has become more clear than ever.

More and more obvious there grows a need of cardinal decisions in this sphere. For example, such as radical revision of haughty and flimsy attitude of the West, and USA first of all, to Russian problems; unfolding of wide scaled and exactly addressed financial aid to Russia in order to stabilize its internal situation and thereby to restore a strict order in the ensuring of the nuclear weapon arsenals. Another example is the offer of the former Secretary of Defence of USA Robert McNamara, published in 1997 in the Russian press, about the necessity of coming back to the nuclear weapon free world.

A boldness of the last application is presented to the Russian military as over maximum yet. Today it is difficult to find in this professional circle somebody, who is ready to consider seriously the offers on dissolution "of nuclear club", but not to regard it as naive utopian and far from reality and possibilities of the international community.

However still recently the prospects of the Soviet system and the WTO disintegration seemed so utopian. Nevertheless it was held in front of all world. Who could really expect such collapse degradation of the Soviet military power or could suppose the scale of combat operations in Yugoslavia unfolded at the centre of quiet, civilized Europe in the end of 20th century, or in Afghanistan in the beginning of the next century?

So why the idea of comprehensive elimination of the nuclear weapon would be excluded from our thoughts, dreams and dealings? What yesterday still seemed utopia, tomorrow becomes a reality, a historical validity. For example post-Soviet Ukraine (the largest republic in former USSR) has already realized it’s nuclear free choice after destruction of the last nuclear warhead (October 2001), which has been moved away before.

Still everything seems to indicate that the Russian military and the politics are not ready to believe in such prospect and don’t want to dream about it. Their estimates of military and political situation, being published last time, show that even under a condition of complete elimination of world nuclear arsenals just a number of military threats remains actual for Russia, to which it should be able to answer adequately. Russian leadership is deeply convinced, that it is impossible to be done without frightening factor of the nuclear weapon.

Meanwhile not far ago (1997) Vitaly Shlikov (former Vice-President of State Committee on Defensive Questions of Russian Federation) wrote that neither the President, nor the Government and the military command simply had no notion what to do with the defensive complex in conditions of market economy. But today mass media are unanimous that after ascension to authority in 2000 the new administration shows political will to rational comprehension of developing situation.

What does threaten to security of Russia in the beginning of 21st century apart from the nuclear danger?

In the text of National Security Concept of Russian Federation is affirmed, that the level and scale of military threats is growing. First of all it is connected with NATO transition to the force actions outside of the zone of responsibility and without sanction of the United Nations Security Council. It is fraught with a threat to destabilize all strategic situations in the world. In opinion of the Russian experts behind all of it lies the process of firmly establishing the USA global leadership and one-polar model of the world structure.

How it looks in military sphere? In the 1990s the unprecedented break away of the United States in the amount of military expenditures from all other countries has taken place. The budget of Pentagon is equal to the military expenditures of ten largest countries following USA. Approximately a half of the world weapons export is shared by USA. The obvious growth of offensive possibilities of conventional forces of the NATO countries above defensive potential of the Russian Federation is available. The ambitions of USA are testified by Washington’s determination to apply force in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan by demonstration of force in the Taiwan strait, by expansion of NATO, by intervention in Somalia and Rwanda, by allocation of the hostile states with their prosecution up to constant force punishment (Iraq), by economic embargo (Cuba) and open pressure (Iran, Northern Korea, Libya). It is also a new strategic concept of NATO accepted under strong influence of Washington, which provides "military operations in unstable areas" outside the former zone of responsibility.

In spite of the NATO obvious crisis and apparent dim perspective of it’s surviving just in the nearest 5 years there is opinion, that the threat "of humanitarian intervention", i.e. introduction of international "peacemaking of forces" in the territory of bordering states of CIS, and first of all, in such unstable areas as Chechnya, Georgia has place. According to some estimates an intervention of the Western states into the Chechen question last time was in many respects limited by rather narrow political frameworks because of Russian nuclear weapons possession and means of its delivery to territory of any NATO country.

A menacing one for Russia becomes a technological breaking away of the number of leading states and increasing of their possibilities to create the arms and military equipment of a new generation. It creates the preconditions for qualitatively new (nuclear free) stage of arms race and for radical change of forms and ways of military operations conducting. At the same time the majority of modern states, including Russia, are not ready to conduct warfare with employment of high-technological types of weapon and even in the foreseeable future they will not have the opportunity to have it. Huge financial expenses and high level of
industry development are required for this purpose. The political leadership of such states not accidentally see the way of the military security maintenance in possessing of the nuclear weapons as the cheapest mean. The presence of nuclear status allows them to protect themselves from probable aggression unfolding by the Yugoslavian script.

At the global level a special concern of the political leadership and military command of Russia is caused by Washington’s determination to leave the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972). This treaty, affirms Marshal I. Sergeev, is a cornerstone of strategic stability, the basis of the arms control system. As a main motive of the U.S. decision on deployment of the National Missile Defense system I. Sergeev names the aspiration of Washington to obtain strategic domination in the world, which in this case first of all will has anti-Russian orientation31. At the same time Sergey Ivanov (Minister of Defence) considers that one of the reasons here is the intention of U.S. military-economic complex to obtain astronomical profits.32

As a reply to the U.S. actions, at the end of 2000 Russia for the first time in last 12 years has adopted the modernized combat complex “Topol – M” (RS–12) with a range capability up to 10,000 kms. The launch of this rocket vehicle is impossible to block by a nuclear explosion of the opponent. It breaks through atmospheric “nuclear umbrella” and has complex of means for overcoming of the actual and prospective antiballistic missile systems33.

The atavisms of confrontation way of thinking, of a “force cult philosophy” manifest itself again. The chairman of State Duma (Parliament) Defence Committee general Andrey Nikolaev pays attention, that in Washington Russia is frankly regarded as a source of threats. “They do not speak, that are going to be at war with Russia, but name her as a source of threats. They explain it by the Russian unpredictability, by inability to maintain the mark situation in the nuclear complex, by opportunity of the nuclear technologies outflow to the third countries”34. A. Nikolaev’s conclusion is: “today the population of Russia has no complete understanding about existing threats for the state”.35

Rather certain position in his estimate has the director of the USA and Canada Research Institute of the Russia’s Academy of Science Sergey Rogov, specifying: “the illusions about non-conflictiness of the world development after the end of the “cold war” have disappeared”36. The discontinuance of open confrontation has reduced sharply the danger of large-scale aggression against Russia, but a new system of international security with participation of Russian Federation has not been created. Today Russia has no enemies, but it also has no reliable allies and partners. In long term in case if confrontation with one of the great state or a coalition occurs, Russia will find itself in isolation. As a feature of new international situation S. Rogov considers the simultaneous presence at the system of international relations the traits of multipolarity (activity of a lot of the states seeking a role of the centres of force, aspiration of the countries with mass armies to regional leadership) and one-polarity (only the USA have a cumulative set of all components of force – economic, military and political). However S. Rogov is convinced that the return to arms race is contraindicated for Russia.

The history teaches, that the set back of confrontational way of thinking should not be rigidly connected only with the military and their corporate interests. The sociological researches, being carried out in the Russian Army, show clearly the absence of former spirit of warlikeness in the modern mentality of the officer corps. It is reasonably to listen an authoritative opinion of the academicians Valentin Falin (in 1970s he was the USSR ambassador in West Germany), who’s experience warns: “The most arrant militarists, as a rule, are the civilians. The majority of officers and generals are not so inclined to reckless judgements, as the other civilian people who have never smelt the gunpowder. The militant civilians not only consecrate the hare-brained plans of headquarters, but fairly often just order the military their way of thinking and behaviour”37.

Recently mass media began to show even more often the danger of activation of the struggle for repartition of the spheres of influence on the post-Soviet territory and in the immediate proximity from Russia.

As a most disturbing direction for Russia there are specified southern borders of the country. The situation there is mostly determined by attempts to strengthen the influence of Islamic fundamentalism and to cover by its ideas (including the help of the weapon) all the region. Generally to the South from the former USSR borders there is formed a zone of antagonism of some states, which are capable under certain conditions to begin a new repartition of the territories. The possibility of realization of such intentions, especially on the background of nationalism and separatism, through the international terrorist organizations and local militant religious groupings activity creates a real threat of local conflicts and wars unfolding38. This danger is constantly reproduced by the tense situation in Northern Caucasus. Traditionally there are uneasy relations on territorial issue with Japan and China (in latent or open form).

New clash factors occurs in mutual relations with some European countries in connection with the NATO expansion to the East. A systematic preparation for acceptance of Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia to the alliance takes place. Some states, first of all the USA and Norway, appreciably increased the efforts of escalating their potential of military and economic presence in the Russian sector of Arctic Region. The command of Russia’s Northern Fleet believes, that Norway and its NATO allies aspire at any way to assign the rights on disputable areas to themselves and to limit ultimately the Russian presence in Barents Sea and in Arctic Region in whole, pursuing concrete economic interests connected with the control of rich gas and oil deposits, of fish craft etc.39

In this concern it is necessary to pay attention, that in military mass media it is definitely expressed the forecasts
on 21st century, as the century of struggle of the states for natural resources. Russia with its great mineral resources will be involved, as the experts consider, into an orbit of global interests of the world leading states, which will be asserted by the military force too.

Thus, the basic character of modern system of military threats for Russia is determined, on the one hand, by general negative background connected with a downturn of Russian defensive potential, a reduction of the allies number, an increase of separatist and international extremist forces activity, and with a growth of a number of indirect threats from the states that are carrying out "unfriendly" policy towards Russia. On the other hand, a new quality to this system under conflict conditions gives the danger of employment of space facilities, information environment and new technologies.

The dangerous tendencies also take place in the sphere of military-political mentality. The atmosphere of trust between the nuclear countries forms hardly and it seems, that on the part of Russia this process has already passed the peak of openness. If in the past mistrust to the West was based on the fear that the Russia’s declarations about its intention to disarm would not be transformed into practical actions, now there is quite another situation. For today the Armed Forces of Russian Federation in comparison with the end of the 1980s has been already reduced in 4 times, while in the world, in spite of peaceful rhetoric, this process has not exceeded 30% of a mark\(^3\). At the same time there takes place a relative increase of the USA and other advanced countries share in the world military expenditures.

The search of further ways to provide National military security was brightly reflected in recent public discussion between the former Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Igor Sergeeev and the Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin\(^3\). The campaign, had been undertaken by A. Kvashnin in order to reduce the status of Strategic Missile Forces as an Armed Service to the level of an Arm, has become in reality, as the analysts consider, an attack of the nuclear deterrence principle – the basis of modern military strategy of the state. In other words, it is only a reaction to prevailing opinion in the highest command on priority role of the nuclear weapons deterrence, which seems as an absolute weapon being capable to constrain the opponent in any conflicts, up to local wars.

The success of last point of view is most likely because of its political comfort – only stressing the universal possibilities of nuclear weapon it is possible to combine the declarations about the necessity to create a "compact army" and aspiration to reserve the most part of status attributes of a great power.

The scandalous image in the Russian press of discussion between I. Sergeeev and A. Kvashnin has demonstrated a crisis of the National military security system concept in the framework of old paradigm. As a condition to carry out full-blooded military reform becomes a serious modernization of the Army, because the nuclear weapons deterrence is already not enough for parrying the real threats to the national security\(^40\).

Concerning doctrinal establishments on fulfilment of the task to keep the readiness of the Russian Armed Forces for the employment of available nuclear potential, there is a marked conceptual vacuum too. On its background in the military press, mostly in the columns of "Voennaya Misl" (the main theoretical magazine of the Defence Ministry) was initiated the discussion on the concept of a "controlled limited nuclear war"\(^41\). These publications emphasize the necessity of expansion of the nuclear weapons military function so as to liquidate the superiority of aggressor in the region by the tactical nuclear weapons employment from the defending side against military objects. It is considered that the threat of the nuclear weapons employment in response to large-scale operations of the opponent with using by him not nuclear, but only conventional weapons, would put its efficiency under doubt. The target for not strategic nuclear weapons in such case can be the nuclear power stations of the states – aggressors. Its quantity in Western Europe is much more, than in the European part of Russia, and its density of placing is many times higher. Therefore even falling behind the NATO in structure of not strategic nuclear forces, Russia can threaten with a defeat of a greater number of the nuclear power stations.

The availability of tactical nuclear weapons gives, in opinion of the authors, a chance to prevent avalanche development of the regional conflict into unlimited employment of the nuclear weapons at a global level. However it is admitted that the technique of specification of tactical means sufficiency at a regional level is very complex, if it is possible at all. Thus, the military-power paradigm of the nuclear weapons deterrence displays a new, paradoxical in its deliberate simplicity, way of adaptation to the new distribution of forces around post-Soviet Russia.

Eventually, the analytical materials being published in the Russian military press, allow to make the following conclusions:

1. After the "Cold War" termination the dynamics of military and political situation in the world is determined by three basic tendencies:
   - Global economic, political and military leadership of the USA;
   - Formation of the multipolar nuclear weapons world;
   - Unprecedented economic and military weakening of Russia with preservation of its pretension to a role of great military power.

Against this background the last actions of international terrorist organizations find a new dangerous actuality.

2. Modern official – doctrinal understanding of the system of military threats to Russia reflects the objective causes for reconsideration of the nuclear weapons deterrence absolute role concept.

3. In the Russian strategic mentality of today prevail the upholders of the views on the national security strength-
ening through the expansion of the range of nuclear weapons deterrence means.

4. The role of strategic nuclear weapons is reduced mostly to a role of psychological threat of its deployment. Nevertheless the Russia’s political and military leadership still considers the nuclear weapons as an unshakeable base of the international security system.

Footnotes

1 Russia occupies 14% of world land, its frontiers stretch for 61.000 klm.


3 See: Kvashnin A. "Main Goals of the Military Reform", Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 2000, No 237. KZ is the official daily newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defence.


20 See: Marchenkov V. "To Train to Economize, to Economize while Training", Krasnaya Zvezda, 2000, No 244.


23 See: McNarama R. "Return to Nuclearless World is Necessary”, NVO, 1997, No42.


27 See: Rogov C."Where will the Wind Begin to Blow from Potomac”, Krasnaya Zvezda, 2001, No 29.

28 Quoted from: Potapov V. "Russia in the Modern World" (Seminar "National Security under Circumstances of Modern Globalization"), Morscoy Sbornik (Sea Almanac), 2000, No 6, p.9.


34 Quoted from: Nikolaev A. "Programme of Stabilization”, Krasnaya Zvezda, 2000, No 236.

35 Quoted from: Rogov S. "To Make National Interests as a Corner-Stone”, Krasnaya Zvezda, 2000, No 246.


39 This discussion had place in 2000 and was widely interpreted in Russian mass-media.


SOUTH AFRICA

THE RISE AND DEMISE OF SOUTH AFRICA´S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME: LESSONS FOR STATES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMMES?

Mr Guy Lamb and Ms Karen Peters
Project Coordinator and Research Assistant:
Project on Peace and Security
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
Private Bag
Rondebosch 7710
Rep South Africa
Email: glamb@ccr.uct.ac.za

Summary

This paper provides an overview of the creation and termination of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme, as well as South African government’s policy on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation since 1994. The aim of this paper is to determine if the manner and process of South Africa’s denuclearisation provide any lessons for other countries with nuclear weapons programmes.

South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme was established in 1971 by the Minister of Mines, following three decades of peaceful nuclear energy research. In 1974 a non-nuclear scale model of a gun-type explosive device was constructed and tested covertly. The first nuclear device was completed in 1977, with a cold test being planned in the Kalahari desert. However, the test was cancelled following pressure from Western governments. The first nuclear device was completed in 1977, with a cold test being planned in the Kalahari desert. However, the test was cancelled following pressure from Western governments. In 1978 the programme became militarised, with Armscor, the state arms manufacturer, taking control of nuclear weapons R&D. In 1982 the first deliverable nuclear explosive device was produced, and by 1989 the South Africa had constructed a total of six completed nuclear devices and one incomplete device. The standard explanation for the South African government’s decision to develop a nuclear weapons programme is that of deterrence against an attack by the Soviet Union, and as an instrument to gain US support should the need arise. However, it appears as though the programme was initially created for reasons of scientific prestige.

In 1989 the nuclear weapons programme was terminated by President F. W. de Klerk. By 1991 the entire nuclear programme had been dismantled, with the materials from the nuclear devices being safely stored. A safeguard agreement was signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency. On 10 July 1991 South Africa signed the Non-proliferation Treaty. The conventional explanation for the termination of the programme is that by 1989 South Africa no longer considered a Soviet-sponsored invasion to be a credible threat, particularly given the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, it is possible that the apartheid regime did not want an African National Congress (ANC) government (and perhaps also white extremist groups) to gain access to nuclear weapons.

Since 1994, the South African government has opposed all nuclear tests, and subscribes to the view that security is derived from nuclear disarmament and not nuclear proliferation, and hence it has proactively pursued a disarmament and non-proliferation agenda at an international level. Despite the fact that South Africa appears to be an anomaly in terms of nuclear disarmament (as it is the only country that has voluntarily terminated its nuclear weapons programme), there are two broad lessons that can be drawn for other countries with nuclear weapons programmes. First, given the right combination of factors and conditions, complete nuclear disarmament at a national level can be achieved, and second, the termination of a nuclear weapons programme provides the disarming country with the opportunity to gain prestige in international disarmament circles.
The Rise and Demise of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme: Lessons for States with Nuclear Weapons Programmes?

“We must ask the question, which might sound naive to those who have elaborated sophisticated arguments to justify their refusal to eliminate these terrible and terrifying weapons of mass destruction – why do they need them anyway!”

(Speech by South African President, Nelson Mandela at the 53rd Session UN General Assembly, New York, 21 September 1998).

