16th World Congress
Peace Through Health
Confronting global security threats
Henrik Salander
Secretary-General, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
[The following talk was given on behalf of Mr. Salander by IPPNW Co-President Gunnar Westberg]
At the heart of the global competition for security lie nuclear weapons. This is not obvious on a daily basis, but it is an underlying reality. Nuclear weapons are the only true weapons of mass destruction. They represent the only large-scale mass violence source there is. This is accentuated by the fact that this is also a monopoly on large-scale violence, restricted to only eight states, roughly one state in 25 througout the world. As long as those eight states regard their own weapons as security enhancers, while denying them to all others, the incentive to aquire both nuclear weapons and other WMD will always be there. Therefore, in a certain sense, global security starts and ends with nuclear weapons.
That said, it is at the same time clear that the present risks for use of nuclear weapons are rather confined—although still great. The risks for use by states is concentrated to three main parts of the world, the Korean peninsula, the Middle East and South Asia. But in addition to this, there is an all the more ominous and geographically unconfined possibility, namely use anywhere in the world by terrorists.
Despite this situation, developments on the state side have, incredibly, been largely negative during the last seven to eight years, after the indefinite extension of the NPT and the successful negotiation of the CTBT. Threats against the nuclear non-proliferation regime come from all directions.
The breakout efforts were more serious than we had anticipated. DPRK, Libya, Iran and earlier Iraq have made deliberate and sustained efforts. The so-called nuclear Wal-Mart was worse than anticipated. Reductions in large arsenals continue, but weapons are stored, not verifiably destroyed. Budgeting for plans to develop new and usable nuclear weapons demonstrate that nuclear weapons are perceived to have value. Seen over the last decade, the NPT has been slowly undermined when, first, the treaty was extended indefinitely coupled with undertakings to put in place a CTBT and an FMCT, and then none of these undertakings have been fulfilled.
Let us not forget that simultaneously, the norm against use of nuclear weapons continues to be strong. But it is not completely immune to weakening – that is exactly why it is worrying that nuclear weapons are still thought of as possible to use; even in a preemptive situation. This signals more reliance, instead of less, on nuclear weapons and thereby goes against one of the agreements (the ”diminishing role”) among the thirteen steps from the NPT 2000 review.
Trends like these need to be slowly and carefully reversed, while governments at the same time avoid irreversible steps that undermines the regime. If the moratorium on nuclear tests holds over the next few years, and if intensified diplomacy can work out tenable agreements with not only Iran, which may be within reach, but also North Korea, which will be more difficult, then I believe the norms against nuclear weapons will still be quite strong and can be further strengthened over time.
For that, it is imperative to diminish the incentives for aquiring nuclear weapons. That in turn means that we must get much closer to solving the perennial regional problems in the Middle East, the Korean peninsula and South Asia. It also means that long-term disarmament is indispensible.
In almost all these areas and issues, the United States is the leading power. Therefore, all in all, the single most important development at the present time for the strengthening of the regime against nuclear weapons would be if the United States, as a democratic, responsible, dominant power would take the lead, and lead by example.
So much for the overall picture. Now a few words on the task at hand in more practical terms. A strong message, as the one IPPNW puts forward, still needs to be underpinned by good analysis and by answers to difficult questions. It is one thing to get a forceful argument across to public opinion – it is another to take on all the difficult follow-up issues that present themselves as soon as one looks at the continuing influence of existing and would-be nuclear arsenals. Let me give a few examples of questions that need to be answered in a continuing discussion between decision-makers, NGO's, diplomats and analysts:
- Are there incentives forceful enough to have countries abandon their indigenous nuclear programs? Or, in other words, are proposals to internationalize the nuclear fuel cycle and close the ”Article IV loophole” realistic?
- In the area of the IAEA safeguards and additional protocol—how much improvement is needed, and how much is realistic?
- As regards control of nuclear material: are existing plans, conventions and initiatives (Trilateral, G-8, Nunn-Lugar, global HEU clean-up and others) sufficient if implemented, or are new approaches needed?
- How can India, Israel, and Pakistan be brought closer to the NPT?
- How can practical chances for the CTBT and the FMCT to materialize be kept alive and strengthened in the short term?
- How can tactical nuclear weapons be brought into the negotiating realm?
- Within the NPT process, how to tackle the discrepancy between the steps agreed by parties in 2000 and states’ actions or non-action thereafter?
These and many other issues must be penetrated. A consensus needs to be developed slowly but surely on many of them, before nuclear weapons can be put out of use forever.
The WMDC—the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission under the chairmanship of Hans Blix—will try to contribute to such a consensus. The WMDC mandate is broader than that – it includes not only nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons and the means of delivering them, such as missiles, but also terrorism-related issues in connection with WMD. But nuclear weapons will definitely figure very prominently when the Commission presents its final report in the beginning of 2006.
The Commission has so far devoted one full three-day session to the discussion of nuclear weapons and will continue with that in their next session in November. A number of studies have been commissioned in the nuclear field to serve as a background to Commissioners. Many of those have been posted, or will soon be, on the WMDC website (www.wmdcommission.org). The Commission invites all interested NGOs to submit contributions to the Commission in writing. With IPPNW, co-arrangements in the form of workshops and seminars are in preparation. The first seven-eight months of the Commission’s existence have been devoted to the start-up of substantive work, whereas the outreach to NGOs and academia will be more prominent from now on.
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is an area where governments feel very clearly the demands that people around the world put to them and the strong engagement that people invest. At the same time, it is sometimes said that disarmament has gotten off the agenda in recent years. This may be true in the sense that the big fights and debates, especially about nuclear weapons during the Cold War, are over. But I believe that the nuclear issues are on their way back, in spite of the fact that today’s nuclear issues are more difficult to grasp and analyse than doomsday deterrence was.
From personal experience, not least when I was chairing the NPT PrepCom process, I know very well how important and how productive it is for governments to interact with civil society on disarmament and non-proliferation issues. Two other examples close to me are the New Agenda Coalition and the ongoing work in Geneva on biological weapons.
IPPNW has great possibilities to be very influential in direct dialogue with responsible decision-makers all over the world, and has already made effective use of those possibilities. Self-evidently, one can always do more, and perhaps more effectively too. A continuing discussion of that is necessary, as in all continously changing processes. However, the question of focus is essential. Not having been active in IPPNW myself, but observing from outside for a long time, I feel quite strongly that the focus on nuclear weapons and nuclear war is one of IPPNW's most valuable assets. It gives enormous strength and credibility to IPPNW's efforts.
I therefore hope that IPPNW will continue to concentrate on nuclear weapons and nuclear war. Branching out into many wider peace and conflict issues would in my mind risk jeopardizing this almost unique focus and expertise. It is of course not for me to lecture anybody about this—please receive this merely as an observation from an outside viewpoint that might be of some use in your discussions.
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