Commentary:
Facing Up to Genocide: The Obligation to Intervene Holly
Burkhalter The Canadian commander of United Nations peacekeeping forces
in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, General Romeo Dallaire, has stated that he
would have been able to suppress the butchery if he had been given 5,000 troops
to do the job. Dallaire’s tantalizing “what if” shames the West
to this day: Stopping the perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda, who were lightly
armed, poorly trained, and much more expert at killing unarmed men, women, and
children than in confronting professional soldiers in battle, could have been
accomplished relatively easily had the US and its allies responded affirmatively
to General Dallaire’s requests for modest reinforcements. Sadly, the
one place in the world where humanitarian intervention was most needed to save
a people from genocide was also the place where it might have been the most expeditiously
accomplished and where, in the end, nothing was done. Those in the human
rights movement who had appealed for intervention to save Rwandans vowed not to
let our government sit idly by the next time mass ethnic killing began. That “next
time” for Physicians for Human
Rights (PHR) was Kosovo. Although the number killed in Kosovo pales in comparison
to Rwanda, the two tragedies were similar in that the international community
had months of early warning signs of a carefully planned campaign to destroy an
ethnic group. In Kosovo, that destruction took the form of “demonstration”
killings of thousands of Kosovar Albanians to create terror and flight; destruction
of Kosovar Albanian civil society through arrests or targeted executions of Albanian
doctors, political figures, journalists, and other civil society leaders; widespread
destruction of homes; and the eventual expulsion of more than 800,000 Albanians
from their country. An Appeal for Peacemakers PHR,
which was barred from investigating human rights violations in Kosovo by President
Milosevic, nonetheless collected significant data on abuses by interviewing Kosovar
refugees in Albania in June 1998, several months after Serbian forces began a
brutal counterinsurgency campaign against the nascent Kosovo Liberation Army uprising
in the province. Both because the early days of the Kosovo conflict bore all the
ugly hallmarks of Milosevic’s four-year war in Bosnia and because of the
world’s inaction in Rwanda, PHR issued an early appeal for an international
“peace-making” force to be deployed in Kosovo with a mandate to protect
the Albanian population from depredations by Serbian forces. But a ground
force to protect Kosovar Albanians was not considered at the time, and the US
and Europe instead engaged for nearly a year in diplomatic efforts to persuade
President Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo. Gross abuses against Kosovar
Albanians accelerated throughout the period, culminating in the massacre of 45
civilians at Racak in January. The massacre galvanized the US, Russia, and the
European Union to convene in Rambouillet, France to develop a peace agreement
which was presented to President Milosevic as an ultimatum. When he refused to
accept its terms (which included the deployment of NATO troops within Kosovo and
limited autonomy for Kosovar Albanians) the 19 NATO governments responded with
a campaign of targeted aerial bombardment beginning on March 24. The early
weeks of bombing did not persuade President Milosevic to pull back his forces
from Kosovo, as NATO had hoped. On the contrary, he accelerated enormously his
well-orchestrated military campaign to forcibly remove a considerable portion
of the Albanian population from their homes and homeland. Hundreds of thousands
were forcibly deported and thousands killed. NATO gradually expanded its targets,
including many sites in and around Belgrade and targeted facilities used by civilians,
such as the electrical grid. After 11 weeks of bombing, during which time an estimated
2,000 Serbian civilians were killed and 5,000 injured, Milosevic acceded to the
West’s demands, withdrew his forces from Kosovo, and a UN force, with NATO
at its core, occupied Kosovo. By July, 1999 some 650,000 of the estimated 800,000
Kosovar Albanians who had fled over the past year had returned. A
Successful But Troubling Intervention The intervention in Kosovo was a
welcome indication that the world had learned something from its shameful inaction
in Rwanda and this time was ready to do what was necessary, including deploy military
force, for the explicit purpose of stopping a sovereign from plundering and destroying
his own people within his own country. Moreover, the intervention can be, in many
ways, considered a success. The bombing campaign achieved in a matter of a few
months what a year of intensive diplomacy and two Security Council resolutions
failed to produce: the near-complete withdrawal of Serbian forces from the province
and thereafter the swift return of a large number of the Kosovar Albanians.