Introduction

In terms of nuclear disarmament South Africa occupies a unique position internationally, as it is the only country to have developed a nuclear weapons capability and then voluntarily relinquished it. This paper seeks to determine if the manner and process of South Africa’s denuclearisation provide any lessons for international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

This paper consists of the following four sections: the creation of the South African nuclear weapons programme; the termination of the nuclear weapons programme; South Africa’s policy on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation since 1994; and the lessons for other countries with nuclear weapons programmes.

The creation of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme

South Africa was a major supplier of uranium to Western powers from the 1940s, and as a result of this link became involved in nuclear energy research and development (R&D). Assistance was provided by the governments of the United States (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK), in particular, South African scientists received training in the USA and Europe, and South Africa was able to source highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the USA (Spector and Smith, 1990: 270).

In 1948 the South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB) (it was later renamed the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) in 1982) was established by an Act of Parliament to exercise control over the production of, and trade in, uranium. This Act was amended in 1959 to make provision for research, development and utilisation of nuclear technology. In 1965 South Africa acquired a research reactor, and research was initiated to develop both separated plutonium and HEU. The former part of the programme was terminated in 1969 due to its high cost. Throughout the 1960s the uranium enrichment programme made steady progress, and by 1967 uranium had been enriched on a laboratory scale through a process based on a stationary wall vortex tube. In 1969 construction began on a secret pilot HEU plant at Valindaba, near Pretoria (known as the Y-plant). In 1970, due to a number of security breaches, Prime Minister Voster informed Parliament about the existence of the Y-plant (Beri, 1998).

In 1971, with South Africa on the threshold of developing its own home-grown HEU, the Minister of Mines gave the AEB permission to undertake R&D on nuclear explosive devices for mining and construction purposes (De Villiers et al., 1993: 99). By May 1974, a non-nuclear scale model of a gun-type explosive device was secretly tested; and later that year, after the results of the test were known, Prime Minister John Voster approved plans to construct a small number of explosive devices and to build a secret testing site in the Kalahari desert (Beri, 1998).

The first nuclear device was completed in 1977, and a cold test of the device at the Kalahari site was planned to test the device’s non-nuclear components, logistics and instrumentation. However, before the test could take place, the Kalahari site was detected by Soviet intelligence, which informed the US government. Following pressure from Western governments, South Africa cancelled the planned test, and Kalahari site was abandoned and sealed (De Villiers et al., 1993:100). By the beginning of 1978, South Africa was able to produce its own HEU. It was also at this time that the programme became militarised, with Armscor, the state arms manufacturer, being given effective control of nuclear weapons R&D.

In September 1979 it is widely believed that South Africa conducted a nuclear weapons test in the South Indian Ocean, however, to date no conclusive proof has emerged to confirm this event. In 1982 Armscor produced the first deliverable nuclear explosive device, and by 1989, the South African nuclear programme had constructed a total of six completed nuclear devices and one incomplete device. In 1989 the nuclear weapons programme was terminated by President F.W. de Klerk. It is estimated that a total of 1,000 personnel were involved in South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme (De Villiers et al., 1993: 102).

The dominant explanation for the South African government’s decision to develop a nuclear weapons programme is...
that it was designed to act as a deterrent against an attack by the Soviet Union, and as an instrument to gain US support should the need arise. If Soviet or Soviet-sponsored military forces directly threatened South Africa, the regime reportedly planned to announce that it had a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, dramatically testing one or more of the weapons, if necessary, by dropping them from aircraft over the ocean, hoping that such a test would oblige the US to intervene on behalf of the Pretoria regime (Sagan, 1996: 60; De Villiers et al, 1993:100-101). From the mid-1970s, the South African government became increasingly concerned about the emergence of Soviet-aligned Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique. In addition, mainly as a result of South African military incursions into Angola and its support for the Unita rebel movement, Cuba sent troops and military equipment to Angola in support of the government.

Perceptions of Soviet-sponsored military invasion certainly provided the impetus for the perpetuation and intensification of the programme, however, with the benefit of hindsight, this explanation does not adequately account for why a nuclear weapons programme was established in the first place. The reason for this is that the programme was ge-stated within the mining sector, not the military sector; and was created prior to emergence of Soviet aligned governments in Angola and Mozambique, and even before to the official adoption of South Africa’s policy of “Total Strategy”, which was first articulated in 1977 Defence White Paper). According to Sagan (1996: 69-70), the programme was initially established for issues of prestige and was primarily championed by scientists within the mining industry in order to enhance their international reputations. Sagan (1996: 69-70) points out that the military was not consulted in terms of the design and construction of the first nuclear device. The result was the device was too unwieldy to be deliverable by an aircraft and had to be redesigned in order to conform to the safety and reliability standards set by Armscor.

**Termination of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme**

Following de Klerk’s decision to terminate the nuclear weapons programme, a Steering Committee, which included representatives of Armscor and AEC, was tasked determining the costs and benefits of maintaining the weapons programme. The Committee recommended the following: the dismantling and destruction of all nuclear devices (including the design and manufacturing information); the decontamination of equipment; and the closing of the enrichment plant. Furthermore, an independent auditor was appointed to ensure that this process was completed. (Howlett and Simpson, 1993:162; De Villiers et al, 1993:104).

In early 1990 the Y-plant was closed, and by the end of 1991 the entire nuclear programme had been dismantled, with the materials from the nuclear devices being transferred to the AEC for storage. Also in that year, a safeguard agreement was signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition, South Africa provided the IAEA with an inventory of nuclear materials that were in its possession. This was followed by an inspection of relevant facilities and sights by an IAEA team, which verified South Africa’s inventory. Surplus nuclear material is currently being stored in specially designed vaults that have IAEA seals and are checked on a regular basis (Howlett and Simpson, 1993: 166-167).

In September 1990, Pretoria agreed to sign the NPT, but only “in the context of an equal commitment by other states in the Southern African region.” Following intensive diplomatic efforts, especially by the US and the Soviet Union, Tanzania and Zambia agreed to sign the treaty. South Africa finally signed the NPT on 10 July 1991 (FAS, 2001). In 1993, the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act became law. This Act prohibits South African citizens from being involved in programmes relating to the construction of nuclear weapons.

Politicians, government officials and many analysts have argued that the termination of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme was primarily due to the following: an improved condition of regional security; a desire to achieve greater international acceptance; and financial reasons. The argument follows that in 1989 the South African government’s perception of the likelihood of a Soviet military invasion was significantly reduced following the planned withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, Namibia’s transition to independence, and the end of the Cold War. The termination of the programme and the signing of the NPT were seen as a means to reduce South Africa’s international isolation, which had been brought about by its apartheid policies. The nuclear weapons programme was also proving to be costly in financial terms. The initial cost of the programme was estimated to be in excess of R700 million (in current prices), however, the actual figure is estimated to be significantly higher (Mackerdhuij, 1999:8; Batchelor and Willet, 1998: 72).

There is, however, another dimension to the termination of the nuclear programme that has not often been voiced. That is, there is a strong possibility that the apartheid regime did not want an African National Congress (ANC) government (and perhaps also white extremist groups) to gain access to nuclear weapons. According to Sagan (1996: 70-71) the de Klerk government’s actions “spoke more loudly than its words: the weapons components were dismantled before IAEA inspections could be held to verify the activities, and all the nuclear programme’s plans, history of decisions, and approval and design documents were destroyed prior to the public announcement of the programme’s existence”.3

**South Africa’s approach to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation since 1994**

Since 1994, when the ANC was elected into power, the South African government has based its laws, as well as both its domestic and foreign policy on the respect for hu-
man rights. Hence, the government has opposed nuclear tests, and has been publicly critical of the governments of France, China, India and Pakistan for conducting such tests. In terms of nuclear weapons, South Africa subscribes to the view that world security is derived from nuclear disarmament and not nuclear proliferation, and consequently it has proactively pursued a disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998). At a national level, the South African Parliament has passed the Nuclear Energy Act (1999), which prohibits the nuclear material to be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

South Africa has taken an active role in the international arena in promoting comprehensive nuclear weapons disarmament and non-proliferation. In 1995, lobbying by South Africa contributed significantly to the indefinite extension of the NPT, which, it has been argued, ensured the viability of nuclear non-proliferation by making the non-proliferation regime more universal (SIPRI, 1996: 589). South Africa also played a key role in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (1996), with South Africa’s Ambassador to the United Nations having served as the Chair of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organisation.4 South Africa has become a member of the following non-proliferation entities: the Zangger Committee, Nuclear Supplies Group and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It played an active role in the negotiation of the African Nuclear Weapons-Free-Zone (Pelindaba) Treaty in 1995. In terms of the Treaty, signatories undertake not to acquire and possess nuclear explosive devices. It prohibits nuclear testing, the dumping of radioactive waste and armed attacks on nuclear installations.5

In 1998 South Africa entered into the ‘New Agenda Coalition’ (NAC) with the governments of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia and Sweden. The first action of the NAC was to issue a Joint declaration, titled, ‘A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,’ stating they could “no longer remain complacent” at the hazards posed by maintaining nuclear weapons stocks. Since 1998, the NAC has introduced an annual resolution at the United Nations General Assembly on the need to promote a nuclear free world. At 2000 NPT Review Conference, due the negotiating skills of the NAC, the Nuclear Weapons States (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States) committed themselves to “an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals” (Roche, 2000).

Lessons for other countries
At a superficial level the denuclearisation of South Africa appears to be an anomaly in terms of nuclear disarmament. After all, historically, South Africa is the only country to have completely disbanded its nuclear weapons programme at its own behest. This was unequivocally influenced by the fact that prior to the creation, and during the existence of the programme, no other African country south of the Sahara possessed a nuclear weapons capability, and that the termination of this programme took place during an extraordinary domestic political transformation, as well as at the dawn of the post-Cold War era.

However, despite the uniqueness of the South African experience, two broad lessons can be drawn for other countries with nuclear weapons programmes.

First, given the right combination of factors and conditions, complete nuclear disarmament at a national level can be achieved. In South Africa, the juncture of reduced threat perception by the South African government, financial constraints and concerns (though somewhat misguided) that nuclear weapons material would be misused under a new regime, led to the termination of the nuclear weapons programme.

Second, the termination of a nuclear weapons programme provides the disarming country with the opportunity to gain prestige in international disarmament circles. The South African government, due to skilful political positioning and manoeuvring, has been able use its voluntarily termination of its nuclear weapons programme as a means to gain considerable international prestige in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Bibliography


### Footnotes

1 At this time a double flash was detected by a US Vela satellite over the Indian Ocean, which was characteristic of a low-yield nuclear explosive test. South Africa and possibly Israel were suspected of being involved, however South Africa denied that it had tested a nuclear explosive device. Subsequently, the Carter administration in the US assembled a panel of scientists to assess the data from the satellite. The panel concluded that, lacking independent collaborative data to support a nuclear origin of the signals, the original interpretation of the satellite data could not be justified. According to the panel, the flash could have been caused by a combination of natural events, particularly a micrometeorite impact on the detector sunshade, followed by small particles ejected as a result of the impact (FAS, 2001).

2 “Total Strategy” entailed a co-ordinated, co-ordinated and total response by the apartheid state to the perception that there was a “total onslaught” of communist expansion in southern Africa.

3 In 1992 there was speculation in the press that an ANC government might transfer weapons grade uranium to Libya, Cuba, Iran, and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as recompense for support the ANC received during the liberation struggle (Pabian, 1995: 10).


Summary

To summarise, if we want to rid the world of nuclear weapons:

1) Western cosmology (or civilisation, culture) must be addressed as deeply determining for the development of nuclearism. We all need a deeper understanding of the mechanisms and deep-rooted assumptions that make nuclear weapons look natural and legitimate (at least to those who have them).

2) Secondly, it will be necessary to open up Western culture to other cultural influences that are, in and of themselves, less conducive to nuclearism, be it Gandhian, Buddhist, Hindu, Taoist or other kinds of thinking. Particularly after September 11, 2001, we should try to strengthen the ‘soft’ peace-promoting aspects of all religions and the dialogue among them. World unity in diversity, not uniformity, is desirable. The very existence of nuclear weapons is a gross negation of diversity.

3) Further, there is a need to discuss and develop a set of truly global ethical norms that are not based on the local neighbourhood ethics we are used to running. So far globalisation has been military and economic, while cultural, ethical and political globalisation is lagging ever more behind. Western citizens and their governments have to develop less anthropocentric worldviews and become more humble and caring about the future for all humanity because we have so much technological power, as some would say more than the human race is mature enough to handle.

4) To rid the world of nuclear and other weapons, we have to attack the self-created, pathological enemy images and threat assessments. There is a great need to actualise, in pedagogical manners, the huge arsenals of non-violent conflict-resolution and the values of mutuality, coexistence, unity in diversity, tolerance, reconciliation and forgiveness – to make the soft power stronger and make the hard power weaker. The next step is to present the alternatives to decision-makers saying something like, ”if you pursue these different policies based on these different norms and concepts you are likely to create fewer enemies and win more friends in the future – in short, be more safe.” (Some examples follow).

5) Finally, to learn to live without the bomb, we need a better balance between male and female thinking and understanding of life and politics. And more women in decision-making structures.

This leads us to the second major question raised in the introduction: how to envision a far better, nuclear-free world?

Mr Øbergs article will follow on page 42.
Instead of Nuclear Weapons

New Views on Human, Global and National Security

An international IPPNW and Peace Researchers seminar
taking place at the Russian Federation State Duma,
Moscow 25th March 2002
Instead of Nuclear Weapons
Вместо ядерного оружия:
новые взгляды
на обеспечение
глобальной
и национальной
безопасности
Can We Learn to Live without the Bomb?

Ten years after the so-called end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons are still with us. There is the BMD, the risk of diversion of fissile materials, the fear of nuclearisation of terrorism. The weapons and their means of delivery have become ever more sophisticated. Through base systems, sub-marines, aircraft carriers, the global reach of militarism has intensified. Still, in proportion to the increasing threat all this represents to humankind’s survival as well as to democracy and global development, public debate with visions of a nuclear-free is desperately feebly.

Advocates of a nuclear-free world, face immensely powerful governments and military-industrial-scientific structures. We also face the arrogance of power of the roughly 600 individuals (presidents, prime ministers, defence ministers, chiefs of staffs and commanders) who operate the global nuclear system, over and above the heads of 6 billion people on Earth. There has never been a referendum on whether or not citizens wanted to be ‘secured’ or ‘defended’ by nuclear weapons. Indeed, one could advance the hypothesis that nuclear weapons would be abolished if true national and global democracy were a reality. But advocates of nuclear freedom must also do some soul-searching and ask: have we chosen the most effective strategies and tactics in our work for nuclear disarmament? My answer is a definite ‘no’!

The, perhaps provocative, thesis of this analysis is that we have:

a) underestimated the human, psychological, existential and cultural-cosmological aspects of the nuclear age;

b) we have worked far too much against the nuclear weapons as such (technical-material criticism) compared to working out visions of a better nuclear-free and peaceful world (existential, philosophical constructivism).

Existential aspects – or: what is so attractive about nuclear weapons?

While most people abhor nuclear weapons and war, they also, consciously or unconsciously, embrace them as something good. Many have infused positive values into the very existence of the Bomb. It carries a secret as to how it will “act” the day it is used and few have ever seen a nuclear weapon. It is mystical and belongs to a teasingly exciting but closed society and is said to have magic powers. While it is a threat to all, it also carries the hope of our salvation; we can hope to obtain “security” from an evil enemy who, if he tries to kill us, will be killed himself.

By infusing the bomb with godlike imagery and integrating it in what is a consistent belief system bordering on deep religiosity, people can play God themselves, become the Destroyer and the Maker, create an eternal future or punish – themselves and/or others. What Robert Jay Lifton calls the “passionate embrace of nuclear weapons as a solution to death anxiety and a way of restoring a lost sense of immortality” could be, I believe, one of the least thought of explanations of the fascination held by many vis-a-vis the omnipotent Bomb.

Another dimension is that of individual versus collective death. The imagery of mass-destuctive weapons is filled with allusions to death and dying. The search for the smallest unit of life led to the atom, the splitting of which is also the key to utter destruction. Could one argue that nuclear mass death is more attractive or more acceptable than individual, natural death? If it is true, as Tom Lehrer sang in the early 1960s, that in a nuclear war “we’ll all go together when we go, every Hottentot and every Eskimo” – then, one may hypothesise, our individual death becomes somewhat easier to think of and live with. The individual is relieved of the pain and fear in meeting death alone and can imagine that he/she will meet loved ones “on the other side.”

Closely related to this is the whole question of suicide – the so-called balance of (nuclear) terror and nuclear war often being compared to suicide: if we start we will get killed ourselves. If there are any signs to the effect that our present global civilisation and our times are suicidal, it is the first time in human history that we are also able to carry out the decision to exterminate ourselves and a considerable part, if not all, of Creation.

If we want to rid the world of nuclear weapons, we have to address these deep-seated existential issues, get them on the table, dialogue about them and overcome them as obstacles to change. It will not help us to focus on and attack the weapons or the nuclear managers, as is done in demonstrations, petitions, disarmament and arms control negotiations.

In front of us, thus, lies a huge existential, educational and soul-searching task that can only be approached through small-group and global dialogue and research: what are the positive aspects of nuclear weapons that have, for fifty years, prevented people world wide from rising against them as the utter madness they de facto represent?

Culture, cosmology and ethics

Except for the Chinese, Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons, all are

Christian nukes. They are the inventions and products of a Western or Occidental ‘social grammar’ as well as the West’s superior technology and science. Nuclear weapons can be seen as isomorphic with pyramidal or feudal structures of society and are managed by an all-powerful elite that seeks to dominate other peoples, other cultures and Nature. Male science came across the atom when trying to deprive Mother Nature of her secrets. Their function is conceived within a short time perspective – Big Bangs.
delivered within a few minutes over thousands of kilometres, a quick ending of a war or of all of civilisation. They are the embodiment of the power of science and technology over ethics and spirituality.

They are isomorphic with a mono-theistic belief system. Presumably, the user of nuclear weapons is completely convinced that there is only one truth, that he possesses that truth and that he has ‘God on our side’. In a culture based on poly-theism and on the belief that there can be more than one single truth, like e.g. Gandhianism and Buddhism, nuclear weapons and their use seem more difficult to explain and justify. Further, nuclear weapons are deeply anthropocentric; they are extended powers of Man, the Man that is the centre of everything, which means that there is nothing sacred and nothing above Man. Since the test in Alamagordo, code-named Trinity, an ever more secularised, technocratic and God-forgetting Occident took upon it to play God. Never before had Man been able to even think of the decision of whether or not to let Humanity live. Hitherto, that had belonged exclusively to the authority of God. Since 1945 Man competes with God about being the Almighty. And we are reminded of Robert Oppenheimer’s “I am become Death, the shatterer of the world” as well as Einstein’s famous dictum that everything then changed except our ways of thinking.

In terms of ethics on might say that Kant’s categorical imperative became outdated as a global rule. Philosopher Hans Jonas, for instance, rightly points out that the ever open question of what humans are or ought to be is now less important compared to the “first commandment tacitly underlying it, but never before in need of enunciation: That they should be – indeed as human beings. We need, he says, to expand Kant and observe a rule that he formulates in this manner: “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life.” That is, with the advent of nuclearism, we need to stress that there should be something rather than nothing and that we and the world will hardly survive in the long run without an ethics of global responsibility. The fundamentally new ethical claim is that we are responsible for preserving the Earth precisely because we can destroy it, and that was not a relevant issue before of thinking.

There are at least other essential aspects on the Bomb as expressive of Western cosmology. It is a deeply male-dominated technology and civilisation. The war system and the military-industrial system is the extreme expression of it; the Bomb has virtually no female aspects such as nurturing, mutuality, permanence of humanity, non-contractual obligations, cultivation of Nature, respect or care for future generations. Indeed, it is the negation of all that.

Secondly, it seems the West cannot live without enemies. If you do not have them, you construct them. Most security experts and politicians seem to depart from the utterly misguided assumption that, first, there is an objective threat assessment done and then military defence and security policies are developed to meet them and reduce their potential impact. The whole system operates the other way around as can be seen in the reaction by the West to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact: the war-preparing system continues virtually unchanged while images of threats and favourite enemies are produced through a kind of assembly line.

Third, the Western obsession with enemies points in the direction of an inner weaknes from paranoia. The more wealth one owns, the more power and privileges one has in an ever more unequal world, the more there is to fear to lose. Thus, others more easily come to look like envious, greedy and threatening – be it refugees, asylum-seekers, terrorists or ‘rogue’ states. All dangers have to be fought. There is a potential terrorist or bomber lurking around every corner – and thus we have the pathological, autistic system of self-created threats producing ever more sophisticated weapons and using more and more scarce resources irrespective of what reality actually looks like. The weapons are put to use to legitimate and justify the power system and thereby creating more future enemies, e.g. people who hate the West; in short, the new Bin Ladens.

Towards a vision of a nuclear-free world

George Bernhard Shaw has said that most people look at the world as it is and ask: why? – but what we ought to do is to look at the world as it could be and ask: why not? I believe this is essential; we need to develop images of a nuclear-free world to help people overcome the sense of powerlessness as well as overcome the obstacles mentioned above. Admittedly it is a tall order, but it has to be done by those who see the need for change; those who benefit from the nuclear system in particular and the military system in general cannot be expected to develop alternatives to them. While some people may concentrate on some alternative visions and strategies, others may brainstorm and advocate other changes. In the rest of this exposé, I shall focus on only a few, fully aware that there are so many other equally important aspects and themes.

1. Globalisation must now reach the fields of politics, NGO activities, ethics, peace-making etc. By globalisation we mean here a truly global dialogue and exchange. Even future-thinking NGOs are often surprisingly ‘provincial’ thinking that if they have a national network or a European platform that will do. It will not. The economic and military globalisers truly see the world as one system, as one field of operation. They are more visionary in that sense than most alternative forces. Disarmament and de-nuclearisation must be globalised via Internet, e-mail, travels and exchanges at all levels. Meetings, dialogues and peace work in which only one culture, one civilisation or one religion is represented will be increasingly irrelevant.

2. Top priority: Westerners must learn from others, receive spiritual and other “development aid” from non-Westerners, humbly learning rather than merely teaching. Teaching others (or teaching them lessons) and believing that the West is # 1 is a serious disease found among Western

governments as well as many columnists, experts, alternativists and NGOs. So Westerners should ask others: how do you think we can get rid of nuclear weapons and the war system, what is your philosophy about peace and world order and can you help us?

3. Non-violence must be taught and learned across the change community. It means studying the classics and the contemporary cases where non-violence has played a historical role. The present tendency of alternativists to accept warfare, national military defence, humanitarian intervention, bombings here and there is an implicit support to the nuclear system.

For instance, there is far too little debate (and resistance) among intellectuals throughout the Eastern European system (and among Western NGOs assisting them) about membership in the nuclear-based NATO alliance and the nuclear-related European Union. It is an implicit endorsement of violent conflict-resolution which, in its turn, legitimate more nuclear weapons and militarism.

4. A new emphasis must be placed on non-violent conflict-resolution, on preventive diplomacy and violence-preventive (not conflict-preventive) policies and strategies. It must happen on the individual, the small-group level, the national, regional and the inter-national and the global level. That in its turn means new education. Peacemaking by peaceful means (the UN Charter norm) requires professional education in the school system, in vocational training, in NGO communities and educational settings, in national peace academies and throughout the international organisation system, such as in the OSCE and the UN. It takes at least as much education to learn to mitigate and solve conflict with as little violence as possible as it does to learn to fight wars.

5. It is of utmost importance for democracy and pluralistic debate that NGO continues to stand for Non-Governmental and does not come to denote Near-Governmental. The more state-finance NGOs (and e.g. peace research) obtain, the greater the likelihood that they stop being alternatives to government politics, including nuclear and other military policies.

6. Public education about proportions and allocations of means in this world. We should intensify the dissemination of information concerning the general citizenry everywhere about the allocations to the military and to repressive systems and how much good could be done in the world if these priorities were changed. This means also helping the media to make a more relevant coverage of world affairs. Over the last 25 years of lecturing and teaching in different parts of the world, I’ve been surprised how unknown these proportions still are even to the socially concerned – as is, by the way, the UN Charter. It is difficult to imagine that people find it acceptable that 75,000 to 100,000 die unnecessarily every day from lack of food, water, shelter, sanitation etc (not from war) while the world’s most privileged governments pour even more billions into ‘security.’ But how many actually know these facts? And how many feels powerless when they hear them? Neither, I am sure, do they find it acceptable that world military expenditures equal the income of the 49% poorest people on earth. The question we must address is: why is there not a mass protest, a mass willingness to change, an outrage and a cry for ‘enough is enough’? Is there a deficit in awareness, in empowerment or in democracy as we know it.

7. Central to policies for a nuclear-free world are answers to the question: how can we learn to solve perfectly natural conflicts world wide with as little violence as possible and certainly without the use of mass-destructive weapons? People everywhere must be given a chance to learn as much about conflicts and conflict-resolution as they do about, say, computers. We talk about ordinary illiteracy and IT illiteracy, but most of us are conflict illiterates.

Perhaps leaders should not become leaders before they have something like a driving license for conflict-management? We build safer cars and roads, we only issue driving licenses to people who have studied theory, know the traffic signs and have practised behind the wheel. Why? To reduce human suffering and the costs of accidents. This idea should be emulated when it comes to conflicts in our world. No leader would never send young boys with no military training into war, but governments and other actors carelessly send military, diplomats, lawyers, former ministers, etc out as mediators and ‘conflict-managers’ to conflict regions without as much as a weekend course in conflict-understanding psychology or mediation. Of course it must go wrong – and when conflict-resolution goes wrong, violence takes over and the internationals blame the local parties.

But violence comes when conflicts are deliberately provoked or ignored or wrongly treated. It comes when one sees no way out. Creative intervention with non-violent means can help avoid the tunnel vision that violence and wars are based on.

8. The UN Charter remains the best single document for global peace-making. The UN is in obvious need of substantial reforms, but if more member states and decision-makers would just honour the letter and spirit of the UN Charter, the world would undoubtedly be a much more humane place than it is. It is time we really take it seriously and allocate the most competent people and much more funds to the UN and its family. The UN is the sum total of what its members make of it. When they speak warmly for nuclear abolition in the General Assembly and continue to develop nuclear systems at home, they make the world a less safe place and undermine the normative importance of the United Nations. Regional organisations as well as thousands of NGOs can contribute to the UN norm of peace by peaceful means and apply this principle to problem-solving in fields such as the environment, peace, women’s issues, globalisation. And they could do more to honour this principle that is the case today.

9. Ideas and norms are at least as important as organisational matters. Each human being is a potential movement for change, including nuclear abolition. Anyone who has
learned something can help others understand. The idea that big governmental and non-governmental organisations with multi-million dollar budgets are the only ones who can bring about change is utterly misleading and self-serving for exactly those organisations. It is true that we need wider co-operation because problems cross borders in an increasingly globalising world, but it does not follow that we are best helped by ever bigger units. Bigger organisations are often characterised by low levels of creativity and flexibility as well as political correctness because of dependence on government funds. And the bigger the organisation, the more power at the top and, thus, the more energy devoted to power struggles.

10. **We need alternative defence and security.** We need defensive defence structures, only operable if a member of the international system – be it a province, a country or a region – is attacked. Long range forces with devastating destructive power (offensive defence) should become a thing of the past, since they are meant to be used only outside of one’s own territory. The ideas that each country or region can keep offensive forces and credibly maintain that it has only defensive motives should again be a thing of the past. There are many ways to envision it but a combination defence of a) defensive military, b) civil, economic and structural preparation (against embargos, terror, economic crisis), c) a minimum level of self-reliance in case one should be cut off and civil protection, d) civil resistance and e) non-violent struggle are all highly relevant elements.

In a democracy some citizens may want to carry weapons, some want to help secure their society in purely civilian ways; modern defence should be responsive to both categories. But not to the wish of carrying any type of weapons: the offensive conventional and the mass-destructive weapons should be phased out a priori. Modern defence and security also implies training many young women and men in international non-violent service, mediation, reconciliation and reconstruction.

Governments and NGOs can decide also to establish “conflict consortiums” in each country consisting of area experts and conflict-resolution experts, NGOs and ministerial staff who would engage in conflicts around the world before they flare up, in short practising early warning and early listening and early action. The only thing nobody needs is the authoritarian “you-have-no-choice-but-NATO-membership and exclusively military defence technically capable of offence. It goes against democracy and it goes against the simple fact that different peoples and different cultures face different security challenges and thus cannot all be fed the same standard solution imposed by Western power.

We have touched upon a series of themes and initiatives for the future: multi-cultural dialogue and mutual learning, basic non-violence, public education and education in conflict-management, global norms and the importance of the UN Charter’s provisions, global conflict-management that promotes violence-prevention and violence-reduction and, finally, alternative multi-layered defence compatible with genuine democracy.

*If a development took place in this direction grosse modo, the ‘need’ for nuclear weapons and other violent means would be reduced. The only way I can see us moving in that direction is dialogue, dialogue and more dialogue. And it should revolve around “the four ‘Cs’ “: coalition-building, constructivism, creativity and concrete visions of more humane, just and peaceful societies.*

We need to throw off the fear that tells us that change is more dangerous than continuing with the present policies. Instead we need the hope and the vision that democracy, justice, development and peace means freedom from nuclearism and reduction of violence to zero. It can be done in many ways and the above elements can be combined in thousands of ways. There will never be one concept of world peace but only many smaller ‘peaces’ that make up a global unity in diversity.

Hopefully, we shall never see the thesis confirmed that there has to be a nuclear accident or war before people get together and act. Let’s begin now and work with a deep conviction that there is common sense and an empowering democracy through which nuclear abolition can be achieved. Until we have tried much more intensely, we do not know that it is impossible.
InSTEAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
PERSUADING BRITAIN TO DO WITHOUT

Mr Stephen Pullinger
Executive Director
International Security Information Service (ISIS)
Strand Bridge House
138-142 The Strand
London WC2 1HR
United Kingdom
Email: isis@isisuk.demon.co.uk

Summary

This paper provides a perspective on why Britain still retains its nuclear weapons at a time when the country has rarely been more secure from external military threat. It begins by examining the obstacles to British nuclear disarmament. These are seen as being:

• The domestic political legacy
• Public opinion and low saliency
• Personnel
• Official resistance to a nuclear weapon-free world
• International events

The basic paradigm governing general public and establishment thinking can be challenged and overcome. The variables that could break the paradigm and influence Britain’s decision on nuclear weapon retention are identified as being:

1. Cost – when decisions are required about the replacement of Britain’s Trident system it is likely that the cost of maintaining Britain’s nuclear forces will become a salient political issue.
2. Reduced nuclear threat – favourable international developments could reduce the actual and perceived threat of nuclear weapons to Britain.
3. Disarmament lead from others – either the US or possibly the EU might take a lead on disarmament, taking Britain with them.
4. Public opinion changes – nuclear weapons either become irrelevant to the public or, conceivably, perceptions of disarmament change as a result of worrying pro-nuclear US actions.
5. Energetic leader / pressure from party – leading political figures may embrace nuclear disarmament as a personal crusade and/or pressure from within their parties to disarm may become more powerful.
6. Nuclear accident / or offensive use – a major accident involving a nuclear weapon could sufficiently raise fears in the domestic and international populations to ignite calls for all such weapons to be scrapped. The actual use of nuclear weapons would also certainly spur calls for disarmament.

So, taking these six variables into account, what are the most likely (or least unlikely) circumstances under which Britain might renounce nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future?

On the negative side, the present domestic political climate in Britain does not suggest that any radical policy shift from a British Government is likely. The Labour leadership remains keen to portray itself as strong on defence, and plainly wishes to keep its unilateralist past well and truly buried. The Conservative party, as it hardens its right-wing agenda, hardly looks ready to consider disarmament. Across the Atlantic, with a Republican in the White House, supporters of multilateral arms control have their hands full just defending what has already been achieved without being in a position to advance their cause. So, in the immediate future at least, one cannot envisage any disarmament lead from the US for the UK to follow unless perhaps there was a significant accident involving nuclear weaponry.
This paper provides a perspective on why Britain still retains its nuclear weapons at a time when the country has rarely been more secure from external military threat. It concludes that recent history, political inertia and ingrained public perceptions are equally if not more important factors than ones of threat assessment and preservation of national security. The paper then seeks to address these obstacles to British nuclear disarmament and to suggest what needs to happen to bring about a change in policy.

Introduction – Nuclear Disarmament is British Government Policy

The British Government is committed to helping to achieve a nuclear weapon-free world. True, it still cites the obstacles to achieving this goal, but nevertheless it did make an “unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the global elimination of nuclear weapons and has gone some way (further than any of the other Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)) in making progress towards meeting that goal. So, to some extent at least, there is movement in the right direction. How far the British Government will go in the long run, however, is much more open to conjecture. For significant progress to be made will require a number of stubborn impediments to be overcome.

Although actually setting the goal of trying to achieve a nuclear weapon-free world (NWFW) is important it does not necessarily follow that the ultimate achievement of such an objective can or will be reached. The important point is the degree to which the intention is serious and sincere, and the consequent level of commitment devoted to reaching the ultimate goal. The further necessary steps to complete de-weaponisation might prove impracticable (or be claimed to be so) to take for any number of reasons. Nevertheless, Britain and the rest of the international community could travel a lot further down the road of nuclear confidence building, arms control and disarmament before such an ultimate decision stage is reached.

Conversely, if the nuclear powers chose not to pursue a NWFW seriously and then experienced a rapid expansion of nuclear-armed states, say 10-15 years hence, by the time public opinion began to appreciate the attraction of a NWFW (and the real dangers of a multi-nuclear world) the opportunity to achieve one might have been lost - perhaps forever. Indeed, under those circumstances, public opinion would be just as likely to endorse a policy of retention as to become more enthusiastic for renunciation.

A. Obstacles to UK nuclear disarmament

1. Domestic political legacy

Until the early 1980s the major political parties in the United Kingdom supported the retention of nuclear weapons. But following its electoral defeat in 1979, the Labour Party adopted a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament as part of a general shift leftwards. The Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher, which adopted a strongly pro-defence stance, attacked Labour’s unilateralism as naïve and defeatist. Electorally, unilateralism – along with many other Labour policies – proved very unpopular. The Conservatives were emphatically returned to office in 1983 and 1987 and Labour felt obliged to re-examine many of its policies, including its attitude towards Britain’s nuclear weapons.

The then Labour leader, Neil Kinnock decided that Britain’s nuclear weapons had to be “neutralised” as a political issue. There was no great enthusiasm for nuclear weapons within Labour ranks, in fact quite the reverse – there was (and still is) a strong and persistent anti-nuclear feeling amongst a significant portion of the Labour party. But the Labour leadership was frightened of showing sentiments that could be slated by the Conservatives as ‘unpatriotic’. Labour calculated that if it was ever to get re-elected it would have to reassure the British public that the future of the UK deterrent would be secure under a Labour government.

So began a gradual process of Labour retreat from unilateralism. In the early stages of this policy transition, the Labour leadership tried to suggest that Britain’s nuclear weapons would serve merely as a grand bargaining tool that Britain could employ to help secure wider multilateral nu-
clear disarmament. But the illogicality of preserving an expensive weapon system solely for the purpose of getting rid of it lacked credibility. After all, many asked, why continue to waste money on something to which you ascribe no value as a weapon?

The Labour leader was also forced to begin back-tracking on his earlier commitment that he would never use Britain’s nuclear weapons. This embarrassing question hung over the Labour leadership for a number of years, only finally being laid to rest when Tony Blair assumed the leadership of the Party, said that nuclear weapons did serve a deterrent role and that he would be prepared to use them. Ironically, Labour’s volte face occurred just as the Cold war was ending and the Soviet threat was disappearing.