Notwithstanding the fact that NATO achieved those desirable outcomes, however,
the intervention was deeply troubling from a human rights perspective. Most significantly,
the refusal of the US and Europe to deploy troops on the ground to protect civilians
early in the conflict permitted Milosevic to bulk up Serbian forces in Kosovo
massively in the year since he began his brutal counterinsurgency. Thus by March
1999, when fruitless diplomacy was finally abandoned, the military situation was
very different from Rwanda where, if Commander Dallaire is correct, humanitarian
objectives could have been accomplished at little cost. In Kosovo, NATO forces
could have expected to face at least some combat and casualties. Moreover, NATO’s
long delay in acting forcibly against Milosevic (though it had issued threats
for a year) meant that his troops had free rein to kill thousands of civilians
in the interim. A second and related concern is that NATO regularly and
publicly promised that an invasion force was not under consideration and when
force was ultimately--and belatedly--employed against Milosevic, it was exclusively
in the form of aerial bombardment. Moreover, because of the assumption that neither
Americans nor Europeans would tolerate casualties in the course of a humanitarian
intervention, the rules of engagement for NATO pilots was to fly above 15,000
feet and thus out of range of Serbian anti-aircraft fire. That strategy was successful
in that the alliance suffered not one single combat casualty, but it was costly
in other terms. NATO pilots inevitably hit civilian targets because they were
not able to distinguish them from military targets at the height and speed at
which they were flying. Rules of engagement which enhance the risk to civilians
in order to minimize combat casualties are a violation of international humanitarian
law. Moreover, the refusal to use low-flying helicopters, which might have
permitted allied pilots to lock on tanks and soldiers, meant that Milosevic’s
forces were able to operate relatively unscathed in Kosovo throughout most of
the conflict. Deprived of visible military targets that it could hit three miles
up, NATO expanded considerably its bombing of civilian (or, more accurately, dual-use)
targets, such as the electrical grid. Many experts believe that bombing the civilian
infrastructure of Serbia was key to Milosevic’s finally coming to terms,
but such a tactic is not compatible with humanitarian law, however useful it might
have been in achieving a humanitarian objective. Deploying
Force When No Good Options Remain Human rights groups were right to criticize
the allies’ tactics and to have demanded compliance with international law
standards in the course of the Kosovo intervention. But those who favored intervention
to stop Milosevic’s crimes in Kosovo are obliged to acknowledge that by March
24, when the bombing campaign began, all the options in Kosovo were bad ones.
Given the political constraints under which NATO operated (i.e., the “zero
casualty” policy and the lack of support for a ground force among the allies,
which had the practical effect of denying a staging ground for such a force),
the high-altitude bombing campaign may well have been the only option at hand.
Though flawed, this was greatly preferable from a human rights perspective than
the alternative, which was a Serbian reign of terror in Kosovo indefinitely.
Fortunately, the world did not permit in Kosovo what it watched and tolerated
in Rwanda. Yet the massive use of force against Milosevic was deployed so belatedly
that thousands of Kosovar Albanians were killed in the interim. And it was deployed
so cautiously, in terms of NATO combat casualties, that thousands of Serbian civilians
died unnecessarily. Delaying military action until 40,000 strong perpetrators
were thoroughly dug in significantly limited the options for constraining their
abuses because of NATO’s unwillingness to engage in what would have likely
been a bloody ground war. Perhaps deploying force much earlier might have accomplished
the expulsion of Serbian forces when their numbers were greatly smaller. Since
that would have required a more modest military undertaking, the goal might have
been achieved with less destruction in Serbia, with far fewer Serbian casualties,
and without the loss of some of the 10,000 Albanians who died at the hands of
the Serbian police and soldiers during their year of terror in Kosovo.
On the other hand, there might have been significant civilian casualties if a
ground force had invaded Kosovo and engaged with Serbian forces there at any point
in the conflict. Milosevic’s forces might have continued to murder and to
deport civilians, and might have accelerated the destruction of Kosovar Albanian
villages on his orders, just as they did throughout the bombing campaign. Moreover,
the military task for NATO forces of expelling his troops from Kosovo would have
been greatly complicated by the need to protect and defend civilians at the same
time. There is no humanitarian intervention strategy that can be developed
for the next conflict that is based on the last one, because each such occasion
is unique. But scrupulous adherence to humanitarian law is required in any military
operation, even if it places soldiers at higher risk. One hopes that our government
does not judge that risk to be so high that it refuses to intervene to stop the
next Kosovo or Rwanda.
HB is Advocacy
Director of Physicians for Human Rights. Address correspondence to Holly Burkhalter,
Physicians for Human Rights,
110 Maryland Ave. NE, Washington, DC 20002 USA.; e-mail: hollyb@phrusa.org
© Copyright 1999 Medicine & Global Survival
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
Resolution 260(III)A of the UN General Assembly, December 9, 1948 [Editor’s
note: The following are the first nine articles of the Convention. Articles 10-19
deal with administrative issues of accession and ratification by the signatories
and have not been included for reasons of space.]
The Contracting Parties,
° Having considered the declaration made by
the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December
1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit
and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world;
°
Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses
on humanity; and
° Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind
from such an odious scourge, international cooperation is required;
Hereby agree as hereinafter provided. Article 1.
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace
or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to
prevent and to punish. Article 2. In the
present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.
Article 3. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit
genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide.
Article 4. Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials or private individuals. Article
5. The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions
of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for
persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.
Article 6. Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in Article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in
the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal
as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall
have accepted its jurisdiction. Article 7.
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall not be considered as
political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge
themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and
treaties in force. Article 8. Any Contracting
Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action
under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention
and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article
3. Article 9. Disputes between the Contracting
Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide
or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3, shall be submitted to the International
Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.
[UNTS No. 1021, vol. 78 (1951), p. 277]
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