2. Public Opinion and low saliency

Labour’s abandonment of unilateralism brought it back into line with its main political adversary – the Conservative Party. Hence, as far as domestic politics is concerned, Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons became a non-issue; there was no political mileage for the Conservatives in raising the issue. As nuclear weapons became of little concern to the people, so they also fell well down the politicians’ agenda too. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) went into abeyance – the sizeable public marches calling for nuclear disarmament became a thing of the past, as they also did elsewhere in the world. Labour was re-elected to Government in 1997 and again in 2001.

So, how does the British public now think about this issue, when it does? Everyone is aware that the Cold War is over, with Russia – unable even to quell properly an uprising in tiny Chechnya – resembling an emaciated bear rather than a ferocious grizzly. On the other hand, the Russians still have thousands of nuclear weapons and their mood and fortunes could change. Then there are other potential enemies too, such as Saddam Hussein – a ruthless dictator with proven WMD capabilities against whom Britain has fought previously. Broadly speaking, the public has a sense that if the country has a nuclear arsenal of its own – the ultimate deterrent – no-one will dare attack Britain.

Yet, there is no deep anxiety about the issue: there is a widespread appreciation that the risk of involvement in nuclear war has declined. The ‘rogue’ state argument does not generate the same popular (or official) fears that it appears to in the US, for example. One gets the impression that the British public could be susceptible to persuasion about the continuing need for Britain to have its own nuclear weapons, should its political leadership decide to take such a lead. Nevertheless, the task of convincing the people that they can be protected just as well without nuclear weapons – indeed, that they will actually be safer in a world without any such weapons – is unlikely to prove a simple one. This is especially so given the probability that the mature national debate required would quickly degenerate into simplistic exchanges of distorted sound-bites, whipped up by the tabloid press.

3. Personnel

Despite it being official policy, there is little evidence that the British government currently has any intention of actively seeking to achieve that ultimate goal.

Since coming to office, the Labour government has demonstrated a willingness to use Britain’s armed forces – most dramatically, in the Balkans, Sierra Leone and Iraq – in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. The Prime Minister is gaining a reputation as a “strong” leader, not afraid to tackle his foes with military might. This tough defence stance has helped exorcise the Party’s unilateralist past. It is hard to imagine, therefore, that it will do anything that might resurrect those anti-nuclear memories in the public mind by taking any new risks in this field. Moreover, there is little to see what the Government might gain from pursuing such a course. There is certainly no public demand that it should do so. For it to alter its calculation – to take up the cudgels for nuclear disarmament – would, therefore, probably require changes in external factors.

This view is strengthened by the British Government’s performance in pursuit of its (far less ambitious) arms control agenda. When the Prime Minister did speak out here – urging the US Senate to ratify the CTBT – he was rebuffed. Since then, despite the Bush Administration’s rejection of other multilateral arms agreements, for example, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – both contrary to British policy – Mr. Blair has been muted in his public response.

This reluctance to ruffle US feathers, and indeed to (publicly) go along with dubious US actions, illustrates a persistent theme of British foreign policy, namely to preserve Britain’s so-called special relationship with Washington. US views on UK nuclear weapons may be ambivalent but London sees these as symbolising a special US-UK partnership and, incidentally, as a counter-balance to federal Euro-centrism.

It should not be forgotten, however, that a sizeable proportion of the Labour Party would probably like the leadership to adopt a more active and purposeful attitude towards UK nuclear disarmament. An aggressively unilateralist Republican US President might just prove the spur that stirs backbenchers’ passions sufficiently to see them attempting to force a change of tack in government policy.

Despite such pressure from within its own ranks it is not difficult to imagine that the present government, driven largely by the political imperatives of the election cycle, will resist tackling a problem that might take 20–30 years to solve.

4. Official resistance to a NWFW

Within the British establishment there is a significant constituency that cannot conceive of a NWFW either because it is believed to be naive and unrealistic or because it is judged impractical. Even those who can conceive of it, struggle to see how to reach it safely and remain there on a secure and
permanent basis. This school, which still holds sway within the defence and foreign ministries, calculates that because the proliferation of WMD is probably inevitable eventually, Britain’s retention of nuclear weapons remains crucial. There is even a strand of opinion that opposes British nuclear disarmament on the grounds that this would leave France as the sole nuclear power in Europe.

On the other hand, a number of extremely senior military figures, including at least four former Chiefs of the Defence Staff, since retiring from active service, have spoken out against the utility of nuclear weapons. This constituency, which may well enjoy extensive silent support from within the armed services, rejects the vast diversion of scarce resources away from conventional defence forces into a weapon it regards as having no useful purpose.

5. International events

Nuclear disarmament by Britain alone would, of course, be insufficient to secure global nuclear elimination. Nevertheless, such a change of attitude on the part of one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council could have an impact on the climate for disarmament. It could, for example, encourage those within the other nuclear states that favour nuclear elimination to show their colours more readily, and to increase pressure on those who continue to resist nuclear disarmament within their own countries. The New Agenda Coalition of states, formed with the intention of furthering the disarmament agenda in practical and constructive ways, would surely welcome such an influential new recruit.

On the downside, given the views of the new incumbent in the White House, the immediate priority may be to secure a hold on existing arms control agreements rather than trying to push ahead with a more radical disarmament schedule. Nor do any of the other nuclear weapon possessors appear ready to contemplate seriously, for the foreseeable future at least, complete nuclear disarmament.

B. The Present Paradigm

The present paradigm governing general public and establishment thinking in Britain can be summarised very crudely thus:

- If Britain retains the power to eliminate any potential enemy no-one will ever dare attack it. There are still dangerous dictators out there etc.
- It is a deterrent – not a weapon that Britain will ever use.
- Why should Britain give up its nuclear weapons and get nothing in return when it has invested so much money in them? Besides, there is no great pressure to give them up.
- Its nuclear weapons provide Britain with a certain “clout” in world affairs – they keep Britain at the “top table”.
- No one else will give them up
- Even if a NWFW is desirable it is not feasible.

That said, there are indications that the multilateral pursuit of the global elimination of nuclear weapons is popular with the British people.2 The point is that the above is essentially a ‘default’ policy, rationalising the situation Britain happens to find itself in at the end of the Cold War, but not positively advocated in its own right by any serious political group. The absence of pro-nuclear zeal, anywhere in Britain’s system, is just as significant as the weakness of the countervailing forces.

C. Breaking the paradigm

If this is an accurate picture of where we are, how might things change? What are the variables that could break the paradigm and influence Britain’s decision on nuclear weapon retention?

1. Cost (cost-benefit analysis influenced by international environment)

Now that all the capital expenditure has been invested, the running costs of Britain’s nuclear forces are a relatively small proportion of the overall defence budget (offically a couple of hundred million pounds per annum, although the true figure of sustaining Britain’s nuclear infrastructure and of protecting its nuclear-armed submarines and bases is far higher). Only when decisions about Trident’s replacement are due is it likely that the cost of maintaining Britain’s nuclear forces will become a salient political issue. In a harsh economic climate and a benign international security climate one can envisage there being strong Treasury pressure to justify a sizeable new capital investment. A decision on a replacement for Trident probably will not be necessary until 2005–2010.

2. Reduced Nuclear Threat

The decline of Russia’s military capability and enhanced democratic credentials could render the possibility of a Russian threat to the UK so small as to not be worth seriously contemplating. This would still leave some potentially hostile regimes in the Middle East but they would surely have less salience for the UK nuclear debate than did the USSR. Favourable political developments in the region – post-Saddam Hussein – could also reduce threats to the UK. Geographically, proliferation worries further afield – South Asia and beyond – are unlikely to stir UK requirements for nuclear missiles.

3. Disarmament lead from others

For global nuclear disarmament to make any serious progress a change of heart or mind in the US would probably be needed. A pro-NWFW government in the UK would surely follow any US lead with enthusiastic support. A sceptical UK government, on the other hand, still dependent on the US for the supply of nuclear missiles, may well feel obliged to go along with US aspirations, however reluctantly.

It is conceivable that an initiative for nuclear disarmament could emanate from Europe, maybe fostered by mounting European resistance to US foreign policy and a parallel strengthening of EU defence and security identity. This might result in Britain (and France) taking a lead in developing an arms control and disarmament policy that was quite distinct from the US one.
4. Public opinion changes

One can envisage the political saliency of nuclear weapons diminishing to the extent that they simply slip so far down peoples’ agendas that they become irrelevant – no-one continues to care very much whether or not Britain has nuclear weapons. Of course, such public loss of interest may well arise from perceptions of an improved international environment as mentioned above.

Another conceivable scenario could be one in which a unilateralist US begins to act in ways that are at variance with British and European security interests. A clumsy imposition of US Missile Defence plans, for example, could alienate Russia and damage the fabric of multilateral arms agreements, thereby seriously undermining strategic stability. This, in turn, may lead to greater demands from European publics (including Britain’s) to pursue a different, more pro-disarmament, path.

5. Energetic leader – pressure from party

In future, Britain may be governed by a Prime Minister or collection of ministers who regards nuclear disarmament as a personal crusade, an issue about which they feel sufficiently passionate to take considerable risks to promote. Pressure from within its own political party may also help to push a government in this direction. On an issue of this political significance, the government’s commitment may (although not necessarily) have had to have stood the test of the electorate before his or her policy could be embarked upon.

6. A nuclear accident/or offensive nuclear use

A major accident involving a nuclear weapon could sufficiently raise fears in the domestic and international populations to ignite calls for all such weapons to be scrapped. The actual use of nuclear weapons would also certainly spur calls for disarmament. Depending on the context however, it is also quite conceivable that use might induce some countries to cling onto their nuclear weapons even more fervently and others to begin or accelerate the pursuit of their possession – in order to avoid the fate of those who were unable to deter their nuclear-armed adversary.

D. Conclusion

So, taking these six variables into account, what are the most likely (or least unlikely) circumstances under which Britain might renounce nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future?

On the negative side, the present domestic political climate in Britain does not suggest that any radical policy shift from a British Government is likely. The Labour leadership remains keen to portray itself as strong on defence, and plainly wishes to keep its unilateralist past well and truly buried. The Conservative party, as it hardens its right-wing agenda, hardly looks ready to consider disarmament. Across the Atlantic, with a Republican in the White House, supporters of multilateral arms control have their hands full just defending what has already been achieved without being in a position to advance their cause. So, in the immediate future at least, one cannot envisage any disarmament lead from the US for the UK to follow unless perhaps there was a significant accident involving nuclear weaponry.

On the positive side, circumstances can be envisaged in which a British Government decided not to proceed with a successor system to Trident. Under benign international conditions, with a friendly Russia and a post-Saddam Iraq, the case in favour of investing billions of pounds in a new nuclear weapons system may well lack persuasiveness. This would be especially so if there were simultaneous clamourings for more spending on public services in a period of tight fiscal restraint. Ironically, taking its cue from an indifferent electorate, it may be the Treasury that sounds the final death knell for Britain’s nuclear weaponry.

Footnotes

1 In 1960, whilst in opposition and against the wishes of the party leadership, the Labour Party Conference voted in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament, but the vote was overturned the following year.

2 Cite poll commissioned by Pugwash. It found that: The UK should dismantle nuclear weapons gradually in a coordinated plan with the other nuclear states – 59 per cent; The UK should keep nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future – 23 per cent; The UK should eliminate nuclear weapons unilaterally (i.e. regardless of whether other countries do so) – 14 per cent. [NOP Consumer Market Research poll. Sample size 1004. Fieldwork 19-21/5/95.]
The end of the Cold War opened up for a world where military might no longer be the only or even the best guarantee for security. In the region around the Baltic Sea, the Baltic Sea Region, (BSR), this has become particularly obvious. From a situation where the iron curtain, right through the Baltic Sea itself, blocked almost all possibilities to co-operate, a multitude of new possibilities have emerged. Since 1991 a host of new, both state and non-state, organisations and networks have been created and develop in the region. These deal with everything from government co-operation, such as the Council of Baltic Sea States, CBSS, to environmental protection, economic co-operation, social development, city and town co-operation to art and culture.

An international region where common institutions and organisations dominate the interaction between countries constitute the beginning of a Security Community. In a Security Community common institutions, which are able to handle inter-state conflicts in a peaceful way is a key component. Other important aspects are democratic development in the counties, economic co-operation and confidence building in all spheres of society.

Here we will describe briefly the creation and development of a network of universities in the BSR as one component in a BSR Security Community. The Baltic University Programme, BUP, was initiated by Uppsala University in Sweden in the wake of the Cold War. It had its first meeting in early 1991. The interest for joining the Programme was large. On the eastern shore of our common sea there had not been many opportunities for students and teachers to work internationally. In the West many wanted to learn more about and meet colleagues in the “new” countries in the East. Already in the fall of 1991, 70 universities in 11 countries took part. Today, more than ten years later, 170 universities in 14 countries are established in the network, and a total of more than 7000 students study in the BUP every year.

Creating links between participating teaches, researchers and students is a key issue in BUP. This is done both through conventional meetings, summer courses, etc. and by using Information and Communications Technologies. Satellite TV was important in the first five years. Since then Internet and video conferencing have taken over at a rapid pace. The frequent interactivity contributes to confidence in a region where suspicion about “the others” once dominated. It is promising to see that students go beyond the mistrust and even animosity between countries that as a rule (to be continued)
dominated in an older generation. The phenomenon of “collective guilt” is rapidly losing ground. Instead we see an interest and respect for the cultures in neighbouring countries. The polls among BUP students indicate that getting to know each other and international co-operation is most appreciated.

The main concern within BUP is regional development. Thus environmental protection, development of the societies and the concept of sustainable development and democracy are main subjects studied. The agenda of the

BUP in itself thus is made to support the growth of a Security Community. The notion of security discussed in the publications, TV programs and conferences of the Baltic University is by necessity comprehensive security. It goes far beyond hard security and develop the notions of environmental security, public health, protection of culture and economic development.

The concept of security community and comprehensive security is elaborated in the small report attached. It is all excerpts from publications within the Baltic University.

Creating a Security Community in the Baltic Sea Region

1. The concept of a security community
(by Wallensteen, Nordqvists, Levinsson)

1.1 Wars and armed conflicts
One of the most significant issues in international relations is the one of armed conflict and war. During the Cold War, the continuous danger of nuclear war and a general insecurity for small countries plagued the world. In December 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved. The ‘Cold War’ as we were used to seeing it – military, political and to an important degree technological competition and rivalry between the world’s two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective military alliances – came to an end. The end of the Cold War also reduced the likelihood of a major war among the great powers of the world. The reduced tension in the international system has also created possibilities for promoting co-operation and building new kinds of bonds between former enemies. It has also created opportunities for domestic liberalisation and a rebirth of states and nations all around the world.

But the end of the Cold War has also unleashed new violence and unrest in some regions and nations where the newly born sovereignty has, for many of the states, been challenged by age-old rivalries and animosities.

These internal conflicts, that were suppressed during the Cold War, today constitute a major challenge to the international community. Indeed, patterns of disruption can be found all over the world, and the same patterns can be found in the Baltic region. But set against the recent violent history of the Baltic region, the past decade has shown positive signs of both political and economical consolidation towards democracy and the market-economy and new forms of co-operation and accord. But due to the relatively short time span of these new developments, the question is what the future holds for the countries of the region in terms of peace and security. To respond to this question, the authors have chosen to begin with the notion of “security community”. Thus, we ask: are conditions created for a future security community in the Baltic region? In a long-term perspective, a second question is important: towards which type of relations are we heading as a region?

1.2 Security community
What then does the notion of a “security community” entail? Today there is no fear of a renewed war between Sweden and Norway. The fear of war between Germany and France is also receding among the general population and among leading decision-makers. This means that disputes between these countries are expected to be handled in peaceful ways: through direct negotiations or within multilateral organisations (such as Nordic co-operation, the European Union). These are examples of significant and lasting changes in relationships which, in this century, have given rise to serious conflicts or wars. The peoples of these countries now feel more secure vis-à-vis each other. As this feeling is shared on both sides, it can be said that a security community has been created in these cases, i.e. Sweden – Norway and France – Germany.

The notion of a security community was introduced by a leading social scientist, Karl W. Deutsch, active in the United States but originally from Prague. His definitions can be seen below. The process, by which such security communities are created, while the countries still consolidate their independence, is an important one. In a discussion on the dangers of wars and chances for peace in the Baltic area, the concept is useful. We thus ask whether such a security community can be developed in the Baltic region in the foreseeable future. This would mean a significant change in

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present relations between countries and peoples in the region. Especially since the Baltic region has been an area of conflict for many wars in recent centuries.

1.3 Characteristics of a Security Community

Deutsch specified 14 factors for the emergence of security communities. These seem to be relevant in a discussion of the use of this concept for the Baltic region, but can be merged into the following five aspects:

1. **Relations to outside actors** are important for the emergence of a security community. This might be the existence of a common military threat to the region or joint security co-operation extending beyond the region. Deutsch finds that outside military threats sometimes promote co-operation within a region, but that such effects are short-lived. It suggests, however, that the general relationships surrounding the region are important, and thus, we need to discuss the relations between the smaller states of the region and the major centres of power in Europe.

2. There would have to be a **communality of major values** among the countries concerned. This refers to a shared view of, for instance, democracy and market economy. The spreading and stabilisation of democracy in Europe as a whole, as agreed in the Paris Treaty of 1990, and in the Baltic region would be a most important factor for the future. In particular, democracy increases the legitimacy of governments and gives access to power for more groups. The links between domestic democracy and the absence of war are dealt with specifically.

3. There would have to be **mutual responsiveness** among the states and peoples of the region. This refers to an ability to predict the behaviour of other states. It requires extensive contacts and communication, as well as psychological and political adjustment, for instance, to the loss of a dominant status that is a result of changing conditions. Experience in solving conflicts peacefully, as well as active participation in international conferences, would indicate responsiveness.

4. **New forms of behaviour** among the states and peoples, which make the present distinctly different from the past, are another feature of a security community. This involves, for instance, improving economic conditions for the whole or important parts of the region (compared to other regions, as well as compared to the past). This we could interpret to mean a move away from reliance on armaments for security to disarmament, giving room for other types of contacts.

5. To this we need to add the significance of **common institutions**, which at the same time respect and uphold the independence of the member states, and contribute to concerted actions in security matters. Such institutions may incorporate many of the four factors but are still important in their own respect. Such institutions, which might be the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), NATO, EU (the European Union) or others, can be evaluated with respect to their significance for security in the Baltic region.

1.4 Security communities and alliances

One may ask if a security community is the only way to enhance the security of a state or a region? To be sure, the quest for security is often described in terms of defensibility, alliance-building and military capability. According to this perspective the only way to gain security and stability is to join an alliance. The problem with this view is the fundamental question of inclusion and exclusion, i.e. that an alliance is always directed towards some other, and this other is usually perceived as a threat. It may even be so that the creation of alliances in a particular region, to all intents and purposes, decreases the level of security for both the insiders and the outsiders and that new patterns of conflict are created upon old ones. In addition, history is full of examples where the promises of the alliance have not been very credible and the supposed security has in fact turned out to be an in-security.

A security community is not the same thing as an alliance. Whereas a security community is about trust, confidence, transparency and a high degree of non-formal interactions between central actors and institutions among states within an area of geographical proximity, an alliance is a formal coalition of states that coordinates its actions to accomplish some ends. An alliance that is concerned with international security is normally codified and formalised by a written treaty that encompasses a range of issues that is supposed to last across time. Another major distinction is that alliances and security communities have different purposes. Alliances generally have the purpose of augmenting their members’ power relative to other states, and they join the alliance to defend themselves against a common external enemy. In a security community states join in so as to increase common welfare by enhancing interdependence. An alliance also differs from a security community in terms of the promises that are behind its purpose. The security that derives from an alliance is upheld by the promise that an attack on one is an attack on all. It means that every member in the alliance is willing and obligated to use force in order to defend its allies even though its own security is not threatened. In a security community, disputes are settled peaceably and no one will use force against any member of the community.

The final distinction that can be made between an alliance and a security community is the way the institutions are organised in order to provide or facilitate security. In an alliance, the institutional mechanisms are based on an authoritative or hierarchical decision structure. This is usually visible in a unified command and that some parts of the political national decision-making are surrendered to a supranational level. A security community, on the other hand, is based on an egalitarian decision structure. It means that every peaceful procedure of dispute settlement is sought by an enhanced transparency, mainly through such institutional mechanisms as sharing information, and by promoting different confidence-building measures.
2. Patterns of security
(by Kjell-Åke Nordqvists)

2.1 Security regions
There are some regions in the world that have been free from armed conflicts after the Second World War and have developed in a direction towards “security communities”. A pattern of security has emerged. Such security regions are:

North America (Canada, Mexico, USA);
The Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden);
The European Community (France, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg and Italy);
The Australia/Pacific region (Australia, New Zealand, Pacific states).

These regions all have a history of violence. For some of them this goes far back in time. The Nordic countries have not experienced an interstate war since 1809. The last Mexican-American war ended at the beginning of the 20th century. France and Germany, now considering forming a security community were major belligerents on the European continent up to 1945.

The security regions have all established democratic systems since the early part of the century, with the sole exception of Germany with its periods of Nazism and weaker democratic institutions in Mexico. Trade patterns have been an important feature in the creation of patterns of security. The European Community was created expressly with European security as a major objective. More recently, formal trade agreements between the Nordic countries in the framework of EFTA/EU and between Canada, USA and Mexico in NAFTA, have emerged.

The end of the Cold War led to two different global processes: new peace agreements were made in a number of conflict situations (such as Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Cambodia), while in other areas new conflicts emerged (such as in former Yugoslavia, and the Caucasus region). In addition, a number of nations in the Baltic region regained independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Thus the outcome of the end of the Cold War was of both positive and negative in character when it comes to peace and security aspects.

There is a possibility that southern Africa, which is a conflict region today, may develop into a security region. The conflicts following the end of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique seem to have come to an end. The apartheid system in the Republic of South Africa is being abandoned. Democratic institutions are slowly developing with new multiparty elections. Yet the war in Angola has been recorded as being the worst in the world in terms of casualties. Positive developments are also seen in Central America, where important steps towards internal demilitarisation have been taken.

2.2 Suppressed regions
There is also a third category of regions or states, where neither war nor peace has reigned in the post-World War II period. We will not count these as security regions, but as suppressed regions. States that did not allow pluralist views about their own society are included in this category. Examples are a majority of African states from independence up to 1990, the Soviet Union, China/Burma/Mongolia, and military dictatorships in Latin America from the 1950s up to 1992. However, it is important to note that even if many of these suppressed regions has either been broken down or is undergoing a process of liberalisation, there are
still a great number of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes left. These regimes exist not only in remote parts of Africa and Asia, but also in the Baltic region of today.

Thus, we can see three types of regions in the post-World War II period: “security regions”, “conflicting regions”, and “suppressed regions”.

The Baltic region has experiences from two of the three types of regions. This heritage shapes the conceptions of security in different countries of the region, as well as opinions about how security can be achieved in the future.

3. Widening and deepening the concept of security
(by Wallensteen, Nordqvists, Levinsson)

3.1 Traditional and liberal security concepts
The end of the bi-polar world, with the consequent lessening of the nuclear threat, did not only entail a fundamental different world order that brought about new forms of multilateral international relations. It also obliged academics to re-think and re-analyse the concept of security both theoretically and practically. Consequently, several scholars in the academic community have re-considered what is, and what should be, included within the concept of security and whether a broader definition reflects a more accurate interpretation of reality.

By bringing in a broader spectrum of actors and societal structures into the security agenda, the concept of security tends to include more and more issues of an internal or transnational character. Thus, the role of the state has diminished at the expense of a more comprehensive understanding of what is “security”. But even if this wider meaning of security and security policy, including dimensions of economy, societal issues, environmental protection and disarmament better reflects a common understanding of security, it also makes the security debate more difficult.

The decade after the Cold War has therefore been marked by an ongoing debate about how far the traditional political-military concept of security should be extended to include non-military aspects of security as well.

The debate about the concept of security has been divided according to two theoretical perspectives, in which the first one argues that a widening and deepening of the concept reflects the contemporary world better than the old one, and a second one that argues that a broadening of the concept will result in a theoretical anarchy where everything from “thugs”, “drugs” and “bugs” to severe international crisis and armed aggression is included in the concept. To facilitate a better understanding and provide an overview of this debate, it is practical to categorise these perspectives according to their “core arguments”. The first one should therefore be labelled as the “traditional” view since it defines the concept of security in terms of an original state-centric essence. The other perspective is labelled liberal, because of its more open view of the security agenda. However, even if there is agreement among those who see a need for a wider definition of security, they sometimes hold a different view on the need of deepening the concept – i.e., that the concept of security should have another object of reference than the state.

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3.2 The differences
The “traditionalists” hold the view that by leaving the long-established notion of security, made up by power politics and military capabilities, it would mean that everything becomes a matter of security and that the concept loses its theoretical cogency. The definition and understanding of security should therefore be as narrow as possible in order to maintain analytical clarity and theoretical simplicity. The state, according to this perspective, is the most important object of reference since it is the primary actor in the international system and the principal organiser of political, economical and social matters on the national level – such as the welfare of its subjects and the safeguard from any external threats. By expanding the concept of security beyond the limits of the territorial state, it is not possible to identify and study security since it becomes impossible to assess and determine the real threats to one’s security and complicates the ability to make necessary political priorities between ‘security’ and ‘non-security’.

Among the advocates for a wider and deeper understanding of the concept of security, there are those who see a need to broaden the concept to other areas than the military one, but that it is still necessary to refer to the state or to other large scale of political collectives. And there are those who argue for a more extensive interpretation and definition of security that should have a global perspective with a focus on the individual, and not the state, as the primary object of reference. They consider the “traditionalist” view of security as ethno-centric and out of touch with the current process of globalisation that has diminished the role and the significance of the territorial state. However, what unites the advocates for a wider and deeper understanding of security, is the perception that most threats towards security are not solely external and primarily derived from power politics and military capabilities. They firmly believe that a definition of security must appreciate the fact that the majority of contemporary conflicts, and for that reason threats to security, are not external but internal, and comes from political domestic mismanagement, social and economical discrimina-
tion, cultural and ethnical intolerance and environmental catastrophes.

What underlies the conceptual debate of security is the way in which both the traditional and liberal proponents perceive the function and organisation of international politics and relations.

4. Peace and democracy
(by Wallensteen, Nordqvists, Levinsson)

4.1 Peace and democracy
Democracies are about as prone to war as are authoritarian states. But stable democracies are very unlikely to wage war against other stable democracies. The explanation for peace among stable democracies lies primarily in normative restraints on conflict behaviour inherent in the democratic political culture. When two democracies face each other in a dispute, mutual trust is maintained as each side perceives the aversion to violent solutions in the other. This is a brief summary of the results from recent research on how democracy influences the willingness of states to enter into war.

In 1993, Bruce Russett published a book reflecting the state of the art on the research on the democracy-peace nexus. The finding that democracies shun war against each other is very solid, and has been characterised as the closest that empirical research in the area of international relations has come. In fact, apart from a few special cases, one of which will be dealt with below, two democracies have not once fought a full-scale war against each other. Democratic peace is thus important and needs to be fully understood. It is also a crucial element in developing a security community.

Learning about this relationship for the first time, one might be beset by doubts, especially if one is used to viewing the world through the mistrustful, perhaps even cynical, lenses of realpolitik. But the relationship between a high degree of democracy in two states and the absence of war between them has been thoroughly checked for many such influences through the use of advanced statistical methods. It is true that other influences, such as wealth, economic growth and common alliance membership, reduce the likelihood of war between two states. But the democratic peace holds for such controls. Recently a consensus has emerged in the research community that mutual stable democracy is very close to a sufficient condition for peace in the relationship between two states. Democratic peace reigns even when other favourable conditions, such as wealth, are absent. Democratic peace is not limited to, for example, rich industrialised countries or to NATO-members. Furthermore, no other favourable influence can aspire to the status of a sufficient condition for stable peace, since one can find cases of war that clearly refute such assertions. For example, wars between members of the same military alliance system are in fact quite common, as is indicated by wars such as the Hungarian uprising in 1956, when Hungary and the Soviet Union, two members of the Warsaw Pact, fought each other. Another example is the war in 1982 between Great Britain and Argentina, both of which were allied to the United States.

4.2 Democracy as Conflict Resolution
Democracy is rule by the electorate on the basis of the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This basis of peaceful conflict resolution is at the heart of the explanation for democratic peace. In democracies, violence is seen as an illegitimate way of furthering one’s political ambitions. Actors in the democratic political game abstain from violent means, and trust others to do the same. A competitive political system cannot survive in the absence of this mutual trust in peaceful intentions. Thus the peaceful resolution of conflict is a powerful norm that allows a smooth process of achieving a consensus among wills within the democratic state. Other important norms that constitute the democratic political culture are tolerance and a willingness to compromise. The norms of the democratic political culture carry with them normative restraints on the use of violence in settling a conflict.

The very same norm of peaceful resolution of conflicts can be applied to relations between states, provided that mutual trust is present. In the same way as actors within a democracy view each other as trustworthy, in terms of peaceful intentions, a stable democratic political system works as an identification tag, allowing foreign policy decision makers to distinguish between states. Decision makers in democratic states view other democracies as peaceful, just, and deserving of accommodation. Authoritarian states, on the other hand, rely on the suppression of their own people. If these states are in a state of aggression with their own citizens, how can they be trusted not to have aggressive intentions towards other states? Decision makers in democracies see authoritarian states as inherently distrustful, aggressive and unjust.

Another important aspect of democracy is the institutional constraints on the executive’s power to decide in matters of war. It is often a complicated procedure to persuade the people, the legislature, and other independent institutions that war is necessary. Especially ordinary men and women, who, in the event of war, must bear the burden of military service, bombings, shortages and so on, can be expected to dislike costly foreign adventures. If the executives are directly or indirectly accountable to the people, they must take the preferences of the population into consideration if they want to remain in power after the next election.

Due to the high degree of institutional constraint in most democracies, a state in a dispute with another democratic state can count on ample time for conflict resolution processes, such as mediation, and virtually no risk of incurring a surprise attack. However, not all democratic states have highly constrained executives. The presidents of France and Russia, for example, have extensive presidential powers, and could be considered as relatively unconstrained in this
regard. Furthermore, a state may have a constrained executive without being truly democratic. There have been wars between states where both belligerents have been of the latter category.

### 4.3 Explaining The Democratic Peace

Systematic research indicates that normative restraints are more important in explaining the democratic peace, although institutional constraints are important as well. Evidence indicates that normative restraints best explain why democracies rarely engage even in low-level militarised disputes. Institutional constraints, in turn, prevent escalation into war in the rare cases of serious conflict between democracies.

The discussion above, about constrained executives and political culture, indicates that democracy is a complex phenomenon, making it rather difficult to identify democracies. During the Cold War era of great ideological confrontation, the socialist countries of the Soviet bloc used to argue that the so-called people’s democracies, dominated by Communist parties, were more democratic in the true sense of the word. Today, however, the notion of a people’s democracy has been thrown into the dustbin of history. Instead there are some rather non-controversial criteria of democracy within the field of political science that might be used. In modern states, democracy is usually identified with the right of all citizens to vote, freely contested multi-party elections, and an executive either popularly elected, or responsible to an elected legislature. Often, requirements for civil liberties, such as free speech, are also added. One way of gauging the political culture of a state is to measure the amount of internal political violence, such as terrorism and political executions.

When it comes to democratising countries, special problems arise. As was already outlined above, perceptions are key. It is very important to the process how decision makers in one country view the regime in another country, and whether or not a democratising counterpart is judged sincere in its democratic conviction. In order for mutual trust to develop, the democratic regime must be seen as stable, it must have some duration, and it must have proven its democratic conviction. Some additional criteria are sometimes used against this background when it comes to differentiating reasonably stable democracies from weak democracies that might slide back into authoritarian practices. An observer might require that a working democratic system must have been in existence for a certain number of years for a state to be classified as democratic. Another criterion is that the possibility of the leaders of the government being defeated in an election has been proven by a transfer of power following democratic elections. It is clear that several states on the south-eastern shore of the Baltic Sea could be considered in a transitional period in these respects.

### 5. A network of trans-national actors in the Baltic Sea region

#### 5.1 The political scene – co-operation increases

Formation of political co-operative structures, from loose alliances to federal states, is a central part of regional development. In the Baltic Sea region it is clear that a considerable move towards the creation of common institution has marked the will to create political co-operation. Foremost is the Council of Baltic Sea States, the CBSS, created in 1992, including the 9 coastal states, all Nordic states (that is Norway and Iceland are included) and the European Commission. The inland states, e.g. Belarus, do not take part. The CBSS manages e.g. social issues such as crime prevention in the region, and works to combat drug traffic. Presently issues such as common security and economic integration is not treated in the Council and it is thus still a rather weak political body. As from fall of 2000 it includes, however, the work towards sustainable development in the BSR, the so called Baltic 21 with its own secretariat in Stockholm, and has an enlarged mandate and will be charged with organising all intergovernmental co-operation in the region.

At present we see three common intergovernmental secretariats in the region, the Helcom Secretariat in Helsinki, the CBSS with the B21 Secretariat in Stockholm, and the VASAB Secretariat in Gdansk. To this should be added a co-operation on the parliamentarian level, as the Nordic council since the early 1990’s regularly has invited, among others, the three Baltic States and Poland to join their annual meetings.

Co-operations on a lower administrative level have also bloomed in the region after the systems shift. The Union of Baltic Cities, UBC, was formed already in 1991 through an initiative by Kalmar in Sweden. It has developed to support a large number of so called town twinnings, or friendship towns, and has its own extensive program. It counted in year 2001 99 member cities. It may be compared to associations of cities on the national level, and the since long working association of cities on European level as well as in other areas of the world. On the sub-state, that is county, level there is also a Baltic Sea region co-operation, called the BSSSC, Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Council, with its office in Copenhagen. In addition the CPMR, Council of Peripheral Maritime Regions, with its main office in France, has a Baltic Sea Region group, just as there is since a long time similar groups in e.g. the Mediterranean and elsewhere.

In all these developments of new institutions since the systems shift the region referred to is the Baltic Sea basin. The Baltic Sea region is thus developing politically as a region of co-operation. It is true that some parts of the region, such as the arctic area, are less tightly involved in all these new activities, but they are never the less invited. For politi-
causal reasons Belarus has not been invited to join most of these institutions. For geographical reasons Ukraine, Slovakia and Czech republic are also normally not involved although they share small pieces of the drainage basin. However Norway is, although its share is equally small, invited in its capacity of Nordic country.

5.2 Economic co-operation increases

The European post Second World War trade history is well known. In the west trade barriers were systematically removed to create a common free trade zone, which eventually led up to the European Union. Its predecessors, such as the Coal and Steel Union from the 1950’s and its follower the EC, and the EFTA, European Free Trade Association, from the 1970’s were steps on the way to the union. Today, in addition to the 15 states in the European Union, several states have special agreements with the Union to facilitate trade, including e.g. Norway, Switzerland and Greenland.

In the East economic co-operation within the Soviet Union and its allies in Central Europe were even tighter. This was a natural consequence of the planned economic system. The two systems, west and east, were largely isolated from each other. Exceptions included for examples the trade between the USSR and Finland as a consequence of the peace agreement after WWII.

Do we after the systems shift find tendencies to develop trade relationships in the area around the Baltic Sea? Definitely. In the political documents regarding BSR from the EU Commission and the individual countries in the region it is clear that their policy towards the eastern part of the BSR aims at fostering an economic development, new markets and development of economic life. Considerable sums of money are invested for these purposes. From the western perspective the “new countries in transition” are potential future markets for their productions. From the eastern perspective the richer western countries are invited to invest, and foreign investments is seen as a tool for economic development, and the development of a new economic culture and competence.

The results are noticeable. Even if these “new markets” still are small they are rapidly increasing. For instance the three largest trading partners of Estonia are today Finland, Germany and Sweden. The Russian Federation, which of course formally before was the only trading partner, is now further down the list. Increasing number of companies from the western part of the region is establishing themselves in the new countries. In Poland the by far largest trading partner is Germany, with Sweden on a second position with a value of about 35 billion Euros in 2000. Russia is on a third place due to its major role for the gas and oil economy in Poland. Factors that are obstacles in this process are e.g. the still unclear legal situations especially in Russia and the three Baltic States, and weak banking development, factors that are rapidly changing.

The economic development is impressive under the 1990’s. After a painful economic decline in the early years after the systems shift the increase have been rapid and during part of the time world record economic growth rates, up to 11 %, were noted for Estonia and Poland. Several of the countries in the region are candidates for the European Union and the first countries are expected to join probably by 2004.

In addition to formal trade agreements to constitute regions, economists also focus on special so called growth regions. In Western Europe “the yellow banana” – referring to its curved appearance on the map – stretching from London over eastern France and Montpellier to Barcelona in Spain is one such much discussed area. Another one is the Öresund region which includes the cities of Malmö and Helsingborg in Southern Sweden, Helsingör and Copenhagen in Denmark, and which may enlarge to Northern Germany with Hamburg. Is there such a region in the Baltic Sea Region? Apart from the Öresund region the line from St Petersburg, over Helsinki and Tallinn to Stockholm and perhaps down to Öresund, has been pointed out to have the capacity for extraordinary economic co-operation and growth. It is sometimes referred to as the “Blue banana”.

An enthusiastic promotor of economic co-operation and growth in the Baltic Sea region is the former Danish minister of Foreign Affairs, Uffe Ellemann Jensen. He has together with a series of large companies in e.g. the telecom sector and the energy sector arranged conferences to promote economic growth and business development in the region. These efforts are supported by rather large sums from the governments in Sweden, Finland and Denmark to promote business development, in the order of 100 million Euro yearly. They are also systematically supported by chambers of commerce, export councils and EU initiatives. It is clear that the Baltic Sea region is a region of increasing economic co-operation. After the expected expansion of the European Union the formal economic co-operation will include the entire region with the important exceptions of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. However work to develop agreements between the EU and the near regions of NW Russia, especially the Kaliningrad Oblast, is already ongoing, and may make the border less sharp.

5.3 Regional development as spatial planning and sustainability

The development of a region may also be seen in the context of planning, regional and local planning. Comprehensive planning, local plans etc are all part of the larger scheme called spatial planning. This concept, difficult to describe, addresses all kinds of changes in society. Obvious is infrastructure development, building of residential areas, industry etc but also culture, and social development are included. The background to these efforts to develop a holistic developmental concept were the 1980s.

In the mid 1980’s the development of the world as a whole was seen as a series of failures. The developing third world continued to be poor and in conflict despite all developmental aid. The industrialised part of the world had entered a route of immense resource consumption and environmental destruction. Obviously this was, if continued – leading to disaster. The dystopia that was discussed included de-
stroyed environment, emptied natural resources and collapsing societies. The United Nations were at the time calling a commission to deal with the dilemma, the so called World Commission for Environment and Development. In 1987 the Commission published its report that asked for a new kind of development, called sustainable development. It was described as a development that “would allow us to meet our own needs without endangering the possibilities for future generations to meet their needs.”

The concept of sustainable development was both political, technical or scientific and ethical. In fact it was the value dimension of the concept that was stressed most often, not the least by the chairman of the commission, the former Prime Minister of Norway, Ms Gro Harlem Brundtland, when she presented the work. Sustainability, it was stressed, could not rely on environmental concerns alone, the so called ecological dimension of sustainability. It was crucial to take into account also the economic and social dimensions. There were enough examples of how these three dimensions were interconnected to convince that a good development needed to be comprehensive and include all sides of society. Obviously sustainable development requires that the development is peaceful, and, as is often underlined, also co-operative.

On the European Union level co-ordination of spatial planning is a concern since the 1980’s. It is clear that development of infrastructure require co-ordination. Roads and railroads need to relate to each other. But much more is discussed in the context. A first concrete step to co-ordinate planning in Baltic Sea region was the conference organised in the fall of 1992 on the initiative of the Swedish minister of physical planning Ms Gördel Thurdin. Her proposal was to co-ordinate planning for a sustainable future as a co-operative project in the region in parallel with similar efforts within the European Union. The ministers agreed and created VASAB 2010, Visions and Strategies for the Baltic Sea Area, lagging two years behind the European project which was aiming at coordination by the year 2008. The secretariat of VASAB has its site in Gdansk, Poland.

The area that VASAB is looking into is partly larger and partly smaller than the one covered by the Helcom Convention. It extended further north, to Murmansk, and further South, into Germany (See maps). It was the area considered the most relevant for spatial planning.

Also the following meeting on the level of Prime ministers of the region in Visby in May 1996, dealt with the developmental issues. The ministers then agreed on the creation of an Agenda 21 for the BSR, the Baltic 21 to support a sustainable development in the region along the principles laid out in the Agenda 21 Document from the Rio conference. The Baltic 21, it was agreed should address seven dimensions: industry, energy, transport, agriculture, forestry, fishing, and tourism. In addition spatial planning with VASAB as the responsible actor was added. Later on the new sector of education and so called joint actions have been added to the Baltic 21 process, to make it a very comprehensive programme for addressing issues of sustainable development in the region.

It is clear that improvement of the environment is a very basic component in the Baltic 21 activities, as is proper resource management. But in the longer terms social and economic development will have an equal weight in the agenda. The Baltic 21 co-operation has the potential to become one of the most forceful tools in making the Baltic Sea Region a region of co-operation. It should be recognised that in this respect the BSR is rather unique in the world. No other international region has entered on such a process. There are only formal agreements in some regions, e.g. in the western Mediterranean, but nothing as concrete as the Baltic 21.

5.4 The environment of the Baltic Sea region

Environmental protection is an important concern in planning. It is natural that regions defined by geographers are relevant to environmental protection. The common water – a river, a lake or a sea – receives pollutants from the entire drainage basin and if the inhabitants wish to protect their common water they have to co-operate. Even if you yourself do not pollute but your neighbours do, your water will still be polluted, or, as most often stated, pollutants do not recognise state borders. However they are often stopped by borders between drainage basins.

Water is relevant for pollutants in one more way: Pollutants sooner or later end up in water, either since they are emitted with waste water, they are leaking to water from land, or they are washed out from the air with precipitation, rain or snow. The concern for water is thus well motivated. Water, clean water, is very important to people in all kinds of life situations. Interviews even with poor inhabitants tell us that they are willing to pay quite much if they were given better water. It is reflected by the fact that more than 90 % of environmental investments of the newly independent states in the Baltic Sea region after the systems shift was used to improve water, either wastewater treatment or water provision.

The common water, the Baltic Sea, was also a priority when in the first moments of the systems shift in 1990 the Swedish and Polish Prime ministers invited all states around the Baltic Sea to a meeting to support and extend the co-operation in the region. One important result was a rapid improvement and extension of the Baltic Sea Convention. The new Convention, signed in Helsinki in 1992, included a much larger portion of the drainage area of the Baltic Sea. This is a major step forward for the protection of the environment. After all at least 95 % of the pollutants in the Sea comes from land and to improve the situation of the water it is necessary to comes to grips with the root causes of the pollution, that is activities on land. A large program started to remove 132 identified “hot spots”, the worst polluters, in the region. The major banks in the region were engaged to finance the implementation of this programme, which was planned for 20 years, that is up to 2012, and to a cost of some 20 billions of Euro. In 2001 it is fairly well on way and
some 30% of the money has been invested and 20 of the hotspots removed.

The next regional meeting on governmental level was held in the fall of 1992, as mentioned above, with the aim to coordinate physical planning, of course with a large concern for the environment. Also the following meeting now on the level of Prime ministers in Visby in May 1996, dealt with the environmental issue. In the creation of an Agenda 21 for the BSR, the Baltic 21, and the aim of a sustainable development in the region along the principles laid out in the Agenda 21, environmental issues even more important. The B21 process were made the responsibilities of the ministers of environment.

Further initiatives for environmental protection in the Baltic Sea Region include the work within the UBC, Union of Baltic Cities, and educational activities in the Baltic University Programme and the school project called BSP Baltic Sea Project and several projects run by non-governmental organisations co-ordinated by the so called Coalition Clean Baltic, CCB.

5.5 Conclusion

Above are described some of the many co-operative actions now blooming in the Baltic Sea Region. These are clearly relevant to the five main points addressed in the description of a security community in the introduction: Democracy is strengthened, economic co-operation increases, responsiveness increases, common institutions develop, and in addition the political surrounding is mainly supportive. But the enumeration of regional organisations above is only representing a small part of the whole picture. In reality there is a fine woven net of interactions and communications around the Baltic Sea from personal, economic and governmental to co-operation between hospitals, universities, scientists, farmers, authors, artists, schools, and many others.

In the beginning the common water was an easily grasped common concern and symbol. Today co-operation concerns much more than protection of the Baltic Sea. In all its simplicity these thousands of bonds between individuals will make it possible to create the mutual understanding and trust that form the basis of a security community. The Baltic University Programme is contributing not only to the understanding and analysis of this process but also to its formation through reaching thousands of young students that will create the future of the region.

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In: _WeltTrends_ 7: 9-29
Summary

Professor Sergey Kapitza made a presentation on the programme Dialogue Among Civilizations, initially the theme for United Nations Year 2001. A book “Crossing the Divide” presenting “Dialogue Among Civilizations as a soft tool of diplomacy” was launched at the UN in November 2001. Mr Kapitza, representing the “Group of Eminent Persons” that will promote this book and the philosophy of Dialogue Among Civilizations, explained that a dialogue between scientists in United States and Russia on the topic of nuclear weapons presently takes place. We live in a new world, and world wars must be part of history. Physicians are important for crosscultural dialogue, and we need “soft ware diplomacy and new visions on security” stated Mr Kapiza.
The meaning of a dialogue among civilizations

The United Nations General Assembly will meet in plenary meetings at its fifty-sixth session to commemorate the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations 2001 and consider follow-up actions.

What does a dialogue among civilizations mean? One could argue that in the world there are two groups of civilizations – one which perceives diversity as a threat and the other which sees it as an opportunity and an integral component for growth. The Year of Dialogue among Civilizations suggests us to revisit diversity and to seek a new system of relations based on inclusion. Hence, the goal of the Year is to nurture a dialogue that is both preventive of conflicts – when possible – and inclusive in nature.

To do this, Governments, the United Nations system and other relevant international and non-governmental organizations were invited by the United Nations General Assembly in November 1998 to plan and implement cultural, educational and social programmes to promote the concept of the dialogue among civilizations.

In a resolution adopted on 13 November 2000, the General Assembly decided to devote two days of plenary meetings at its fifty-sixth session to commemorate the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations and consider any follow-up measures. The Assembly also encouraged Member States and observers to be represented at the highest possible political level at these meetings.

Following is the list of eminent persons engaged in this project:

Giandomenico Picco (Italy), Personal Representative of Secretary-General Kofi Annan
Dr. A. Kamal Aboulmagd (Egypt)
Professor Lourdes Arizpe (Mexico)
Dr. Hanan Ashrawi (Palestine)
Professor Ruth Cardoso (Brazil)
The Hon. Jacques Delors (France)
Dr. Leslie Gelb (United States of America)
Nadine Gordimer (South Africa)
HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal (Jordan)
Professor Sergey Kapitza (Russia)
Dr. Hayao Kawai (Japan)
Amb. Tommy Koh (Singapore)
Professor Dr. Hans Küng (Switzerland)
Dr. Graça Machel (Mozambique)
Professor Amartya Sen (India)
Dr. Song Jian (China)
Dick Spring, TD (Ireland)
Professor Tu Wei-Ming (China)
The Hon. Richard von Weizsäcker (Germany)
Dr. Javad Zarif (Iran)
This is an executive summary of the publication of the Group of Eminent Persons appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General on the occasion of the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations.

Unity and diversity

Our unity is inscribed in our genes, and our diversity is an inevitability of nature. Undeniably, humans share a universal bond through a remote yet common ancestry. Curiously, scientists have also recently found that the number of human genes is strikingly small. Thus, as external appearances speak of our differences, the degrees of separation between humans are few indeed.

The context of the dialogue: why dialogue and why now?

This may well be the time of globalization, but it is also the time of the rediscovery of individual identity. As the discovery of individuality brings the appreciation of uniqueness, globalization also broadens our awareness of dissimilarities. Consequently, the two opposing trends, globalization and diversity, are two faces of our current reality.

In the past, the perception of diversity as a threat was, and in some cases still is, at the very core of war. Ethnic cleansing, armed conflict or so-called religious clashes were all based on the perception that diversity is a threat. Recalling the atrocities of the previous decade, the answer to the question “Why do we need a dialogue?” seems simple and even obvious. The ancillary question then is: “Why now?”.

A process of globalization without dialogue may increase the probability of hegemony. Diversity without dialogue may engender more exclusiveness. Therefore, a dialogue between those who perceive diversity as a threat and those who see it as a tool of betterment and growth is intrinsically necessary.

The goal of dialogue as a tool to manage diversity: towards a new paradigm of global relations

Can we move from a paradigm of exclusion, one based on the perception of diversity as a threat, to one of inclusion, based on the perception of diversity as an element of betterment and growth?

Some of the seeds of the new paradigm may already be detectable in our world today. They can be listed as follows:

1. Equal footing (fuller participation in decision-making);
2. Reassessment of the concept of enemy (beyond governance through exclusion);
3. Dispersion of power (no longer a monopoly of power);
4. Individual responsibility in international relations;
5. Stakeholding (in the future of the planet);

Dialogue appears to be necessary to foster these six elements and therefore to engender the new paradigm of global relations.

A different way of looking at the United Nations

Dialogue may offer a way to look at the United Nations from a different angle: its universality and its inclusiveness of all diversities may be the fertile forum where a global social contract is successfully consummated. Such a contract would emerge between those who seek “participation” in the decision-making process and those who need “legitimacy” for their actions. Eventually, “participation” and “legitimacy” appear to be the two core elements of that social contract.

Finally, for a successful dialogue we may perhaps need a new “global ethics”.

“A dialogue between those who perceive diversity as a threat and those who see it as a tool of betterment and growth is intrinsically necessary.”
Mr Victor W. Sidel, MD
Distinguished University Professor of Social Medicine
Montefiore Medical Center
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
111 East 210th Street
Bronx, NY 10467
USA
Email: vsidel@igc.org

Summary

For the maintenance of world peace, the nations of the world must move from “nuclear security” to other forms of security. The United Nations Development Program has introduced the term “human security” to characterize constructive responses to the concerns of the world’s people who seek security in their daily lives. As described in World Development Report 1994, “human security includes protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event.

Human security is not primarily concerned with weapons – it is instead a concern with human life and dignity – but it is an essential step in progress toward effective arms control and assurance of peace. IPPNW has called for movement toward human security through measures that include ending the economic exploitation of less-economically-developed nations by industrialized nations and by provision of higher levels of economic development aid from industrialized nations to poorer nations.

Prevention of armed conflict and maintenance of peace – including prevention of war and prevention of what has become known as “terrorism” – has been termed “global security”. Some of the measures suggested to promote such security are known in other contexts as “national security”, “international security”, “homeland security”, “common security” and “comprehensive security”. Global security will require an international order based on equity and justice, on human security, and on the development of a “culture of peace”. It is the international order referred to in Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized”. As IPPNW has noted, this international order will require comprehensive and effective arms control treaties for a wide range of weapons (including small arms and light weapons, landmines, chemical weapons, biological weapons and nuclear weapons) and a markedly strengthened United Nations that includes peacekeeping forces and the power to establish and enforce economic sanctions that protect the human security of people within the affected nations. The affiliates of IPPNW in 60 nations around the world are working through the international relationships of medicine to help establish a culture of peace, to ease tensions, and to reduce arms in all nations.

Ever since its study of the “Medical Consequences of Nuclear War”, published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1962, and its subsequent studies of the economic, environmental and social consequences of the production, testing, stockpiling and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) in the United States and since its inception in 1980 the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) have called for the abolition of nuclear weapons by all nations.

It was for this work that IPPNW was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1985.
An IPPNW Perspective on Nuclear Security, Human Security, and Global Security

The Meaning of “Security”

The word “security” is easier to define by its absence than its presence. The expressions "Freedom from Fear" and "Freedom from Want," two of the Four Freedoms enunciated by Franklin Roosevelt during World War II, expressed the desire for security even though the word “security” was not used. These uses, and the use of the governmental term “Social Security” in the United States, view “security” as positive, something that people desire. “Security” may also at times be viewed as negative, as in the description of the false sense of security given by the three witches to Macbeth in Shakespeare’s play. These false feelings of security, Hecate comments,

... by the strength of their illusion
Shall draw him on to his confusion.
He shall spurn fate, scorn death, and bear
His hopes 'bove wisdom, grace and fear;
And you all know security
Is mortals' chiefest enemy.

“Security” is often used to mean prevention of or protection against violent attacks, as in “national security,” “international security,” or “homeland security.” “Security” in this sense is used by those advocating warning systems, alarms, guard dogs, armed guards and other methods to prevent personal or property intrusion and by those advocating military responses to threats of war and terrorism. This concept of security, as in “nuclear security,” has been interpreted as security of territory from external aggression, protection of national interests in foreign policy or “deterrence” of attacks by weapons of mass destruction. A half-century ago, Albert Einstein warned that “the explosive force of nuclear fission has changed everything except our modes of thinking and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe. We shall require an entirely new pattern of thinking if mankind is to survive.” We today need a profound transition in thinking about security. He today need a profound transition in thinking about security.

Nuclear Security

Since the use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the failure of attempts to internationalize their control in the late 1940s, nuclear weapons have been relied on by the United States, the Soviet Union (and then Russia), and by a few other nations to “deter” attacks by nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. In 1947, two years after the initial detonation of nuclear bombs, the danger that the few then-existing nuclear weapons posed to the world was recognized by the appearance on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of a clock face set at seven minutes to midnight.

The reliance on nuclear weapons for security has led to vast expansion in the number and power of nuclear weapons. It has become increasingly clear that “nuclear security” – particularly the reliance on “deterrence” based on a nation’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons and on the declared policy of a nation to use them under specific conditions – is a dangerous way to attempt to provide assurance against the use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) weapons against that nation. Experience over the past 50 years has demonstrated that nuclear deterrence, even if it may have played a partial role in preventing nuclear attack during that period, has not prevented many different forms of highly-destructive armed conflict. Furthermore, the current size and power of nuclear arsenals in at least eight nations, “vertical” and “horizontal proliferation” of nuclear weapons, and the development of “mininukes,” have increased the risk that nuclear weapons will be purposely or accidentally used.

Ever since its study of the “Medical Consequences of Nuclear War,” published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1962, and its subsequent studies of the economic, environmental and social consequences of the production, testing, stockpiling and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) in the United States and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) have called for the abolition of nuclear weapons by all nations. This work, together with the work of other non-governmental (“civil society”) organizations, apparently had some impact. The minute hand on the clock face on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists had by 1984, shortly after IPPNW was formed, been moved to three minutes to midnight; after the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by the United States and the Soviet Union and other efforts at nuclear arms reduction, the clock was set back in 1991 to seventeen minutes to midnight.

Recent events have indicated a renewal of the danger. The minute hand on the Bulletin clock was in February 2002 moved forward to seven minutes to midnight, the same warning that was given in 1947! The Nuclear Posture Review conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2001 and released to the press in March 2002, which maintains the illusion that “nuclear security” is an effective policy, is the most recent demonstration that false security is “mortals’ chiefest enemy.” An editorial in the New York Times on March 12, 2002, commenting on the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, states: “If another country were planning to develop a new nuclear weapon and contemplating preemptive strikes against a list of non-nuclear powers,
Washington would rightly label that nation a dangerous rogue state.” David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, on March 15 placed on the internet the following analysis of actions by the United States:

The United States has acted in defiance of the international community in flagrantly failing to fulfill its promises and in actions undermining nuclear arms control treaties. The United States, under its current administration, has taken the following actions in direct opposition to the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to by all parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 2000 NPT Review Conference:  – given notice of its intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to unilaterally pursue missile defenses and the weaponization of outer space;  – failed to ratify and promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and made plans to shorten the time needed to resume underground nuclear testing;  – developed contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against at least seven countries, five of which are non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the NPT, in direct contradiction to long-standing security assurances given to countries without nuclear weapons;  – made nuclear war more likely by making plans to use nuclear weapons for specific purposes, such as bunker busting or destroying chemical or biological weapons stockpiles, and by developing smaller, more useable nuclear weapons;  and – made nuclear ”disarmament” easily reversible by implementing policies that place deactivated nuclear warheads in storage rather than destroying them.

Taken together, these policies demonstrate a clear failure to pursue the ”unequivocal undertaking” to achieve nuclear disarmament that was agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Rather, these unilateral policies threaten the entire non-proliferation regime and raise the specter of nuclear war. Time is running out, and what is at stake is the future of humanity and all life. The nations and people of the world are challenged to stop a ”rogue” superpower, uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty and fulfill the goal of nuclear disarmament before disaster strikes.

In short, a transition from “nuclear security” to other forms of security is urgently needed.

**Human Security**

The United Nations Development Program has introduced the term “human security” to characterize constructive responses to the concerns of the world’s people who seek security in their daily lives. As described in World Development Report 1994, “human security includes protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.” The analysis continues:

For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighborhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? Will they become a victim of violence because of their gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for persecution? In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not primarily concerned with weapons – it is instead a concern with human life and dignity – but it is an essential step in progress toward effective arms control and assurance of peace. . . .

A consideration of the basic concept of human security must focus on four of its essential characteristics:

– Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor. There are many threats that are common to all people—such as unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution and human rights violations. Their intensity may differ from one part of the world to another, but all these threats to human security are real and growing.

– The components of human security are interdependent. When the security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, all nations are likely to get involved. Famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic disputes and social disintegration are no longer isolated events, confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe.

– Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. It is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream. For example, the direct and indirect cost of HIV/AIDS (human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome) was roughly $240 billion during the 1980s. Even a few billion dollars invested in primary health care and family planning education could have helped contain the spread of this deadly disease.

– Human security is people-centered. It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace.

IPPNW has since 1980 called for movement toward the elements of human security through measures that include reducing expenditures on arms and using the resources for human health and welfare, ending the economic exploitation of less-economically-developed nations by industrialized nations and providing higher levels of economic development aid by industrialized nations to poorer nations.
IPPNW has used the international language and the international contacts of medicine to advocate a shift from false and dangerous “nuclear security” to “human security” and beyond that to “global security.”

Global Security

Prevention of armed conflict and maintenance of peace – including prevention of war and prevention of what has become known as “terrorism” – has been termed “global security.” (Some of the measures suggested to promote such security are known in other contexts as “national security,” “international security,” “homeland security,” “common security” and “comprehensive security.”) Global security includes use of peaceful methods of resolution of conflicts and prevention of violence and war, of preparation for war and of militarism. Advance to global security will require analysis and action to prevent: direct threats to life and health, particularly to vulnerable populations, that are posed by outbreaks of violence and war and the use of weapons of mass destruction; the economic and social dislocations that are caused by war and violence; the diversion of resources from health and human services that is caused by war, preparation for war, and militarism; and the environmental consequences of war and of preparation for war. Aspects of this analysis and calls for action are presented in War and Public Health, published in 1997 and issued in an updated edition by Oxford University Press and the American Public Health Association in 2000. Furthermore, advance to global security will require analysis and action on: the impact of events that have been termed “terrorism”; on the roots and prevention of terrorism; on “preparedness for terrorism”; and especially on the dysfunctional and dangerous “war on terrorism” that has been almost unilaterally been mounted by the United States against what it terms the “axis of evil.” Aspects of this analysis will be presented in Terrorism and Public Health, scheduled to be published by Oxford University Press later this year.

Global security will require an international order based on equity and justice, on human security, and on the development of a “culture of peace.” It is the international order referred to in Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.” As IPPNW has noted, this international order will require comprehensive and effective arms control treaties for a wide range of weapons (including small arms and light weapons, landmines, chemical weapons, biological weapons and nuclear weapons) and a markedly strengthened United Nations that includes peace-keeping forces and the power to establish and enforce economic sanctions that protect the human security of people within the affected nations.

The affiliates of IPPNW in 60 nations around the world are working, using the international relationships of medicine, to help establish a culture of peace, to ease tensions, and to reduce arms in all nations. IPPNW received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1985 for its work in seeking to lessen miscommunication and to ameliorate the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now, through regional efforts in the nations of the former Soviet Union, in the Middle East, in South Asia and in the Korean Peninsula and through the IPPNW/PSR Office at the New York City United Nations site headed by Merav Datan, IPPNW seeks to expand the work that it and other civil society organizations are doing to provide accurate information, to open communications, to aid in confidence-building, and to promote global security. We will know that nuclear weapons have been abolished and replaced by human security and global security when the clock face disappears from the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

The abolition of nuclear weapons and the shift from nuclear security to human security and global security will be major topics for discussion at the Preparatory Committee meeting for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty scheduled to be held at the United Nations site in New York City on April 8 to 19, 2002. This paper, as well as other papers in this conference, will be presented as contributions to that discussion.
IFMSA – International Federation of Medical Students’ Associations

International Federation of Medical Students’ Associations – IFMSA
Basic facts from the present Secretary General and from the www.ifmsa.org
Email: gs@ifmsa.org

Summary

Some basic facts about IFMSA are given in this report. IFMSA, founded in 1951 and representing medical students in 83 countries (year 2002), has ongoing programmes for the benefit of health, conflict prevention and medical education. IFMSA co-operates with IPPNW since 1983. The IFMSA programme, also including a vast medical students exchange activity, is an example of “new security” made up by common concerns on health programmes, international networking and young health workers’ confidence building.
International Federation of Medical Students’ Associations – IFMSA

The official founding of IFMSA took place in 1951. The association today counts on 91 member organisations, including 8 associate and 24 candidate members, representing 83 countries. The number of annual medical students exchanges are 7000: 6000 within the SCOPE (Standing Committee on Professional Exchange) programme and 1000 within the SCORE (Standing Committee on Research Exchange) programme.

The SCOPE programme with professional exchanges aim to promote understanding and cooperation amongst medical students and all health professionals. The exchange program offers a unique educational and cultural experience in addition to the regular medical knowledge. It also helps to broaden the students’ understanding of medical and social conditions in different countries.

The SCORE programme with research exchanges is a 1-6 month program available all year round in 37 different countries. Research Exchange offers you the opportunity to participate in a focused and personalized research program in order to expand your knowledge in a specific area. You’ll be able to earn credits, to interact with other cultures and form social and professional networks.

Recent conferences have been held around the themes of
- HIV and Cultural Issues (1997)
- Refugees and Reproductive Health (1998)

IFMSA International Projects
- Curriculum Database
- Godfrey Children – “A project of Hope”
- Calcutta Village Project
- ASPIS – Awareness Strategies for Pollution from Industries
- Romania Orphanage Initiative
- Peace Test Project
- Taiwanese Earthquake Exhibition
- International Student Network on Ageing and Health
- Influence of Studying on Students Health
- Zimbabwe Village Concept Project
- Palestinian Refugee Project in Lebanon
- Rwanda VPC

IFMSA National Projects
- Health Education Intervention in Secondary Schools
- Nurturing Music in Prenatal and Perinatal Medicine and Child Development
- The Sign Language Course for Medical students

IFMSA has relations with WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNESCO, IPPNW, WFME, WMA, Global Health Council, UNAIDS.
Russian Medical Students

The View of Russian Medical Students on Global Peace and Nuclear Disarmament

Alexei V. Vigidortchik, Medical Student,
Chairman of the IPPNW – Russia Students Committee
Kirill A. Polyakov, Medical Student,
Vice-Chairman of the IPPNW – Russia Students Committee
c/o Russian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War – RPPNW
Solianka Street 14
109801 Moscow
Russia
Email: scipnnw@online.ru

Summary

Russian Medical Students have since the late 1990’s reactivated their actions in the Russian Affiliate of the IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War). The first results from the “Nuclear Capitals Research Project” are presented at this seminar. The report describes Russian medical students attitudes towards nuclear weapons, weapons that will soon be inherited by this young generation. The results from the first 93 questionnaires filled in by Russian medical students showed that 76 % feel the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation in the world, although 81 % feel that nuclear weapons in their country make them feel secure. 75 % think it is good that Russia spends money on disarmament programmes, and 91 % state that money spent on nuclear arsenals maintenance is necessary. 78 % want more information on nuclear issues from their government.
The View of Russian Medical Students on Global Peace and Nuclear Disarmament

It was about three years ago when three students decided to re-establish students participation in the work of the Russian Affiliate of the "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War" Non-Governmental Organization. Since then a lot of work has been done towards peace promotion among Russian Students.

Today there is a constantly functioning Students Committee with its chairman, vice-chairman and co-ordinators working on different issues, like nuclear disarmament, landmines abolition, small arms, peace education and motivation of medical students to take part in peace movement. Student members of the IPPNW take part in international conferences and research projects, organize lectures and discussions with international representatives of peace movement for other students. Their work is aimed at making other students informed about global security issues, problems of the modern world trends and ways to influence on politics in their own country to build a weapon-free world.

Through these activities IPPNW Students Committee established tight connections with specialists in the field of catastrophe medicine – The Department of Military and Extreme Medicine at the Moscow Sechenov Medical Academy. This Department became a host for some of the meetings organized by the Students Committee and Moscow medical students took part in the Nuclear Capitals Research Project expressing their attitude to nuclear weapons inheritance in Russia.

Members of our Students Committee take part in the annually organized international peace conferences and congresses. We also make presentations of IPPNW work at student scientific conferences that are hosted by Moscow Sechenov Medical Academy – this gives us an opportunity to bring out peace ideas to medical students from major Russian Medical Schools and make them familiar with global disarmament issues.

Students of IPPNW plan to expand their work in the field of medical aspects of weapons of mass use, like landmines and small arms. We now try to make contacts with the Department of Traumatology, Orthopedics and Catastrophe Medicine – as doctors working there are volunteers in Russian National Catastrophe Medicine Center (mobile hospital of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation).

The Nuclear Capitals Project preliminary results of the 93 questionnaires filled in by Russian medical students from 17 to 28 years old (47 female and 46 male) showed that 76 % feel the threat of nuclear proliferation in the world, although 81 % feel that nuclear weapons in their country make them feel secure. 75 % think it is good that Russia spends money on disarmament programs, but 91 % states that money spent on nuclear arsenals maintenance is necessary. Still 78 % of the questioned students would like to get more information on nuclear issues from their government. The final results will be presented at the 15th IPPNW and PSR Congress "Summit for Survival" in Washington, May 2002.
Youth (teenagers) and teachers from 22 schools in 19 countries worldwide have participated in a research structured project “Instead of Nuclear Weapons – What do the Youth Think?”. Four methods were used.

I. Attitudes towards the words “Nuclear Weapons” were investigated.

II. Nine of the 22 schools wrote essays on the topic “Instead of Nuclear Weapons”.

III. Discussions face to face took place at an international Youth and Schools conference in July 2001.

IV. A Model United Nations General Assembly (MUNGA) was performed discussing among other topics the US Nuclear Missile Defence system.

Some of the important results from this project are:

I. The words “Nuclear Weapons” affect youth in a negative way. All the students associations were negative, cruel and gruesome. Such fears among young people must become a serious concern among decisionmakers in our world.

II. When I made this assignment I did expect papers with new brave ideas emerging from young creative minds. This did not happen. Most papers echoed the facts that we already know and few explored the focal point of “Instead of Nuclear Weapons”. Some of the concrete suggestions on how to achieve a safer world are discussed in this paper. One of the expressed opinions was that youth want to belong to the same “WE” and move away from the “WE” versus “THEM”.

III. The most creative discussions arose when students and teachers met face to face on an equal level. Many of the young people recognise the need to change people’s attitudes on a deeper level. Conflict resolution skills, collaboration across cultural boarders and moving away from the competitive society were mentioned as paths that can lead to a new way of human relations and security. Unfortunately this research project showed that there is a lack of basic knowledge about Nuclear Weapons and the destructiveness of these “weapons”. The youth of today do not remember the Cold War and it’s deterrence politics. Views on national defence seem to be very conservative. Youth are stuck in the traditional ways of thinking about security and few new ideas about alternatives to nuclear weapons came up.

IV. MUNGA is a good method for students to deal with and to learn about difficult topics. Through a MUNGA process students learn more about the others, the “strangers”. The students representing USA at the Life-Link conference 2001, had a tough time in defending themselves, but became more confident during the assembly. After a long debate the assembly voted for the resolution to condemn the USA efforts to install the long-range missile defence system and recommended the countries with nuclear weaponry to work towards further reducing their nuclear arsenals.

The Life-Link Friendship-Schools Programme promotes small peace activities and projects at schools worldwide and facilitates contacts between schools that have similar interests; “Act Locally, and Think / Communicate Globally”. To engage in focused projects offers to the youth an opportunity to learn more about Nuclear Weapons, about the Cold War, about Conflict Resolution skills, about Creative Collaboration and to take necessary Care and Responsibility. Youth and teachers at schools worldwide must be given the means, like Information and Communication Technique as well as Partner-Schools programmes, in order to address
global issues. On a large scale youth and schools collaboration across national borders will build confidence and new security, a security that will substitute the deterrence with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Such partner-schools programmes must and can be promoted today, “instead of nuclear weapons”.

**Introduction**

Ten years have passed since the Cold War ended and at the same time the threat of a third World War with Nuclear Weapons also ended to many people, but not to all. The Nuclear Weapons are still there and even if the relations between the United States of America and Russia are now warmer than before there are other threats to global peace. Recently both India and Pakistan declared the possession of Nuclear Weapons and it is still unclear whether Iraq has the potential to create Nuclear Weapons or not. The degradation of the military system in the former Soviet Union states makes one wonder who has got the power over the Nuclear Weapons and if the security systems really are secure. Every now and again there are reports about terrorists trying to purchase parts of Nuclear Weapons and in wars such as in the Balkan states NATO uses depleted uranium war heads, the effects of which are still disputed. The recent world events in the form of terrorist attacks are also painful reminders that there are those who will use any methods to prove a point. The world political situation may be different now than ten years ago, but there are still enough Nuclear Weapons to destroy the earth many times over.

During the eighties there was a general sense of fear for a Nuclear War. School children were told and taught about the effects of “the Bomb” both on humans and on nature. Nuclear winter was a well known term and everyone knew the dates when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed.

Through this project I wanted to find out more about the general feelings among students about nuclear weapons today. I also wanted them to think about alternatives to nuclear weapons: INSTEAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. This report is a combination of several different parts, all dealing with Nuclear Weapons in one way or the other.

**Material and method**

Life-Link Friendship-schools invited some 30 schools to join the project INSTEAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. The schools were chosen because they were also invited to attend the Life-Link youth conference held in Sigtuna, Sweden 8-13 July 2001. The conference would give them an opportunity to meet and discuss the project face to face. Nine schools took on the challenge to write an essay on the topic of Instead of Nuclear Weapons but all the 22 schools that finally attended the conference participated in one or several activities that dealt with the issue (Table 1).

This project includes several different parts/activities. The projects have all been taking place over a six-month period, March to September 2001. I will give a brief introduction to all parts but not all of them will be discussed in detail in this report due to space limit.

**Attitudes**

The first thing the students at each participating school were asked to do was to write down three words that come to mind when they hear the words “nuclear weapon”. They then had a group discussion about the words they had written down and the feelings and emotions felt when

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**Table 1. The list show all the schools who have contributed to this project. The ones with a star after the country name have submitted an essay on the topic Instead of Nuclear Weapons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Escuela de Enseñanza Media 432</td>
<td>ARGENTINA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLA Wiener Neustadt</td>
<td>AUSTRIA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellect School</td>
<td>AZERBAIJAN*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrotechnical School</td>
<td>BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical School of Electronics</td>
<td>BULGARIA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paphos Kkykos Lyceum</td>
<td>CYPRUS*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manor House School</td>
<td>EGYPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustavi Georgian Gymnasium</td>
<td>GEORGIA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anansu Local Authority Basic School</td>
<td>GHANA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Monica School</td>
<td>INDIA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Peace Statue Campaign</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krimulada Secondary School</td>
<td>LATVIA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International College</td>
<td>LEBANON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasile Alecandri School</td>
<td>ROMANIA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyceum # 567, St Petersburg</td>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School # 57, Moscow</td>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Srednja Vzgojiteljska Sola in Gimnazija</td>
<td>SLOVENIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Njudungs gymnasienskola</td>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sigtuna Skolan Humanistiska Läroverket</td>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newport Free Grammar School</td>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandown High School</td>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vladislav Ribnakar School</td>
<td>YUGOSLAVIA</td>
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discussing the issue. At the end of the project the students were again asked to write down three words that come to their mind. I felt it would be interesting to see if the students' attitudes had changed after having participated in this project.

**Writing of essay: Instead of Nuclear Weapons**

This was the most challenging part for the participating schools. They were asked to write a paper, in the form of a scientific paper, on the topic: Instead of Nuclear Weapons. I gave them two questions to help them get started:

1. Which are the main human and psychological obstacles for a nuclear weapons disarmament process?
2. How can a comprehensive and sustainable security be built, to overtake the nuclear weapons deterrence concept?

I wanted the paper to be creative and concrete from the youth’s points of view. After I received the papers I sent all the papers to all the schools for them to read through.

**Discussion about Nuclear Weapons**

Students and teachers attending the Life-Link conference met for almost two hours to discuss different aspects of Nuclear Weapons. Some of the issues we talked about were:

1. What makes Nuclear Weapons so good that countries are unwilling to be without them?
2. There are however, countries that don’t have Nuclear Weapons. Why is that?
3. How can we change this great belief in Nuclear Weapons? What is there instead of Nuclear Weapons?

**Model United Nations General Assembly (MUNGA) – Role Play**

During the Life-Link youth conference a MUNGA role play was conducted. Each school delegation (two students) represented a country, different from their own. They were also given two resolutions that they were to debate. The role play was conducted in the form of a United Nations General Assembly. A chairperson moderated the assembly and the different delegations were given time to debate the resolutions from their countries point of view. After the debate there was a vote for or against the resolution. One resolution was about the long-range missile defence system proposed by the United States of America. The role play takes several days to prepare both for the organisers and participating students but the general feeling after is that it is a worthwhile exercise and an effective teaching tool. Students learn to debate not only their own point of view but others as well. They also learn more about other countries which gives a better understanding of different views.

**Action**

After the discussion about Nuclear Weapons the students felt that there should be a specific Nuclear Weapons action in the Life-Link Manual. I was given the task to formulate one (www.life-link.org).

**Results and discussion**

**Attitudes**

There is no doubt that the words Nuclear Weapons affect youth in a negative way. All of the associations that the students had were negative, cruel and gruesome. Words like blood, death, war, suffering, cancer, World War and destruction were common. It is obvious that people are still afraid of Nuclear Weapons. Even though we don’t talk about Nuclear Weapons as much as we used to there is still a general fear and it has been shown in several studies and proclaimed in several documents that humans can not grow to their full capacity if they live under fear. The fear that these students feel should be a serious concern to the decision makers in our world.

I had hoped that participation in this project should have changed the students’ attitudes from fear to a feeling of empowerment to change the situation but this was not the case. There was still a negative and destructive association to the words even after having participated in this project. Death, danger and power were some of the words that students associated to.

**Writing of essay: Instead of Nuclear Weapons**

When I made this assignment I hoped for papers with new, brave ideas from young creative minds. Although many of the papers had many good points, they were in general an echo of what we already know and I sense that teachers were very much involved in these papers. I was presented with facts. Facts about how many had died in Hiroshima, how many weapons there are, what the effects are etc. In other words I was mostly presented with why we should not have them but very few went further. Few explored INSTEAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. It should be said, however, that all papers had good reasoning about why Nuclear Weapons are so hard to rid. I have compiled some of the concrete suggestions on how to achieve a new safe world.

One very important point given in one of the papers which is the prerequisite for the whole aim of disarming is that whatever we do it is our choice. If we don’t do anything that is a choice but we also have the choice to do something. Things don’t just happen and we all have to make our own choices when it comes to Nuclear Weapons. One way to prevent nuclear disaster is the establishment of international confidence building though cultural exchanges, educational programmes, the expansion of social welfare services and fair trade opportunities. To be an active citizen is also a way to make your voice heard. It was suggested that we should all write to world political and religious leaders to let them know that we have not forgotten this issue and to persuade them to break barriers created between humans because of narrow minds and gaps between beliefs. Several papers mentioned the creation of a world government and moral
code. In general there was a feeling that the people of the world need to unite so that we all become “we” and no one ends up being “them”. This embrace of all people, cultures and religions would not only make Nuclear Weapons superfluous but also solve many other problems stemming from inequalities in the world.

Some of the other very concrete proposals included supporting organisations such as Greenpeace financially, the ban on Nuclear energy, and that Nuclear Weapons should be recycled and energy obtained from them.

Model United Nations General Assembly (MUNGA)-Role Play
The general feeling after having participated in the MUNGA was that it was a good way for students to deal with and learn more about difficult topics. The benefits of MUNGA are many. Students have to learn more about other countries. Their economical situation, political structure, social values and the country’s position on the issues in the resolutions. The original reason behind the friendship-school theme in Life-Link was that one does not go to war with someone one knows. Through MUNGA students learn more about “strangers”. It also gives students practice in the art of debating. If you can understand the opposite stand then you will have a better chance in debating for your own position.

The students representing USA had a tough time in defending themselves but became more confident during the assembly. Even though they did not agree with the position of the USA they became more confident in general to stand up for their rights and beliefs and felt they could use that in other situations in real life.

After a long debate the assembly voted for the resolution to condemn the USA and their efforts to install the long-range missile defence system and recommended to bring together the USA and other countries with Nuclear Weaponry to work towards further reducing their nuclear arsenals. The main reason for this was the fear that a long-range missile defence system would result in a new arms race where Nuclear Weapons would play an important part.

Discussion about Nuclear Weapons
During this two-hour session we started out discussing some of the reasons countries have Nuclear Weapons. The most obvious reason is because of their powerful threat. They also gives countries more power in world politics. After all, it was concluded, Nuclear Weapons are a good defence since very few countries would dare to attack a Nuclear Weapons state. Some felt that countries have them because everyone else does. It feels safer to have them if countries near by do. This creates a sense of balance. Someone raised the point that because people don’t know much about the effects and the amounts of Nuclear Weapons in the world they don’t protest. This makes Nuclear Weapons a defence that a country can invest in without having protesting citizens to worry about. Another “positive” aspect that was mentioned was that they destroy a lot compared to the cost, you get more destruction for the money spent.

The fact is, however, that most countries in the world don’t have Nuclear Weapons so we discussed the reason for this. Three reasons were given. First it is too expensive to produce Nuclear Weapons for most countries. A second reason was that the political situation in a particular country and in it’s neighbours is such that they do not feel threatened and thus don’t feel the need to invest in expensive defence systems. The last reason was that countries that choose not to have these weapons have a respect for life that other countries don’t have. A reference was given to New Zealand, which, together with other Pacific states, has declared their country a Nuclear Free Zone.

We felt we wanted to concentrate on how we can change this great belief in the superiority of Nuclear Weapons and how we can make people change their minds about them. One way is to make politicians realise that other weapons are more effective, said one student. It is too optimistic to think that total weapons disarmament is an alternative in today’s world so it is better to at least get rid of Nuclear Weapons. Politicians also have to realise that by using Nuclear Weapons they don’t just cause harm to the enemy but to all countries including themselves. Another suggestion was that more emphasis needs to be placed on conflict resolution skills and to understand the psychology behind conflicts that could lead to the use of weaponry. Decision makers need to have more faith in solutions through dialogue and discussion. Once again the idea of Nuclear Free Zones was mentioned as a good example where several countries go together and give each other support against Nuclear Weapons. If a whole region can declare themselves a Nuclear Free Zones there would be less space for the few nuclear states and it would give the protesters more weight.

At the moment Nuclear Weapons are a minority decision and this is not democratic on a global scale. The lack of debate was also mentioned as a problem. During the Cold War everyone knew about the disastrous effects of Nuclear Weapons and people were constantly reminded of their existence. Since 1991 Nuclear Weapons are no longer an issue. Many young of today are unaware of the effects of the nuclear bombs or of how many there are in the world.

To change the attitudes of people we have to stop the well-spread myth that it is human nature to be violent. According to the Seville document “Statement on Violence” this myth is simply not true. This belief has, however, become a self-fulfilling prophecy as well as a good excuse to invest in Nuclear Weapons. One of the students was of the opinion that if we manage to disarm all Nuclear Weapons the step towards a total disarmament of all weapons would soon follow. The process of disarming Nuclear Weapons would change peoples attitudes and make them realise that living without weapons of mass destruction isn’t such a bad idea.

Finally the problem of disarming became technical. How do you disarm safely and what do you do with the uranium and other radioactive material? We decided that this matter must
be solved and put our hope to scientist and their research and innovations. We concluded that the disarmament of Nuclear Weapons is not really an issue about cost or technology; it is an issue of political will and it is up to us all as citizens of the world to create that political will!

**Steps towards a Nuclear free world**

The discussion lead to some concrete suggestions on how to start changing the world.

The most important thing seemed to be to re-educate people about the dangers. Many of the children today don’t know about Nuclear Weapons since they were too young during the cold war. It was pointed out that this is not just an issue about teaching children about how bad Nuclear Weapons are. It is also about teaching them to trust in the “peace spirit” of humans, to understand that we are not war loving creatures and that all humans want peace. We also need to challenge the idea of aggression. In the society today very many things are about competition. In sports, in schools, at work and in relationships there is often a strong sense of competition. This triggers aggression and is, in the large scale, the reason for countries to invest in Nuclear Weapons. To battle this, students need to learn conflict resolution skills. Also schools should promote activities where students benefit from collaboration and team effort. There are several good conflict resolution programmes that can be implemented in schools. Doing actions like MUNGA or proposed in the Life-Link Manual is also a step toward educating students about peace.

The need to know where the Nuclear Weapons are and who controls them is also one of the first steps in their eradication. There is a need to set up an international monitoring organisation with the responsibility to disarm and safeguard disposed uranium. This is of course a difficult task but if Nuclear Weapons states start discussing further disarmament now maybe an international monitoring organisation will be a reality later.

As the attitudes of the politicians need to change and the will to disarm needs to be evoked the students suggested an action where politicians are invited to participate in a Model United Nations General Assembly role play (MUNGA) together with students. One youth together with one politician should work together to represent a country and to debate resolutions about the subject of Nuclear Weapons. If politicians experience this they might become more open for dialogue with each other and the youth. To have fun together and play is a good icebreaker and we were all convinced that adults today don’t play enough. A role play like the MUNGA also helps in the understanding of other positions and when you learn more about the other side you might suddenly see new solutions because you understand the other position better.

All these thoughts were thought before 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. It is possible that now, with a war in Afghanistan, the essays and discussions would have been different. The unsafety this world sees at the moment is in many ways a result of the big divide of humanity, them and us. The students that took part in this project come from different parts of the world and as mentioned earlier many of them mentioned unity as one of the solutions to create human security. All of them want to be part of the same “us”.

One of the most important lessons coming from this project is the realisation that there is a lack of knowledge. The students who were involved in writing the essays did wonderful jobs of finding out facts but in the general discussion that we had many pointed out the fact that they are not taught about Nuclear Weapons at schools. I don’t believe in scare tactics and propaganda but unless the young of today know and understand what Nuclear Weapons can do, how can they make educated decisions about them? How can they make the choice to protest? I think this is where the responsibility of the people who clearly remember the sentiments of the cold war have to step in and do their job.

I find it worrying that when asked to write about “Instead of Nuclear Weapons”, students are unable to see beyond the “same old story”. All great inventions are someone’s crazy idea, someone that has dared think the unthinkable. We need creative solutions to today’s problems, we need to think big and not be so scared of what others will think. An idea may sounds crazy today but can eventually develop into an idea that is the perfect solution. I can not say if, in this case, it is the students who have limited their thoughts or teachers who have steered the students in their work but the creative and free mind is something we all need to encourage.

All in all I would, however, like to stress the fact that there were many good ideas generated in the process of this project. These were particularly created in the discussion where students and teachers met face to face, stressing the importance of human interaction. What I found exciting was that many of the solutions went deeper into the human mind and many of the students could see that there are many aspects of creating a Nuclear Weapons free world. Conflict resolutions skills, crossing cultural barriers, and trying to get away from the traditional competitive society were some of the very basic things that could solve not just the question of Nuclear Weapons but also many of the inequalities and environmental issues.

Finally I want to express my gratitude to the organisation Swedish Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, who have invited Life-Link Friendship-Schools to participate in this important discussion. Often when important topics are discussed the youth are not invited to participate even though they are the ones who will have to live with the consequences of whatever decisions are made. In this report I think it is clear that youth have thoughts worth consolidating and ideas that should be considered.

Lastly I also want to thank all the students and teachers who have devoted time and effort to this project.
INVITATION TO MORE THAN 25 PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTES AND ABOUT 10 NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS WORLD-WIDE, AS WELL AS THE MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN SEVEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES, WITH THE AIM TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENT STUDIES AND REPORTS ON THE THEME

INSTEAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Sir,

The Swedish Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (Svenska Läkare Mot Kärnvapen – SLMK) in cooperation with the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), has the honour to invite you and your Institute / Ministry / Organisation (below mentioned “institute”) to perform a study and then to report on the topic Instead of Nuclear Weapons.

Instructions and Information
Application form
If you wish to perform a study and to submit a research report, please fill in and return the enclosed application form if possible before end of February 2001.

Selection of accepted institutes
SLMK in consultation with our international federation IPPNW will decide which organisations will finally be accepted. All invited institutes and organisations returning applications with high quality and ethical working methods can be accepted.

Independent research procedure
In order to achieve as wide and unbiased research procedures and reports as possible, we will ask each participating institute to perform its research without contacting the other participants. The list of participating institutes will not be official until late 2001. The procedure that we propose is close to a "brainstorming" session.

"Instead of Nuclear Weapons"
The theme Instead of Nuclear Weapons will not be specified more in detail!
We submit this theme to you, and it is up to you and your institute / ministry / organisation to make associations and visions and to structure a study.
Still there are two dimensions of the Nuclear Weapons problem that we are eager to learn more about from this undertaking:
1. Which are the main human and psychological obstacles for a Nuclear Weapons disarmament process?
2. How could a comprehensive and sustainable security be built, to overtake the Nuclear Weapons deterrence concept?
This invitation intends to attract openminded attitudes, newthinking and research methods that will benefit the process of building security in a Nuclear Weapons free future.
The research report, format and size
We recommend a report format with Methods, Results and Discussion.
Maximum 5 pages size A4, written in 10 points.
We also want a Summary and Conclusions: maximum 1 page, size A4, 10 points.
Some pictures and photos are welcome, e.g. a photo of your institute and staff including the main author/s.

Copyright
No copyright should be linked to these reports. For each report and for future publications, reference should be made to IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, www.ippnw.org) and SLMK (Swedish Physicians Against Nuclear Weapons, www.slmk.org).

Financial support
SLMK/IPPNW will discuss individually with each institute, a financial support within the range of 500 – 3000 US $, covering some of the research expenditures. We encourage necessary fundraising to be undertaken by each participating institute.

Future continuation
We foresee that some of the final reports (sent to us latest October 2001) will include thoughts, results and proposals that could lead to a second phase of this initiative.
We will then discuss with the authors and their institutes how to proceed in the direction of deeper analyses and in formulating more concrete steps towards international and global security “instead of nuclear weapons”.

Presentation and use of the final research reports
• Summaries will be introduced at the Internet homepages for SLMK www.slmk.org and IPPNW www.ippnw.org
• We intend to edit and publish a book (if financial support is found) that will be made available to political and security decision makers worldwide.
• The final reports will be used at future conferences and seminars, like the ongoing programme “IPPNW Annual Dialogues and Seminars with Decisionmakers at the Capitals of the Nuclear Weapons States”.
• We plan to have a special workshop on the theme “Instead of Nuclear Weapons” at the forthcoming IPPNW world conference in May 2002, taking place in Washington, DC United States. Some of the participating researchers and authors will be invited to present and discuss their reports at this conference.

Timetable Drafted
2001 January Invitation sent out to more than 25 institutes
February Applications to be returned to SLMK
March Decisionmaking by SLMK/IPPNW on which institutes to be accepted and included
April – September A six months period for research and reporting
October Month for submitting the reports to SLMK
November – December Editing and publishing period by SLMK/IPPNW
2002 January – February The final edited reports ready for outreach worldwide
May IPPNW world conference Washington, United States
June – A possible continuation of the process.

Yours sincerely

Gunnar Westberg MD
Chairperson SLMK Sweden

Hans Levander MD
SLMK Uppsala Sweden